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Summary
Risk reduction processes in healthcare remain at the core of 21
st
century health care provision,
though the continuing scale of the problem gives little room for complacency. While other
areas of complex technological activity such as air transportation can demonstrate
improvements in safety performance, comparable progress eludes modern healthcare. A
review of risk reduction techniques within healthcare identifies that there exists a lack of tools
involving simulation of risk. It has been necessary in the context of the research to establish
many wholly original information structures representing healthcare activity and associated risk
related interactions
This Thesis describes a new risk simulation environment for the Critical Care Unit of University
Hospital, Coventry which is a 1200 bed modern acute hospital which fully opened in 2006.
Available sets of patient admission/discharge information and records of patient treatment
records used for cost charging together with extensive direct observation of clinical activity are
used to create simulated patient episodes within the Critical Care environment. Specific patient
interventions are sub divided into a series of up to 7 sub tasks which are associated with sub
competencies and a linked adverse effect. Such sub competencies can be coded to reflect
three levels of task complexity. Separate codes can be allocated to identify sub competencies
which are supervised and sub competencies for which additional competency can be requested
from other team members.
A fuzzy logic framework has been adopted to combine empirically derived mathematical
functions which for a specific sub task, translate values of individual effectiveness, distraction,
competency mismatch of individual/team together with the level of supervision to a specific risk
value for each adverse effect. This fuzzy logic framework, referenced as the ‘risk engine’ has
specific responses for levels of sub task complexity and can be modified by indicators relating to
sub task supervision and competency sharing. In addition, each sub task/competency is
associated with an adverse effect whose probability of occurrence can be reduced through
identified safe working practices which are referenced as ‘preventive measures’. Individual
effectiveness is identified as being influenced by cirdadian rhythm, physical effort,
emotional/stress effort, intellectual effort, sleep deficit and long term factors. Organisational
factors influencing individual effectiveness are identified as patient admission and shift
handover.
The risk simulation process is implemented within a 10 bed Critical Care Unit which utilises a
specifically designed nurse rostering process for 12 hour shift periods. Sub grades of nurse
skills (1 to 15) are used to structure skill mix within each rostered group and which are based on
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representative nurse grades (band 5, 6 and 7). Available competencies of nursing staff for a
specific sub task are allocated on the basis of sub grade value and the parameter of individual
competency mismatch is derived from values of required competency and available
competency for each sub task. The team competency mismatch for a specific sub task linked
to a specific individual is derived from the maximum available competency within the active
nursing team. Nursing staff are allocated to patients on the basis of clinical need at the start of
each shift.
A novel feature of the model identifies modes of interaction between nursing individuals on a
‘bed to bed’ basis as relating to parameters of distraction, supervision and competency sharing
and which are related to the physical layout of the active clinical area. A fuzzy logic sub system
for determining values of such interaction coefficients and which uses the same design
methodology as the ‘risk engine’ is described.
The risk simulation model is operated for a sequence of 9 months of simulated clinical activity
and the outcome expressed in a number of ways including the relative occurrence of types of
adverse effects based on occurrences per patient day stay. Comparison is made with the level
of occurrence of locally reported clinical adverse events within the Critical Care Unit at
University Hospital Coventry using the coding system of types of adverse effects of the
simulation system. The lack of agreement between the two sets of data is attributed to
mismatch between the basic information content of the two data sets, under reporting of the
local clinical adverse incident reporting system (as confirmed with comparison with results of
relevant clinical studies) and the need of further refinement in the complex process of simulation
of clinical interventions. Modes of reporting of simulated risk activity are also described in the
context of a normalised patient day where the resulting risk profile is related to the patterns of
clinical activity simulated within the model. This replicates some of the expected characteristics
of simulated data such as circadian factors and of the morning shift changeover but may
indicate the need for further refinement in the process of simulation of clinical interventions.
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Glossary A: Terms Related to Risk and Clinical Risk
Adverse effect An outcome related to a sub task which increases or has the potential to
increase the risk of the patient and which is defined within the risk
simulation system described in this Thesis
Adverse event A generic description of an incident in which has resulted in harm to a
person
Clinical adverse event An occurrence which is registered using the formal system of
identification of unsafe clinical practice within UHCW NHS Trust and is
part of a national system for reporting of such events.




Systematic identification and reduction/elimination of clinical risk
Harm Injury (physical or psychological) disease or death
Near miss A clinical or non-clinical incident where no immediate harm, loss or
damage was suffered but if not investigated could be repeated
Risk ‘A combination of the likelihood of an occurrence of a hazardous event
or exposure(s) and the severity of injury or ill health that can be caused
by the event or exposure(s)’ (British Standards Institution 2007c)
Sentinel event An occurrence that harmed or could have harmed a patient as
referenced within the SEE study (Valentin et al. 2006).
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Glossary B: Acronyms
ABGS Arterial blood gas sample
A&E Accident and Emergency
APACHE Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation
APS Acute physiology score
C2ITU Intensive care unit within Walsgrave Hospital (functioning till July 2006)
C5ITU Intensive care unit within Walsgrave Hospital (functioning till July 2006)
CAE Clinical Adverse Event
CCU Critical Care Unit
CMV Controlled Mechanical Ventilation
CNSI Critical Care Nursing Situation Index
CPAP Continuous positive airway pressure
CPOE Computerized Physician Order Entry
CTAC Control Theory and Applications Centre
CVP Central venous pressure
CVVH Continuous veno-venous hemofiltration
C&W Coventry and Warwickshire (Hospital)
ECG Electro cardiography
EEG Electro encephalography
ENT Ear, nose and throat
EOG Electro oculography
ET Endotracheal tube
EVD Extra ventricular drain
FMEA Failure mode and effects analysis
GI Gastro Intestinal
ICNARC Intensive Care National Audit & Research Centre
ICS Intensive Care Society
ICU Intensive Care Unit
ICUSRS Intensive Care Unit Safety Reporting Study
ID Identification
IMV Intermittent mandatory ventilation
ILT Immediately life threatening
ITU Intensive Therapy Unit
IV Intravenous
MESH Managing Engineering Safety Health
MDD Medical Devices Directive
xxxiv
MHRA Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory products Agency
MRSA Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
NHS National Health Service
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NICE National Institute of Clinical Excellence
NLT Non life threatening
NPSA National Patient Safety Agency
PCA Patient controlled analgesia
PICU Paediatric intensive care unit
PEEP Positive end expiratory pressure
PRA Probabilistic risk assessment
QS Quality Sentinel
RCA Root Cause Analysis
RCN Royal College of Nursing
RFID Radio frequency identification device
SAPS Simplified Acute Physiology Score
SEE Sentinel Events Evaluation
SIMV Synchronized intermittent mandatory ventilation
SLT Secondary life threatening
TISS Therapeutic Intervention Scoring System
TPN Total parenteral nutrition
USA United States of America
UTI Urinary tract infection




In spite of numerous initiatives to target a reduction of incidence of medical errors, the scale of the
problem of ‘avoidable’ adverse incidents remains significant. The publication, for example, of the
Institute of Medicine report in 1999 (Institute of Medicine 1999) which claimed that between 44,000
and 98,000 people die each year in American hospitals due to avoidable medical error provided a
strong focus to improve healthcare safety. The publication of the report also drew attention to the
unsatisfactory nature of many of the systems which had been developed within modern healthcare.
At the same time, the immensity of the task to put in place systems designed to improve the safety of
healthcare practices was also recognized.
Literature relating to Clinical Risk in all its aspects is very extensive but typically reflects the
enthusiasm and conscience of individuals and small teams rather than of well funded research groups.
Research into Clinical Risk is not ‘big science’. The development of the risk model subsequently
described draws from a wide range of peer reviewed publications and from observations within the
Critical Care Unit at University Hospital, Coventry.
The impetus to improve healthcare, however, has not at the same time led to significant development
of models of health interaction that seek to enhance understanding of ‘why clinical incidents happen’.
Hospitals do not develop models of clinical risk based on identifying all possible adverse outcomes of
the associated clinical activity. Specific areas may be reviewed as part of ‘Clinical Audit’ but this is
more the objective assessment of outcomes than the determination of background level of potential
clinical risk. Reduction of clinical risk by all relevant means, however, remains at the core of modern
Acute Trust Clinical policies.
Key data sets created routinely within the Critical Care Unit at University Hospital, Coventry have been
extensively utilised to structure activity models and develop associated risk models. These data sets
relate primarily to admission/discharge data and details of patient interventions. In addition, extensive
time has been spent observing operational activities and interviewing associated clinical staff.
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1.2 Aims and Objectives
The aim of this research is to develop and justify a model of risk simulation based on clinical
interventions within a Critical Care Environment. A linked objective of the research is to look for
structural factors within risk causation which conventional risk reduction techniques have failed to
quantify effectively.
1.3 Outline of Thesis Structure
The existing extensive literature relating to clinical risk does not look to simulation models of health
care activity for its current solutions. The process of structuring and implementing the risk model has
essentially involved researching, creating and developing almost all of its key components rather than
developing or refining already established elements.
Chapter one of the Thesis provides an overview of the various elements of the research and how
elements from the various chapters are used to develop the risk model. A perceived requirement of
this process is to express the activity of the Critical Care Unit within a framework of discrete patient
interventions which, as far as possible, replicate the natural variations of workload, level of patient
care and staff utilisation. In addition, a set of associated possible adverse effects linked with such
interventions is also identified. The risk model seeks to simulate periods of clinical activity and
identify the base level of simulated adverse effects. The risk model can be simulated for variations in
a wide range of input parameters to the model.
Chapter two of the Thesis contains the core literature review which links to subsequent chapters.
This review is naturally dominated by medical literature referencing clinical risk within the Critical Care
environment. Most references dealing with clinical risk, however, relate to clinical risk as a process
where outcomes are linked to specific changes in work practice, such as administration of medication,
clinical management or the use of specific drugs/equipment. This deterministic approach which
quantifies the benefit of finite changes to patient care does not at the same time lead to the
development of models to simulate a broad spectrum of associated risks.
Clinical research is naturally driven by the wish to improve patient care. Such deterministic studies,
will therefore provide guidance on the relative merits of specific approaches to patient care. The
knowledge base that this represents is disseminated widely within the existing medical literature.
While this medical literature does not provide any real focus for developing risk models, it does
describe the nature and relative occurrences of adverse incidents within the Critical Care environment.
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This provides valuable insight into elements of risk model development. It is apparent, also, that this
subset of literature suffers from inconsistency in definitions of even basic terms which describe the
nature and causal factors associated with clinical risk. Elements also included within the literature of
this chapter relate to basic aspects of the links between gaps in competency and levels of errors in
work practice and also factors such as fatigue and sleep deprivation which can reduce individual
effectiveness. Risk reduction initiatives within other sectors such as transportation and industrial are
also referenced. In addition, applications of fuzzy logic for risk determination are described.
The approach described in this Thesis relates to representing risk as a sequence of values associated
with highly detailed structured activity and involving complex interactions between functions
associated with such activity. Such an approach has not been encountered within the literature
search undertaken.
Chapter three seeks to identify factors which can affect individual effectiveness within the clinical work
environment. This chapter draws from wide collective experience within the clinical literature of
factors which can affect individual performance. The most relevant of these factors were identified
and formulated within empirically derived mathematical functions to allow them to be incorporated
within the risk model. Specific key elements are identified as:
 Circadian rhythm day shift and night shift working
 Effects related to handover at start/end of nursing shift and for admission of new patient
 Effect due to sleep deficit
 Level of physical fatigue based on task activity
 Level of emotional/stress fatigue based on task activity
 Level of intellectual fatigue based on task activity
 Long term effects
Factors which relate to depletion of individual effectiveness as a result of undertaking interventions
have been identified with each intervention. These include factors relating to physical effort,
emotional/stress and intellectual effort. As a specific member of staff undertakes a sequence of such
interventions, these factors will be depleted and the individual’s effectiveness thus altered.
Individuals are also allocated a recovery rate for each parameter. References to such ‘depletion’
modes are more developed within the literature describing ‘job shop’ models but are not a typical
feature within current medical literature.
Most referenced literature in this context describes the involvement of components such as shift
pattern, sleep deprivation and task difficulty as influencing individual effectiveness. Such inferences
appear, however, not to be carried forward within the literature to define any form of model
development that would predict quantitative variations in individual performance. This literature,
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however, has been used to empirically identify a range of mathematical functions to quantify variations
in individual performance within the work environment and related to the listed parameters. The
relevance of these functions are subsequently reviewed in the context of their role in risk simulation
scenarios.
Chapter 4 of the thesis identifies patterns of clinical activity within an existing Critical Care unit. This
is chiefly facilitated by access to data relating to patient admission/discharge episodes and details of
clinical interventions undertaken on a daily basis for all patients. Details of routine patient
interventions have been identified by direct interview of a cross section of staff members of the Critical
Care unit including Nursing staff, Medical staff, Dieticians and Pharmacists and Radiographers. Such
direct contact is identified as an essential component of the information collection exercise. Data
relating to clinical activity has been used from July 2006, which co-incides with the opening of the new
integrated Critical Care Unit within the new University Hospital, Coventry. A summary of data sets
used is outlined in Appendix 1.
Analysis of patterns of actual admission/discharge data allows the generation of simulated sets of
such data over specific time intervals. Such patterns of simulated activity are validated against the
intrinsic characteristics of the original data set. Similarly, using the extensive sets of information
relating to clinical interventions, sets of simulated interventions can be generated for patients as a
function of specialty and severity of illness.
The process of replicating episodes of care of individual patients relates to determination of sets of
possible interventions and the pattern/frequency of such interventions within the unit. The
determination of such interventions has been undertaken by direct observations within the critical care
department and analysis of TISS (therapeutic intervention scoring system) data, as records of
interventions undertaken on each patient on a daily basis. The analysis of intervention based data is
highly complex and includes strong dependencies, for example, between the ventilation status of
patients and the level of associated interventions. The replication of interventions based on this
complex data set has been implemented within a specific Matlab programme where interventions are
allocated to 5 minute ‘slots’ within 24 hour periods (288 ‘slots’ per day).
Chapter 5 of the thesis outlines the basic concept of the structuring of an intervention into a set of
elements linking required level of competence, identified competency item, associated adverse effect
if the specific task/competency is inappropriately undertaken and also linked ‘preventive measures’.
This approach is partly derived from observations in the literature of specific adverse incidents which
can be associated with components of competency gaps in undertaking a specific clinical intervention.
A specific intervention can identify up to seven specific competencies, each of which is associated
with a specific ‘adverse effect’ and required level of competency. Specific tables of available
competencies are identified with each staff group such as nursing or medical. Individual
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competencies have values between 0 and 1. Within these tables, there is further identification of
available levels of competency at different levels of staff grade. For band 5, 6 and 7 nurses a series
of 5 sub levels are identified to cover the range of competencies within each band.
At this stage it was also identified that competencies need additional definition in relation to pathways
within the ‘risk engine’ used to calculate levels of risk. These factors have been identified in relation
to:
 Team component flag (is the task supported by the team?)
 Supervision flag (is the task able to be supervised?)
In addition, chapter 5 describes studies of risk causation within Critical Care Units which provides a
framework for establishment of the ‘risk engine’ within chapter 6.
Chapter 6 of the Thesis develops the components of a ‘risk engine’ used to evaluate the specific
values of likelihood of ‘adverse effects’ associated with each competency element within an
intervention. Use is made of a conventional two-input single output Mamdani fuzzy function to
construct the specific computation pathways. The inputs tend to be balanced opposites such as
‘effectiveness’ and ‘distraction’ with the output of ‘modified effectiveness’. At an early stage in the
design of the ‘risk engine’ factors within the structure of the ‘risk engine’ were identified to take
account of components such as the degree of optimisation of protocols and the organisational
cohesion of the clinical group but are not included in the core risk model used. This is referenced in
greater detail in section 6.2. A range of functions have been derived based on fuzzy rules
membership functions to implement the component Mamdani functions within an identified risk model.
The function of the ‘risk engine’ has been extensively tested using a range of input parameters to
validate its operation.
Chapter 6 also integrates together the various elements of the risk simulation processes and develops
further the elements introduced in previous chapters. Figure 1.1 summarises the essential structure
of the ‘risk engine’ utilised to structure the risk simulation process.
6
Figure 1.1. Essential relationships within the defined model of the ‘risk engine’ used for risk simulation.
Figure 1.2 summarises the various strands of input that feed into the risk engine. This process of
definition of variables within the risk simulation system is necessary so that all aspects of the model
are appropriately defined. The complexities of the simulation process arise from the large number of
variable states that require to be functionally defined.
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Figure 1.2. Input elements of the ‘risk engine’.
Functions are introduced to model staff effectiveness including physical, emotional/stress and
intellectual reserve factors. Additional structure of handover/admission functions are defined.
Functions are described for nursing supervision and distraction based on patterns of clinical workload
and staff allocation.
At this stage of process definition it becomes evident how the physical layout of a Critical Care Unit
can influence factors relating to competency sharing, supervision and distraction. Design factors
which minimise time spent ‘out of unit’, for example for the stores/consumables function and which
also improve ‘quality’ of ‘person to person contact’ for competency sharing and supervision are seen
to quantitatively improve patient care by reducing risk estimations.
While the Critical Care Unit at University Hospital, Coventry, has a full bed complement of 26 beds,
this is structured within sub units of 8, 8 and 10 beds. A system for allocation of staff roster for
nursing staff is defined to simulate the activity of 10 beds based on the existing 10 bed sub unit within
the Critical Care Unit. Core sets of admission/discharge episodes are simulated based on historical
patterns of activity between July 2006 and August 2008 as outlined in Appendix 1. This is matched
with simulation of patient interventions based on patterns of critical care activity. Finally the output
adverse effects are simulated as an output of the model.
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Chapter 7 outlines processes undertaken to evaluate the performance of the risk simulation model
with sub sets of simulated intervention data and associated admission/discharge data. This process
identified characteristics of the internal functioning of the risk model and also how risk estimations alter
for variation of factors such as the competency mix of staff groups. The key focus related to
simulation of nurse based activity since this was identified with the majority of patient interventions and
this represented the most complex level of functional interactions within the risk model. Chapter 7
also identifies the outcomes of simulation results with respect to the relevant medical literature and the
records of Clinical Adverse Events linked with the Critical Care department.
Chapter 8 reviews the findings of the research and outlines areas of further work.
Figure 1.3 identifies the main processes of the research project, indicating the processes of
structuring/simulating patterns of clinical activity and processing within the derived ‘risk engine’.
Figure 1.3. Main processes of the research project.
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1.4 Focus of Risk Prevention as a Risk Management Tool
A dominant component of risk culture within the NHS and Healthcare is in general that key
improvements take place as a response to breakdown or failures in systems of care. Key examples
of this mechanism are the Bristol Enquiry (Bristol Royal Infirmary 2001) and the Allitt enquiry
(Department of Health 2004a) where significant markers for change were based on a response to
situations of significant failure.
This contrasts with the approach in this research which relates to developing a risk model based on
identifying risk before it actually manifests. This method of analysis could be described as the ‘pre-
mortem’ approach compared with the ‘post-mortem’ approach. The terminology of the ‘premortem’
process has been identified by recent business circles in the USA as a viable risk assessment process
within the facilitation of new business start-ups.
1.5 Evidence Based Medicine and Simulation Techniques
The basis on which medical ‘progress’ has largely been developed has been ‘evidence based
medicine’. This is illustrated in figure 1.4 where in a notional study of data relating to factors a) to f)
are collected under controlled conditions and possible correlations are identified between indicated
specific data sets.
Figure 1.4. Data structure of typical evidence based medicine study.
10
The scope of such studies can be limited by the number of input factors that can be reliably collected.
In addition, there is an inherent level of uncertainty/error in the data which is collected. Also, there
may be limitations in the size of data sets of the defined data items that can be collected, based on the
levels of activity of the sampled process. This latter factor confirms the advantage of pooling data
from several similar clinical groups either in the same country or internationally.
.
The levels of complexity identified within this Thesis based on simulation techniques identify the
inherent limitations of the approach of ‘evidence based medicine’ where there are a significantly larger
number of variables which may be difficult to define objectively and hence to incorporate into research.
It is prudent to ask why have models of ‘predictive risk’ not been more highly developed within the
clinical environment. In part, it may not be apparent how such models of risk could be designed,
populated by data and operated within a simulation environment. This may be due to the high level of
complexity of data structures and of computational data processing required within the simulation
process. The resource of peer reviewed medical literature, however, has been an invaluable
resource to assist in structuring of the risk model and associated reports and especially of the basic
‘risk engine’ structure as outlined in chapter 6.
1.6 Summary of Contributions
The following key contributions are identified:
 The identification and implementation of the concept of expressing levels of clinical risk within
a specific clinical environment with expression as finite probabilities of occurrence.
 Structure of patient care as a series of interventions and where interventions are described at
the level of sub tasks which are associated with linked levels of competency, adverse effects
and also preventive measures.
 System for simulation of clinical activity based on admission/discharge data and analysis of
clinical intervention data. This consists of two main components of admission/discharge
details : date time admission and date time discharge, specialty etc. and interventions
associated with specific admission/discharge episodes
 Derivation of competency mismatch function to describe gap between available competence
and required level of competence and implementation of concept of team competency levels.
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 Development of empirical effectiveness functions to structure the ‘individual effectiveness’
value of clinical staff with component functions relating to circadian rhythm, physical exertion,
intellectual exertion, stress, shift handover, influence of admission of patient and sleep deficit.
 Development of ‘risk engine’ consisting of four Fuzzy transitions to calculate output probability
of occurrence of specific adverse effect based on five input functions with individual
effectiveness linked with distraction, individual competency mismatch linked with team
competency mismatch and moderating effect of supervision
 The introduction of ‘coefficients of interaction’ based on physical layout of Critical Care sub
unit which identifies role of physical environment on influence of supervision, competency
sharing and distraction
 Integration of all elements into the risk simulation system listing all elements of the identified
components.
These are subsequently discussed in more detail in section 8.3 of chapter 8.
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Chapter 2: Risk in Healthcare : Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The literature related to risk in healthcare is very extensive but mainly reflects the enthusiasm, or
conscience, of individuals and small teams rather than of well funded research groups. The aim of
the Thesis is to develop and justify a model of risk determination based on clinical interventions within
a Critical Care environment. The associated literature review has identified a wide scope of clinical
observation but focuses on a subset of work within the Critical Care environment. The development
of the model, however, draws from diverse reported findings as part of a process to develop a risk
model which has its roots in known procedures and practice and reflects also the insight of clinicians.
Section 2.16 provides a summary of key elements identified from the literature survey.
2.2 Scale of Problem: Awareness and Communication
As indicated previously, the publication, for example, of the Institute of Medicine report (Institute of
Medicine 1999) which claimed that between 44,000 and 98,000 people die each year in American
hospitals due to avoidable medical error provided a strong focus to improve healthcare safety. The
publication of the report also caused a wide recognition of the unsatisfactory nature of many of the
systems which had been developed within modern healthcare. There is also identified to be a
threshold of perception within the public of the significance of adverse events in medicine. Incidents
with multiple casualties, for example within the transportation or industrial sector, draw more public
attention than a much higher number of avoidable deaths in healthcare which are geographically
separate which are apparently not linked by any common factor. The review by Baker et al. (2004)
essentially confirms within the Canadian Healthcare system the findings elsewhere relating to adverse
medical events. The figure of 7.5% of adverse events of patients within a 20 hospital study (3720
hospital admissions) is comparable with other typical studies.
Governments with direct or implied responsibility for health systems such as the NHS in the UK are,
however, acutely aware of the public perception of such failures in healthcare. In addition, adverse
medical outcomes are being increasingly translated to the cost of litigation. Governments are also
minded to reduce the associated drain on the national purse as indicated by Fenn et al. (2000) and
Department of Health (2003a) where the later report indicated a cost of litigation settlement of £446
million in 2001/2002. In recognition of the need to be aware of rising costs of litigation and initiate
appropriate action, the Department of Health has published a series of documents which focus on the
need of Health Care organisations to take all reasonable steps and measures to reduce risk. The key
initial publication ‘An organisation with a memory’ (Department of Health 2000a) was subsequently
13
followed by ‘Implementing an organisation with a memory’ (Department of Health 2002). These
initiatives are also identified with the establishment of the National Patient Safety Agency as a vehicle
for centralised reporting in England and Wales of adverse clinical events and which subsequently is an
active vehicle for safer healthcare practices (National Patient Safety Agency 2007). Included within
this process was the system of Clinical Governance as an extension of the processes of Financial
Governance within the NHS. Since around 2001, NHS Trusts have been required to report progress
within a set of Healthcare Standards (Department of Health 2004b) which address key issues to
reduce outcomes of Clinical Risk such as levels of patient mortality by specialty/discipline and
generally increase the profile of organisational governance (Department of Health 2006a).
2.3 Regulatory Frameworks: Roles for Risk Evaluation and Risk Reduction
The ongoing development of medical technology within healthcare continues to provide an expanding
range of diagnostic/therapeutic technologies and there is introduced potentially a higher level of risk
due to the increase of interventions and their potential for harm to the patient. The framework within
which medical devices are designed, manufactured, used and maintained within the EEC has at the
same time undergone significant revision. The introduction of the Medical Device Directive in 1997
within the EEC (Medical Device Directive 2002) has provided a framework to introduce a base level of
safety and product certification for use of a wide range of medical devices and products.
In addition, specific standards have been developed as a framework for design/manufacturing of
medical devices (British Standards Institution 2003a) and also for a structured process of risk
assessment of product design (British Standards Institution 2007a). Specific standards have also
been introduced for a wide range of medical device types of which defibrillators (British Standards
Institution 2003b) and high frequency surgical equipment (British Standards Institution 2007b) are
specific examples. In addition, the NHS uses a specific risk management approach for non clinical
applications (SAI Global 2004).
The Medical Device Directive (Medical Device Directive 2002) and associated standards
documentation provide a focus for the function and development of such devices rather than the
management of such devices once they are in use within a health care organisation. In the UK,
guidance on systems of work to ensure appropriate management of such devices is currently provided
by the Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory Products Agency (MHRA). While guidance is often
provided as guidance on specific topics such as sterilisation (MHRA 2002) advice is also provided on
generic systems of device management within the cycle of procurement, acceptance, repair and
planned maintenance and disposal of medical equipment (MHRA 2006). This provides a framework
to reduce the risk of utilisation of such products within modern healthcare (MHRA 2000). It is noted
that the focus of such framework documents is placing increased emphasis on the training of users of
medical equipment.
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2.4 Error in Medicine
Leape (1994, 1998) summarises in a highly effective manner the developments in the basic
understanding of the ways in which human error can arise. One important development in the theory
of human error outlined by Leape (1994) and also described in Reason (1990) is that the concept of
modes of cognition which include that of ‘automatic and unconscious processing’ or ‘schematic control
mode’ and ‘attentional control mode’ where a problem is handled by slower modes of sequential
thought effort. The individual skill based tasks are called ‘schema’. This model is referenced in a
framework by Rasmussen (1981) which identifies factors of skill based, rule based and knowledge
based interventions.
Within this framework, ‘slips’ are described as events which occur while undertaking a skill based
activity. Such ‘slips’ may be due to loss of attention. One mechanism identified as taking place is
where the wrong schema is applied. This is described as an error of capture. A description error is
one where the right action is performed on the wrong object. A loss of activation error is one where
temporary memory loss takes place possibly triggered by interruption.
Such loss of attention in the causation of ‘slips’ can arise from a wide range of circumstances and
including fatigue/sleep loss, alcohol/drugs/illness, boredom/frustration/fear/anxiety and environmental
factors. Allnutt (1987) identifies that poor performance will occur at the extremes of stress as defined
as ‘panic’ and ‘boredom’.
Latent errors are associated with intrinsic sources of error within potentially highly complex systems.
Classic examples are given as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl where the systems had intrinsic flaws
of safety practice which could not be readily appreciated by operational staff. Latent errors can
manifest in medical systems in a range of guises, such as the potential to administer epidural infusions
through intravenous lines. In terms of the prevention of accidents, there is identified the possibility to
structure activity so as to reduce the chance of error and also reduce the consequence of any error
taking place as outlined by Norman (1984). A particularly relevant form of observation of health
systems at risk via ‘vulnerable system syndrome’ is described by Reason et al. (2001).
A highly relevant review of medical errors in the field of surgery has been developed by Cuschieri
(2003). The author indicates that while within the industrial sector there has been effort to classify
human errors after the taxonomy of Rasmssen (1981), there has been no equivalent system within the
medical field. Cuschieri (2003) proceeds to identify two separate classes of medical errors as
Endogenous (Errors arising within the immediate work area by healthcare practitioners) and
Exogenous (Errors arising within the environment in the system of health care practice). The
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significant study by Vincent, Neale and Woloshynowych (2001) describes, however, a worrying level
of incidence of adverse events of 10.8% based on analysis of two acute hospitals in Greater London.
Relevant work of assessment of errors in an ITU environment has been provided by Leape et al.
(1995). According to this study around 178 activities are undertaken per patient per day with 1.7
errors being associated with each patient per day, indicating around 96 % proficiency. A particularly
revealing study by Taxis and Barber (2003) identified an error rate of 49% in preparation and
administration of intravenous drugs. Within various health systems, reduction of such errors has
been implemented by computer driven prescription systems.
2.5 Shift Pattern in Risk Evaluation and Risk Reduction
Several studies have tried to assess the factors associated with shift pattern and satisfaction of staff
involved with a range of types of shift pattern with typical studies reported by Josten et al. (2003) and
Jansen et al. (2003). For the specific risk model being developed, there are specific factors which are
identified to influence the relative ability of clinical staff and nursing staff to function effectively based
on work time patterns.
The study by Josten et al. (2003) argues that studies prior to 1982 indicated that 12 hour shifts tended
to be considered favourably, possibly due to the fact that prior to significant utilisation of technology in
nursing, nursing was less complex than is currently. Jansen et al. (2003) found that there was
associated higher fatigue levels with shift working. It was determined, however, that increased fatigue
levels appeared stable within shift groups, with no appearance of significant deterioration with time
spent within each shift pattern. Jansen et al. (2002) identified that significant differences potentially
existed in need for recovery from work patterns based on shift pattern and gender. Similar
associations are also identified by Jansen et al. (2003).
Various models of resource planning utilise ‘job shop scheduling’ where resources are optimally
matched to demand. Thus factors such as turn round time, efficiency of process, minimisation of
resources and labour are optimised against a specific pattern of demand. Ozkarahan (1995), for
example, describes a system for allocation of surgical procedures to operating theatres which is
designed to optimise utilisation factors, but without any component of risk analysis of activity
schedules.
The general indication of studies assessing individual performance during night shifts as described by
Borges and Fischer (2003) and Fischer et al. (2000) is for a reduction of effectiveness within the
period of night time working. More detailed analysis by Wilkinson et al. (1989) indicated a
deterioration in individual performance levels around 03.30 am.
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2.6 Team Working
There is increasing awareness of the importance of team working in reducing risk in healthcare as
described by Kavanagh and Cowan (2004). The authors describe various initiatives and studies that
have been undertaken to demonstrate the improvements to service provision and associated
reduction of clinical risk that can be achieved through more effective team working. It is significant to
note that the key finding of the Bristol Enquiry (Bristol Royal Infirmary 2001) was to identify key failings
within teams rather than at the level of the individual.
Work described by Bleakley et al. (2004) outlines a novel means of developing team working within
the theatre environment. Outcomes of cohort studies are further described by Bleakley et al. (2006).
Often, however, there are many factors that can restrict the development of team issues. Varma and
Neil-Dwyer (2002) indicate that while the desirability of team working is well understood, and various
initiatives are described to establish team working, it is considered that intrinsic problems relating to
lack of resources and pressure to deliver workloads will hinder such initiatives. The issue of
developing the true potential of teams is further reviewed by Salas et al. (2006).
One review by Bradley et al. (2003) structured a review of a range of studies based on the ‘temporal
framework’ of team organisation. There was evidence from a range of studies that teams which were
established for longer periods had more developed inter personal skills which made such teams more
effective. In the context of intensive care working, for example, there is the issue of how team
cohesion can be identified and developed where, due to the nature of the workload, the staff ‘team’
rarely can be assembled as one entity. This is in contrast to a team in industry/commerce where it is
likely that team members would interact fully with all team members on a daily basis.
2.7 Extended Working Hours and Related Factors
In terms of the effects of long hours of work on efficiency, Savery and Luks (2000) describe a specific
study within Australia and give insight into perceived wisdom of long work hours and social
consequences. Consideration of such factors are relevant for estimation of ‘individual effectiveness’
within task completion studies.
There are also the more complex stress factors involving burnout and clinical depression. Iacovides
et al. (2003) argued that while some work activity can be stressful due to the nature/complexity of the
activity, the development of ‘burnout’ can potentially trigger more significant loss of effectiveness when
the feeling of individual worth based on career expectations and appreciation of personal competence
are undermined and diminished. This type of loss of effectiveness is subsequently referenced as
‘long term effects’.
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In determining risk models in the Critical Care Unit, the prevailing model is not one of selecting
patients in order to optimise the most efficient use of resources. Rather it is one of providing
appropriate care to patients that meet specific clinical criteria based on need. Within the model of
activity, however, the effectiveness of staff remains a critical element. Within job shop models, as
described by Koszalka and Skworcow (2003), factors such as staff resilience/fatigue are identified as
being important and are identified for use within an equivalent model within the intensive care
environment.
Most scheduling problems, however, relate to situations where there is a much higher control over the
processes being optimised and the individual tasks can be included/excluded within the model
confines. In the clinical environment however, the tasks are essentially scheduled on the basis of
clinical requirements and the level of control on use of resources is limited.
The alertness and hence effectiveness of staff does also vary during the day. Within the road
transport industry, work has been reported by Moore-Ede et al. (2004) in relation to determination of
an alertness parameter based on evaluation of circadian alertness and also its utilisation in reduction
of road traffic accidents. The algorithm for the alertness simulator was derived from extensive
analysis of work data of truck drivers.
2.8 Patient Assessment Algorithms in Critical Care
It has been recognised for some time that the evaluation of performance between critical care units
depends on an effective means of evaluating the likelihood of patient survival based on key
parameters of the patient condition.
The APACHE system (Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation) was first reported by Knaus
et al. (1981) and utilised a total of 34 variables on a limited set of patient admissions. The Simplified
Acute Physiology Score (SAPS) model with a reduced set of 14 parameters was subsequently
developed by Le Gall et al. (1984) and represented a simplification of the acute physiology score
(APS) system which had been in use previously. A revised version is also described by Le Gall et al.
(1993).
A refinement of the APACHE classification system as APACHE II as referenced by Knaus et al. (1985)
extended the data set to 5815 admissions from 13 hospitals and with the derivation of a point score
based on initial values of 12 patient measured parameters. At this stage such systems are also
identified as having value for prioritising the resources of critical care departments. A subsequent
development of system in the form of APACHE III was further developed by Knaus et al. (1991) where
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data sets from some 40 USA hospitals were incorporated with the additional inclusion of an expanded
diagnostic list.
A large study of intensive care scoring models has been undertaken by Livingston et al. (2000) in
which five severity of illness scoring systems were evaluated within a large Scottish data set
comprising 10,393 active entries. The SAPS II model was found to provide the best overall
performance though the APACHE II system was found to be more appropriate for comparisons of
mortality rates within intensive care units.
Predictive mortality systems such as APACHE and SAPS utilise the technique of logistic regression to
compute outcome values based on validated sets of clinical data using the Hosmer-Lemeshow
method. Kramer and Zimmerman (2007) indicate that while in general the use of the method is
appropriate, other factors which may influence predictive mortality within a set patient group require to
be taken into consideration. Work reported by Zimmerman et al. (2006) in the development of
APACHE IV has highlighted the fact that predictive mortality models need revision as part of the
natural progression taking place within modern critical care medicine. Within the UK, the ICNARC
research group has been active in tuning risk prediction models for the specific characteristics of
Critical Care Units within the UK (Harrison et al. 2006, 2007). Such predictive mortality systems are
important for individual case management and also for assessment of overall levels of clinical
performance.
2.9 Promoting Safer Patient Care and Management
There has been an increased focus on practice improvement in order to reduce incidence of adverse
events, in contrast to techniques which studied epidemiology of errors. One significant review of
practice based clinical intervention has been structured by Shojania et al. (2001) and which identifies a
broad cross section of acute clinical interventions and how the likelihood of adverse outcomes can be
reduced.
Benjamin (2003) provides a practical overview of medication errors within the USA health system and
proposes a set of remedies to correct deficient practice. Within the context of medication error, for
example, the removal of ambiguous handwritten prescription systems and use of computerised
requests has been shown by Bates et al. (1998) to reduce non intercepted serious medication errors
by around 55% from 10.7 events per 1000 patient days to 4.86 events per 1000 patient days.
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There is increasing clinical focus on evaluating level of care and clinical outcomes based on levels of
clinical supervision in intensive care units. Kahn et al. (2007) identified that in the American model,
the provision of ‘Intensivist physician’ staffing increased the level of standardised process review
measures for patients receiving mechanical ventilation. No attempt, however was made to relate
mortality outcome with level of such supervision. A systematic review by Pronovost at al. (2002)
between 1965 and 2001 analysed ICU morality and length of stay as a function of ICU physician
staffing. It was shown that there was clear improvement in parameters with provision of highest level
of ‘intensivist’ compared with the lowest level of provision. The approach reported by Berenholtz et
al. (2007) develops the concept of a safety scorecard which translates the provision of interventions
and structure of a safety framework into objective measure of relative ‘safety’ of a patient within the
intensive care unit.
Within the USA a specific focus for implementation of a safety culture within critical care has been
developed by the Leapfrog Group as described by Eikel and Delbanco (2003). This group is a
consortium of over 140 large healthcare purchasers which promote patient safety criteria within the
purchase of healthcare. Specific points of reference for the group include computerised physician
order systems (e.g. prescriptions), evidence based hospital referral and appropriate intensive care
physician staffing. A study by Angus et al. (2006) however, draws attention to the existing structure of
many ‘ITU’ units in the USA which fall far short of the recommendations set out in the Leapfrog
initiative.
The development of appropriate practice within the Critical Care environment continues to attract
considerable interest within the sphere of nursing professionals in order to realise the significant policy
statements of the Department of Health in respect of Critical Care provision (Department of Health
2000b, 2000c, 2001, 2003b, 2005, 2006b). Also relevant are policy statements from representative
professional bodies (Intensive Care Society 1997, 2002) and the Royal College of Nursing (2003). At
an international level, there is also increasing awareness of the need to develop systems for risk
reduction in healthcare that ‘close the loop’ in terms of identification/elimination/reduction of clinical
risks (Runciman et al. 2006).
2.10 Physical Environment
The provision of adequate space and also structured infrastructure within the Critical Care
environment are important for safe and effective practice. Specific methods have been developed for
the evaluation of space requirements within the Critical Care environment as described by Hignett and
Lu (2007) in the evaluation of space requirement for specific high-risk clinical tasks. While such
evaluations can be undertaken to determine minimum space for clinical procedures, there are also
considerations based on infrastructure details of specific space utilisations. Research described
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within this Thesis has identified novel elements of physical work environment relating to competency
sharing, supervision and distraction which appear not to be referenced in existing literature.
2.11 Competency Factors in Assessment and Training
The element of competency is in the process of being re-inforced within medical educational systems.
Leach (2002) describes how the system of medical education in the USA has been undergoing a
major review in order to introduce greater elements of outcome based learning which can be more
objectively assessed.
In the USA residency training facilities are structured to focus on the set of six basic competencies and
determine how this is implemented and measured. One small study of local evaluation of
interpersonal skills described by Jouriles et al. (2002) indicates that while such processes of
evaluation by ‘shadowing’ staff at specific phases of their training appears to provide a consistent set
of results, the very act of measurement can influence outcomes as staff take on ‘best behaviour’
mode.
In a more open challenge to the concept of objective competency evaluation, Huddle and Heudebert
(2007) dispute the link between objective measures of competency within the six classes described by
Leach (2002) and the ability to be an effective and safe clinician. The main argument put forward is
that the higher cognitive instincts and skills do not necessarily lend themselves to the process of
objective assessment.
A relevant European response to the trend to move towards competency based training, planning and
assessment for postgraduate medical training has been outlined by ten Cate and Scheele (2007).
Rather than describe competencies, the authors describe these as ’Entrustable Professional Activities’
and anticipates between 50 to 100 of these describing a full postgraduate medical training scheme of
five to six years. This approach confirms a trend to move towards more highly structured medical
training based on identification of roles, responsibilities and the need to be able to undertake specific
interventions. Nursing practice in the UK is dominated by competency based learning, where the
scope of personal development is dominated by the framework of a competency based training
system.
2.12 Risk Reduction Initiatives: Non Medical Sectors
The airline industry is often identified as an excellent example of how the implementation of a safety
culture can reduce the incidence and severity of associated accidents. The INDICATE programme as
described by Edkins (1998) is a safety programme initially developed for regional aircraft traffic within
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Australia. In its development, analysis was undertaken of existing aviation safety programmes such
as MESH (Managing Engineering Safety Health) as developed by British Airways and also the Boeing
Safety Programme Model and core elements of systems incorporated into INDICATE. The key
components of such a system include:
 Appointing of operational safety manager
 Creation of staff focus groups to identify hazards
 Establishment of confidential safety hazard reporting system
 Regular meeting with management
 Establishment and maintenance of safety information data base
 Regular distribution of safety information to staff
The structure of such safety systems is based on the model of Reason (1995) and is designed to
reduce both the set of latent failures that may exist within an organisation and also the errors and
violations that may exist at the individual or team level.
The analysis by Santos-Reyes and Beard (2003) of the safety systems with the British Rail network,
indicates that the many tiers of companies and lines of communication within the railway system
probably increases the difficulty of removal of latent errors within such organisations. Kozine (2007)
describes the application of the single-channel theory of selective attention to the simulation of human
actions in time-pressured scenarios as a mechanism of describing errors in control interface
technology.
2.13 Fuzzy Models
A basic outline of the potential for application of fuzzy logic to risk evaluation is outlined by Ciresi and
Akay (1996) where the imprecise nature of medical decision making and evaluation of clinical
situations is described as being suited to fuzzy expression. Examples of application relating to control
of arterial blood pressure using infusion systems with fuzzy logic feedback are cited as appropriate
solutions where mathematical modelling of system parameters produced more complex and hence
unstable solutions. Steimann (1997) makes the relevant observation that Zadeh (1969) had identified
the unique value of fuzzy sets to meet the reality of ‘a substantial degree of fuzziness in the
description of the behavior of biological systems as well as their characterization’. Steimann (2001)
also references the application of fuzzy systems in medical artificial intelligence. A useful review of
artificial techniques in medicine including fuzzy logic is described by Pandey and Mishra (2009).
The predictive ability of fuzzy logic within a specific clinical area has been outlined by Cundell et al.
(2001) where input demographic variable of age (4 ranges), blood type (4 types), gender and race (4
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types) were mapped to outputs of presence of Staphylococci, Streptococci, E Coli and Non-E.Coli.
With data from 187 patients available, a training set of 155 patients was used to predict the outcomes
of the remaining 32 patients in the set. Using a set of 159 active fuzzy rules, a predictive rate of 84.4
% was achieved which the authors state would be significantly higher than clinical guesswork.
Carr and Tah (2001) describe a system for evaluation of risk in the construction industry using fuzzy
techniques. Inputs relating to local factors such as plant suitability, weather, plant availability, site
investigation and contract documents are described as feeding forward to conditions of plant
productivity and ground conditions which in turn feed forward to changes in performance change
details relating to duration, cost, quality and safety. Rue and Eloff (1996) describe the application of
fuzzy logic techniques to model risk related to computer network access and utilisation.
2.14 Factors Affecting Individual Effectiveness
Individual effectiveness has been identified as a ‘significant’ risk factor and is associated with an
‘enabling’ factor for successful task completion. The process of simulation of factors which
influence individual effectiveness requires to take account of relevant studies which seek to determine
the significance and relevance of a range of factors. Extensive studies by van Dongen et al. (2003)
have attempted to quantify the effect of sleep deprivation on individual effectiveness. Specific studies
such as those by Dorrian et al. (2006) indicate the general reduction of effectiveness within periods of
night shift working. In terms of shift working, one common element of observation, as evidenced in
studies by Borges and Fischer (2003) and Fischer et al. (2000) is a reduction in effectiveness during
night shifts, with the suggestion of lowest effectiveness around 03.30 am.
Numerous studies provide a focus on stress experienced by staff in healthcare and its effect on
individual performance. The study of Elfering et al. (2006) provides some detailed insights into
patient related stress episodes though the greatest source of stress was identified as friction between
other staff members. It is also relevant to confirm that the Critical Care environment is probably the
most stressful work area in acute healthcare, based on the findings of Fischer et al. (2006) which
identified elevated levels of the stress hormone cortisol were only found within the Critical Care
environment of an acute hospital. One relevant observation by Sallinen et al. (2004) was that in a
simulated experiment related to industrial type processes, tasks which required minimal levels of
cognitive skill, such as monitoring of a console, tended to produce an effect equivalent to sleep
deprivation.
More specific simulation of effectiveness factors is, however, identified within studies of job shop
models as outlined by Koszalka and Skworcow (2003). The technique of optimisation of
production/output by maximising individual productiveness to take account of work, rest periods and
individual stamina does not match with the organisational model of the Critical Care work environment.
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Studies thus referenced, however, provide a means of development of a model where effectiveness
factors are identified within the Critical Care environment.
2.15 Risk in the Critical Care Environment
Significant work has been undertaken in determining the frequency, nature and causation of adverse
incidents within the Critical Care environment. Such studies can provide a ‘before’ and ‘after’
comparison with the implementation of a specific component of improved patient management. In the
study undertaken by Sinopoli et al. (2007), no significant difference was found between the rates of
adverse events of ‘medical’ and ‘surgical’ patients, with nature and causation showing similar values.
In a study into medication errors in the hospital environment, Cullen et al. (1997) identified that
contrary to expectation, adverse events tended to occur during routine work phases and not during
periods of heightened stress and anxiety. It was surmised that the core of errors were probably
originating within the structure of medication processes, such as the dependence on hand written
prescriptions.
A significant study by Kollef et al. (1999) identified that the mortality of patients who received
inadequate or delayed antimicrobial treatment was four times higher than those treated appropriately.
An in depth study as reported by Giraud et al. (1993) highlighted both the distribution of adverse
incidents and associated factors, though medication errors were not recorded. The study reported by
Bracco et al. (2001) identifies the use of ‘planning’, ‘execution’ and ‘surveillance’ as categories of
causation with reference to a common core of ‘types of error’. This approach adds value to a linked
programme to reduction of incidence of adverse incidents. In addition, this study indicates that errors
associated with ‘planning’ tend to have greater significance for prolonging of patient stay.
In the study by Rothchild et al. (2005), detailed analysis is undertaken of levels of error corresponding
to 391 patients within 1490 patient days, with indication of a level of 149.7 per 1000 patient days.
Identified categories of adverse incidents provide useful benchmarks for comparison with results of
simulated studies. The so called SEE study of Valentin et al. (2006) took a ‘snapshot’ of adverse
events reported within a 24 hour period on 21
st
January 2004, with the participation of 220 Critical
Care Units around the world. Key areas of concern were identified as ‘lines, catheters, drains’ and
‘medication’ which accounted for around 64% of reported incidents.
The study by Kern and Kox (1999) reported a significant reduction in mortality within a cardiac critical
care facility with the implementation of improved systems of documentation, standardisation of
treatment protocols and team communication. This theme is also reported by Jain et al. (2006),
where the introduction of procedural improvements such as multidisciplinary rounds, hand hygiene
protocol and ‘non vertical’ cultural change brought about a significant reduction in length of patient
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stay. The study of Needham et al. (2004) which identified factors associated with airway related
adverse incidents identifies a highly relevant set of main factors and associated sub factors linked with
such events. The set of sub factors corresponds significantly with the parameters identified within the
‘risk engine’ structures developed in this research.
The study undertaken by Graf et al. (2005) among its findings on adverse incidents and staff related
errors identifies ‘disregard of standards, rules, and orders’ as a dominant source of error. In addition,
a base line level of adverse events of 0.07 per eligible patient day is identified. The study by
Schuerer et al. (2006) confirmed aspects of errors due to ‘disregard of standards, rules, and orders’
though it is likely that this is manifesting as a collective lack of awareness of practice rather than
deliberate disregard for work structures.
In a study undertaken by Binnekade et al. (2001), the relative frequency of adverse situations was
compared for various categories of activity for nursing time per patient less than 30 minutes per hour
and greater than 30 minutes per hour. It was identified that significantly more critical situations were
identified in the group associated with less than 30 minutes of nurse time per hour. The study of
adverse incidents relating to mechanical ventilation by Auriant et al. (2002) categorised the types of
adverse outcomes as a function of level of severity of outcome. Again, a principal cause is
associated with ‘human error and failure to follow rules’ - though it would have been appropriate to
separate these two causes.
The study by Shortell et al. (1994) reviewed information from 17,440 patients from 1691 hospitals in
the USA in which regression coefficients were evaluated for a range of input criteria such as
technological availability against output criteria such as risk adjusted mortality. Specific observations
included that increased technological availability would reduce risk adjusted mortality with also
increased caregiver interaction reducing risk adjusted ICU length of stay.
One of the most relevant studies in this group seeking to link incidence of adverse clinical events to
causal factors was undertaken by Tibby et al. (2004) where analysis of adverse incidents was
undertaken within a paediatric intensive care unit (PICU) over a period of a year. Strong evidence
was identified which linked reduction in levels of adverse incidents with increasing seniority of
supervisory nursing staff.
The literature thus cited is associated with the generic process of improving the safety of healthcare.
The more relevant clinical literature, however, relates to analysis of adverse incidents within the
Critical Care environment. While patient care presents as a series of interventions carried out on
patients, the literature does not appear to ‘drill down’ to the complexity of care at this level. This is the
approach, however, which is developed in subsequent chapters and is one that identifies ‘sub
structures’ of risk within the processes of clinical activity.
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2.16 Summary Elements of Literature Review
Regulatory and Standards Frameworks: These identify risk reduction through safer equipment, drugs
and consumables and backed with appropriate directives within the European Community such as the
Medical Devices Directive and within a framework of quality standards and product/equipment
standards. This confirms that significant sources of risk through use of unregulated medical
equipment and consumables and which may have a higher rate of failure have largely been
eliminated. In the development of models of patient risk within the Critical Care environment in
chapter 5, components of risk linked to intrinsic device failure are not included as sub tasks within
specific interventions. The dominant risk associated through the use of medical equipment and
consumables relates to levels of competency of staff to use such items appropriately.
National Regulatory Bodies: These identify risk reduction through guidance and initiatives from
agencies which include MHRA, Care Quality Commission, The NHS Litigation Authority, the National
Patient Safety Agency and National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE). While no specific role for
development of detailed risk causation models in healthcare is identified, their role has led to the
development of a ‘risk reduction’ culture in all aspects of patient care. In addition, the most focused
risk based approach is introduced via the NHS Litigation Authority. It is noted that while such bodies
place great reliance on the use of risk assessment techniques within the organisations that they
monitor, such risk assessments do not probe aspects of risk causation through ‘understanding’ of
details of interactions of parameters which have the potential to increase clinical risk. This is further
referenced in chapter 8 on aspects of further work.
Simulation of Clinical Activity: Simulation of clinical activity was identified as a core element of the risk
simulation model at the outset of the research. This related to admission/discharge episodes and
also to the interventions experienced by patients within specific admission/discharge episodes. Sets
of data for both types of clinical activity were available within the Critical Care Unit though additional
monitoring was required to include ‘general’ nursing interventions. The literature identified the
essential structures of the TISS classification of patient interventions within the Critical Care
environment and which was incorporated into generic and specific descriptions of patient
interventions. The literature revealed, however, that there can be a significant mismatch between the
‘prescription’ of care prescribed by the intensive care consultant and the pattern of care that the
patient actually receives. A common cause of this mismatch would appear to be the dependency on
written case notes and the difficulty of matching up communications from the intensive care consultant
to the record of activity within such case notes. Important aspects of care such as monitoring for
infections and prescription of antibiotics can be omitted as a result of lack of ability to check if patterns
of care are actually implemented. The non delivery of care elements has consequently been
incorporated into ‘adverse effects’ within interventions as structured within chapter 5.
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Clinical Micro Systems: A key aspect of the risk model relates to the identification of ‘micro systems’
as referenced by Carayon and Gurses (2005) and Nelson et al. (2002) where a framework of
interaction operates within a team environment and within a common set of professional and
managerial goals. This is confirmed, for example, in the way in which nursing rosters are structured
(chapter 6) from a common set of staff and where a set of locally developed clinical protocols (chapter
5) are generated and developed within the micro system of the Critical Care Unit. This also indicates
that if risk simulation models of the type described in the Thesis are to be applied throughout an
organisation, then they need to be developed like interconnecting ‘cells’ within a larger organisational
framework. This is referenced in relation to further work in chapter 8.
Error perception and Causes: There are several approaches to the perception of error in medicine.
One approach reflects the ‘culture’ of the clinician where errors are referenced within a peer to peer
framework but without in depth reporting of incidence levels or analytical insight into the nature of such
risks. One approach is to classify errors using the methodology of Reason (1995) and Rasmussen
(1981). There appears to be little if any application of this method of risk analysis to errors in
medicine. The identification of ‘latent errors’, is however relevant and is introduced in chapter 6 and
referenced also in section 6.2 in the form of ‘level of optimisation’ of procedures within the structure of
the ‘risk engine’. In this context a ‘latent error’ could be a nursing protocol which forms the basis of
nursing practice but which is not optimised in either its effectiveness or level of risk. The improvement
of clinical practice is, however, strongly driven to identify ‘latent errors’ in patient treatment through the
formal structures of evidence based medicine. Such factors were not, however, introduced into the
‘risk engine’ model used for the actual risk simulations undertaken in order to focus on more significant
factors.
One approach in the literature, described in detail in chapter 5, is to identify types of adverse incidents
within the Critical Care environment as a first stage to identifying mechanisms to reduce them. These
studies provide information on both the nature of reported adverse incidents and the relative frequency
of occurrence of such events. Such studies tend however to identify different types of adverse
incidents and also provide inconsistent values of the likelihood of their occurrence. Such studies
provide some relevant information for comparison of outputs of the risk model being proposed, in
particular where the level of specific adverse clinical incidents in chapter 7 is described in terms of
events per notional patient day.
The literature is essentially identifying adverse clinical events as events which actually harmed the
patient or had the potential to do so. In the model developed in the Thesis, the ‘adverse effects’ are
identified more closely with ‘risk latency’ or underlying factors which have the potential to cause harm.
Aspects of combinations of ‘adverse effects’ to result in incidences of actual patient injury are
discussed in chapter 8 with the context of further work.
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The approach of identifying causal factors of adverse incidents within the Critical Care environment is
more useful from the perspective of risk model development, such as in Tibby et al. (2004), where
comparisons are made within clinical data and where one or more factors such as the level of training
or team communication have been altered. This demonstrates the variation of output risk parameters
as a function of input parameters and has some relevance for the risk model being proposed and
helped develop the structuring of grade based competency mismatch in chapter 6.
Team Communication: The literature confirms the value of effective team working, with various studies
providing objective evidence that better teams provide better clinical outcomes. The medical
literature, however, does not develop elements of team working within the scope of model simulation
developed in this Thesis and instead tends to focus on measuring change in outcomes. Concepts of
team interaction, especially relating to sharing of competency, outlined in the literature were able to be
replicated in simulation of skills sharing within teams of nursing staff within a specific physical group of
Critical Care beds in chapter 6. In addition important factors relating to team communications and
handover of patients at shift transitions as identified in the literature were incorporated into simulation
of individual effectiveness in chapter 3 and which are actively incorporated into the main risk
simulation system as described in chapter 6.
Shift Working, Elements of Individual Stamina and Sleep Deprivation: While elements of shift working,
in particular within critical care, provide a focus for many studies, these tend to be directed towards
understanding the culture of shift working in order to mange it more appropriately. Within the few
studies which include objective assessment of ability to complete tasks, it is identified as relevant to
include in the proposed model an empirically derived function, as described in chapter 3, to replicate a
reduction of individual effectiveness during the night shift – with a minimum around 03.30 am.
Elements of individual stamina/stress are referenced within the literature of job shop models with
analysis focused on optimising output based on consideration of stamina functions. While the
medical literature contains many references to the effect of stamina/stress in the workplace, this is not
referenced within the context of individual patient interventions and depletion of individual stamina as
structured in chapter 3. The generic references, however, to effectiveness functions within job shop
models proved useful in developing these in chapter 3 in the context of acute clinical environments.
The proposed model identifies ‘short term’ stress components which relate to specific activity within a
shift and ‘long term’ stress components which carry over periods of weeks or months. ‘Long term’
stress is identified but not currently implemented in the risk simulation model though the associated
medical literature describes extensively the effects of deterioration of individual performance due to
long term effects of motivation/depression.
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Studies in relation to sleep deprivation primarily undertaken within the medical community tend not to
have sufficient controls to derive relevant findings. Results of more rigorous studies, however,
indicate a clear deterioration of performance based on sleep deprivation and this effect is
subsequently used in the proposed model as developed in chapter 3. The literature provides no
guidance on how separate individual effectiveness functions (physical, stress/emotional and
intellectual) should be combined as a single effectiveness value. A structure based on fuzzy logic is
outlined in chapter 6 for deriving a single effectiveness value from the set of component effectiveness
values. This approach uses linguistic interpretation of fuzzy input parameters.
Competency Factors: The literature reveals a trend towards greater identification of training within a
competency based structure. The competency profile of nursing staff tends to be more actively
defined than medical staff based on verification that indicated tasks can be appropriately undertaken.
This can provide a more directed system of learning where the verification of competency is an
assurance of safe and appropriate practice. The literature review, however, found no prior reference
to the approach of describing clinical interventions as sub tasks with associated levels of competency
as developed within the Thesis in chapter 5. The literature confirmed, however, that nursing tasks are
more easily defined in relation to patient ‘care’ than tasks undertaken by doctors in relation to patient
‘management’. This could be described in the context that doctors ‘cure’ and nurses ‘care’. This
influenced the decision to initially simulate interventions undertaken by nursing staff rather than
medical staff.
Risk Reduction: Non medical sectors: The basic human factors relating to safety in sectors outside the
medical field can be expected to have a direct overlap with safety in the Critical Care environment.
The relevant literature implies that it is easier to adopt more rigorous practices within the airline
industry due to the more streamlined approach to adopt improved working practices. It is identified,
also, that processes of risk reduction in the non-medical sectors are more likely to be subject to issues
of security and commercial sensitivity and as a result are less likely to be openly reported then those
in healthcare.
Fuzzy Models: The literature identifies a set of applications using fuzzy logic within the medical field
with also inclusion of review articles. There appears, however, no systems which utilise the specific
fuzzy risk methodology subsequently developed in this Thesis. Aspects of further work relating to
investigation of alternative Fuzzy functions are outlined in chapter 8.
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Chapter 3: Factors Relating to Individual Effectiveness
3.1 Introduction
This chapter identifies factors which are considered to affect individual effectiveness, as a component
of a risk model. It is recognised that a significant number of adverse incidents occur in medicine due
to individual human error and which can be related to individual competency or the level of
effectiveness of the individual. This latter factor can in turn be influenced by workload factors and
also factors such as sleep deprivation. This chapter identifies specific empirical mathematical models
relating to physical effort/stamina, emotional/stress effort/stamina, intellectual effort/stamina, sleep
deprivation, handover and admission functions. The identified models draws from a wide range of
both clinical studies and non clinical studies of such factors which can influence individual
effectiveness within the work environment.
In seeking to model risk within the Critical Care environment, it is important to take account of human
factors that can influence the relative incidence of ‘adverse effects’. While task competency is a key
factor, aspects of ‘effectiveness’ of the individual are also relevant and may be influenced by the
degree of difficulty of patient care and associated levels of stress and fatigue. There are also
considerations linked to patterns of shift working. The literature of ‘work effectiveness’ is very
extensive across all work sectors and with aspects relative to working within the clinical environment
identified as a specific subset of this area of investigation. Studies from medical literature tend not to
identify clear causation between ‘effectiveness’ factors and levels of adverse events, but they are of
value in identifying potential causal factors and how these can be introduced in models to simulate
such interactions. The first part of this chapter aims to identify key concepts/observations made by a
range of investigators. Based on these observations, a model of individual effectiveness is proposed.
3.2 Sleep Deprivation and Individual Effectiveness
The work environment within the Critical Care environment is known to impact on the sleep patterns of
staff, especially staff who work rostered 12 hour night shifts, though there have been mixed results of
studies seeking to relate this to loss of task effectiveness.
A key study by van Dongen et al. (2003) where there was complete control of subjects throughout a
14 day sleep deprivation experiment, found that there was clear deterioration of psychomotor vigilance
performance, working memory performance and cognitive throughput performance as sleep
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deprivation built progressively. Within the study, groups were able to sleep for periods of 4 hours, 6
hours and 8 hours. Within waking periods, tests to evaluate performance were undertaken every two
hours. It was found that the level of deterioration of functions was constant within the specific ‘waking
day’ of the individual. Also, subjects who were progressively sleep deprived considered that they
were adapting to the sleep deprivation process, even though their measured task responses showed
the progressive declines in these determinations. Within the study period of 14 days, the cumulative
sleep deprivation was considered to be equivalent to up to two nights of total sleep deprivation. While
other studies tend not to show the link between progressive sleep deprivation and ‘task
ineffectiveness’ the positive findings in van Dongen et al. (2003) is attributed to the higher level of
control of the subjects.
Based on these findings, there are clear implications for work within a Critical Care environment where
there is likely to be cumulative sleep deprivation among staff based on combinations of long shift
periods and rotations between shifts. A key factor determined in the study is the apparent ability of
the human organism to ‘feel’ bright and alert although there is an obvious decrease in ability to
undertake tasks effectively.
The study undertaken by Dorrian et al. (2006) into impact on healthcare of levels of sleep of nursing
staff sampled the sleep profile and linked adverse events for a set of 23 nurses over a period of 644
days (377 shifts). The authors indicate that the modern directives in healthcare within hospitals,
namely to treat patients more rapidly so that they are acutely ill for shorter periods, places increased
nursing activity within the time phase of actual nurse contact. Patterns of increased nursing workload
can be met in part with increased use of overtime, though this in turn increases the potential risk of
increase of errors due to fatigue. Specific items recorded during the study included work hours
(scheduled and actually worked), sleep length and quality, level of fatigue/sleepiness/stress and errors
which were subdivided into categories of medical, transcription, charting, procedural, slip/fall and
‘other’. Categories of alertness, mental exhaustion, physical exhaustion and stress were recorded on
1 to 5 analogue scale. The study indicated a reduction of effectiveness within night shift activity
compared with day shift activity.
3.3 Stress as an Indicator of Adverse Events
The study by Jones et al. (1988) into links between stress and medical malpractice examined these
factors within four separate clinical settings. Stress was measured using the Heath Factors Inventory
system as developed by the St. Paul Insurance Company in the USA. Specific measurements of
stress related to job stress (29 items), job dissatisfaction (20 items), organisational stress (17 items)
and personal stress (25 items). In one sub study a correlation with stress was generally found
between hospital departments with higher malpractice rates compared with departments with lower
values though no correlation was found with personal stress. The authors indicate, however, that it is
31
not clear if the effect is that malpractice events are more common because of the high levels of stress
or the high levels of stress are a reflection of the high levels of malpractice. In a linked study involving
93 hospitals and also referenced within Jones et al. (1988), details were obtained of hospital wide
stress levels and prevailing levels of malpractice within the selected hospitals. Again a strong
correlation was found between the levels of stress and the level of malpractice, with again no link with
personal stress.
As part of another linked study referenced within Jones et al. (1988), the level of medication errors
was investigated as a programme of stress reduction was implemented within a specific hospital. In
phase ‘A’, the pre-implementation phase, a mean level of 10.25 medication errors per month was
recorded, while in phase ‘B’ , after implementation of the stress reduction programme, this had fallen
to a level 5.14. A relevant feature of the study was that hospital staff were not aware that medication
errors were being reviewed. One inference of this result is that stress is a causal factor for medication
error and probably for other types of adverse clinical event.
3.4 Stress Induced by Adverse Events
An important stressing factor in healthcare can be the psychological impact on staff who feel
responsible for adverse events, especially those that could have led to the death of a patient. The
study by Christensen et al. (1992) where a series of eleven medical practitioners discuss specific
medical errors which they consider are wholly or partly ‘their fault’, reveals stress factors which have
the potential to exert a long term negative bias on subsequent work activity. The authors indicate
that the problem is not helped by the ‘elitist’ concepts communicated within medical training
programmes and that a more open approach to the acceptance of errors may be beneficial to all
parties. It is likely that the very same psychological factors are also active for nursing staff. It is
inferred that if errors were handled more appropriately in the Critical Care environment, this could act
to relieve associated psychological pressures and stress. Also, units with lower levels of adverse
incidents are likely to have reduced levels of stress triggered by this factor. It is generally identified
that deaths of patients within the Critical Care environment can be identified as a significant stressing
factor.
3.5 Impact of Hours Worked on Individual Effectiveness
The study by Barger et al. (2006) which was based on an extensive e-mail survey of 2737 medical
residents in the USA, indicated a strong link with extended-duration work shifts and the level of









Odds ratio of at least one
fatigue-related significant
medical error
Between 1 and 5 8.7 3.5
Over 5 7 7.5
Table 3.1. Summary of study findings after Barger et al. (2006).
The authors indicate that while the generation of serious medical errors is undesirable in itself, the
impact on such errors on the ‘responsible’ medical residents can have seriously damaging effects in
terms of triggering feelings of fear, guilt, anger, embarrassment and humiliation. These effects have
been previously described by Christensen et al.(1992).
In the context of typical Critical Care Units in the UK, the element of sleep deprivation will still play a
part in influencing risk of adverse events though not at the levels prevailing when doctors were
required to regularly work extended hours. In addition, while the effects of sleep deprivation on task
competence are widely appreciated, such as by van Dongen et al. (2003), adequate sleep is also
considered a requirement for memory consolidation and learning after review by Stickgold, James and
Hobson (2000). While it has been accepted that effective sleep is required for perceptual learning,
the study by Walker et al. (2002) has indicated that improvement of a motor skill is dependent on
nocturnal sleep and with a link possibly to the level of stage 2 non rapid eye movement sleep. This
would imply that uptake of new skills/knowledge would be impaired by poor quality sleep patterns.
Thus not only is an adequate sleep pattern important for task completion, it also is a requirement for
optimal task learning.
3.6 Stress Monitoring Studies in Healthcare
The study by Elfering et al.(2006) investigated factors related to stress within the healthcare
environment where over two weeks, all stressful events (minor and major) were monitored by 23
newly qualified nurses within 19 hospitals in Switzerland. The analysis of safety related stressful
events is outlined in table 3.2. One subset of questions related to the incident itself where a
description of the incident was followed by qualification of likelihood of the event being repeated and
also potential of changing the situation for the better. A separate question related to compliance with
safety regulations. A series of questions related to the element of ‘control’ the individual had in work
activity e.g. level of planning of day, ability to take breaks during working day, preparing tasks (e.g.
information, materials etc.), restrictions caused by problems in other areas, level of multitasking and
level of distraction e.g. telephone calls. For each stressful event, therefore, the situational
information was qualified by the other factors.
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It was determined that 19.7% of recorded stressful events were related to patient safety, though, it
could be argued that all stressful events potentially have an impact on the individual’s effectiveness to
carry out duties with patients. This level, however, could range between 10% and 40% within the
group sampled.
Event description Number (%)
Fragmentary, incomplete or incorrect documentation 25 (40.3)
Medication error/near miss 13 (21)
Forgotten or incomplete briefing 3 (4.8)
Delays in delivery of patient care 6 (9.7)
Patient casualty 4 (6.5)
Violence/aggression 6 (9.7)
Failed bleeper 2 (3.2)
Risky patient behaviour 3 (4.8)
Table 3.2. Summary of event description for patient safety related stressful events after Elfering,
Semmer and Grebner (2006).
While the study is focusing on the stressful events that directly related to care of the patient, the
events that are not reported (ie personal, social etc.) potentially have an effect on the performance of
the individual. Also, there is no severity scale to rank the event, though in most cases this can be
inferred from the context of the report. Studies like this are important to reveal issues that would
otherwise remain unreported. While the study appears not to have involved the Critical Care
environment, its observations would tend to apply generally.
The review by Donchin and Seagull (2002) of the ‘hostile environment’ of the intensive care unit
addresses a wide range of issues which have been identified as potential risk factors within Critical
Care Units. In addition, the review draws attention to the ambiguities which exist for alteration of
processes. It is, for example, probably easier to purchase the latest model of health technology than
modify a specific work practice which is firmly embedded within existing practice. This gives rise to
the concept of organisational inertia and the difficulty of making changes to work practices. Also, the
extensive use of patient monitoring gives rise to significant streams of data which staff struggle to
evaluate and utilise effectively.
The study undertaken by Fischer et al. (2006) also found that staff working within the Critical Care
environment tend to have raised levels of cortisol – the ‘fight or flight’ hormone associated with stress.
Such elevated levels were also not reported within other acute areas of the hospital, indicating that the
Critical Care environment has unique factors which tend to trigger heightened stress within the
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individual. Also, the environment of the ITU is full of noise of alarms, the majority of which are false
alarms. In addition, where, for example, many items of similar equipment are in operation together in
close proximity, recognition of a specific alarming device is a problem as indicated by Seagull and
Sanderson (2001). In addition Haas and Casali (1995) have indicated that often the severity of the
prevailing situation is not matched by the signature of the auditory warning signal. The study
undertaken by Grumet et al. (1994) highlighted the significant additional stress which ‘a sea of alarms’
can trigger. Presumably in units with more space per patient, there would be better ‘auditory
discrimination’ of equipment that was alarming. This is an example of physical environment having
an impact on clinical risk.
3.7 Effectiveness and Shift Working
The effect of length of working shifts (day and night) has been extensively studied within a range of
work sectors as based on obvious concerns for both the health of the individual and the safety of work
practices and associated systems. The study of Sallinen et al. (2004) analysed, under laboratory
conditions, factors relating to day shifts of 12 hours where a simulated distillation task was used to
replicate work activity. Measures of individual functioning included electroencephalography/electro-
oculography (EEG/EOG) for objective sleepiness. The Karolinska Sleepiness Scale was used to
assess subjective sleepiness. Work/task performance were evaluated separately. The level of task
stimulation was found to influence the degree of objective sleepiness, on a par with the level of sleep
debt. The authors commented that with many ‘tasks’ in industry now consisting of a ‘supervisory’ role,
there was an increased risk of lower task performance with the reduction of skill/decision making
components of work. Translating this to the Critical Care environment, it is important that work, at any
level of staff involvement, retains a stimulating component. This finding gives rise to the concept of
an alertness factor derived from task activity and which probably has increased significance for night
shift working where level of task activity is generally reduced.
The finding of Sallinen et al. (2004) regarding individual performance during the shift indicate that
neither sleepiness nor performance errors peak at the end of the 12 hour day shift. This is in
agreement with other investigators such as Reid and Dawson (2001). Work simulation and cognitive
tests were best at noon and during late afternoon sessions and worst during the morning or mid
afternoon sessions. Such ‘daytime’ circadian components, however, have not been incorporated into
the risk simulation model described in this thesis.
Within the extensive literature on shift working and individual effectiveness, there appears to be a
consensus on relative alertness within a 12 hour dayshift and 12 hour nightshift working. The study
of Budnick et al. (1994), describing 12 hour shift systems starting at 06.00 am describes a mid
morning peak of alertness at around 9.00 am and in the afternoon around 04.00 pm - with a lowest
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alertness at around 02.00 pm. For the night shift, there is a general decline of alertness from
around 08.00 pm towards the end of shift and with lowest alertness around 04.00 am.
While night shifts are unavoidable, researchers have been keen to determine which pattern of night
shift best preserves individual performance. The study of Wilkinson et al. (1989) compared average
reaction time of nurses during night shift for a weekly rotating night shift and a three monthly
permanent night shift. There was a general deterioration in reaction times measured ‘late’ in shifts at
around 03.30 am for both the ‘weekly’ and the ‘monthly’ shift pattern though the differences were not
identified as significant.
The study of Borges and Fischer (2003) of nursing 12 hour shifts within the Brazilian health system






hour of night shift of self declared
alertness using the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale and based on shifts in time frame of 07.00 am to
07.00 pm. In a review of implementation of 12 hour shifts within a Brazilian petrochemical plant, an
evaluation was undertaken by Fischer et al. (2000) of self declared alertness during both day and






hour of such shifts. Sequential reductions in alertness values were
observed for both day and night shifts, with greater reductions evident for the night shift.
The general evidence of shift working is to identify a variation within the day shift based on circadian
rhythm and also during the night shift with a loss of effectiveness towards 03.30 am. It is generally
observed that adaption to night shift working after transfer from a day shift pattern accentuates such
shift deficiencies.
3.8 Performance Obstacles in Nursing
The identification of ‘microsystems’ within the provision of Critical Care medicine has been an
identified feature of successful units of health provision as expounded by Carayon and Gurses (2005)
and Nelson et al. (2002). This has facilitated analysis of performance obstacles within healthcare
which are relevant to consider within the context of models simulating risk/effectiveness factors. A
specific study by Gurses and Carayon (2007) has identified a key set of factors identified as
performance obstacles as indicated in table 3.3 and within indicated factors of a work system model.
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Identified Obstacle Response Work System Model Element
Equipment not available 32% Technology and Tools
Patient rooms not well stocked 32% Technology and Tools
Spending time seeking supplies 24% Technology and Tools
Spending time searching for equipment 20% Technology and Tools
Spending time dealing with family needs 35% Tasks
Spending time teaching family 34% Tasks
Delay in obtaining medicine 36% Organisation
Searching for patient charts 23% Organisation
Change of shift report too long 18% Organisation
Inadequate shift change information 18% Organisation
Delay in obtaining new medical orders 21% Organisation
Distractions from family members 42% Environment
Insufficient space 26% Environment
Phone calls from family members 23% Environment
Table 3.3. Summary of performance obstacles - after Gurses and Carayon (2007).
This study by Gurses and Carayon (2007) identifies strongly the component of time required to cope
with relatives. This factor surfaces in the study as almost the dominant distracting factor.
Presumably this is a component which relates to the actual period of patient visiting and a component
relating to other contact such as by phone.
In terms of factors which can influence individual effectiveness, the identification of factors relating to
handover are identified as being significant. This can be identified as the initial handover on
admission where the handover can be from an emergency department as described by McFetridge et
al. (2007) or relating to the normal nursing shift handover as reviewed by Currie (2002). It is
appropriate to consider ‘handover skills’ as a specific competency within the range of competencies
identified for nursing staff. It is identified that there will be a general loss of effectiveness of an
individual starting a shift due to ‘handover’ factors. The most significant ‘handover’ effect can be
considered to take place on patient admission, since the Critical Care unit as a whole has to structure
and implement the relevant care pathway for the patient.
In terms of ‘obstacles to care’, the study by Gurses and Carayon (2007) also references aspects of the
physical environment which undoubtedly does influence individual effectiveness. This is in particular
relevant bearing in mind the opening in July 2006 at University Hospital Coventry of a new 26 bed
Critical Care Unit as the amalgamation of three previously separate Critical Care facilities within two
hospitals. In general, the alteration of the physical characteristics of the Critical Care environment to
improve patient space and equipment provision may influence the quality of overall patient care team
interaction. It can be considered that factors relating to the physical environment will have a direct
effect on individual effectiveness. One example is identified as influencing the amount of time
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chasing supplies and equipment and also influencing the degree of team interaction and information
sharing. For any specific modelled system, the physical environment can be considered as a
‘constant’ of the model. It is a significant thought, however, that the quality of the physical
environment of a Critical Care Unit will have a direct influence on its corresponding mortality rate,
though little information is available to validate this assumed link. It is possible, in the model,
however, to include factors which are influenced by the physical environment of a Critical Care Unit.
It would seem, however, an important field of study to develop based on the undoubted impact of such
a factor or patient survival rates for the lifetime of use of the facility. Elements subsequently identified
include factors which influence time spent ‘at the bedside’ and factors which facilitate ‘team
communication’ which are further addressed in chapter 6 of the Thesis. In addition, factors relating to
competency sharing, supervision and distraction are further developed in chapter 6.
3.9 Job Shop Models
Job shop models conventionally relate to optimisation of production of a series of tasks with availability
of production resources as described by Kim and Egbelu (1998) and Bagchi (1999). One optimisation
technique commonly used for this process is genetic algorithms. In application of such techniques, the
key factors relate to process definition identified as configuration of production and availability of
machine resources to optimise production.
The inclusion of elements relating to individual ‘operator’ effectiveness represents the introduction of
an additional degree of complexity into such models. The optimisation technique can be considered
to be applied to ensure that individuals are not over fatigued by the pattern of allocated work which
would result in reduced work throughput. This concept can be considered to be relevant within the
framework of industrial process control, but is less applicable within the context of a Critical Care
environment. The more general interest for the Critical Care environment, however, is the
introduction of simulation of levels of individual effectiveness
Using a job shop methodology within a veterinary practice, Koszalka and Skworcow (2003) outlined a





 Fatigue threshold - the time of continuous work above which fatigue has impact
 Minimum stamina – level below which a worker is rested
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It is therefore within a subset of literature that references to these parameters are made, rather than
within that of medical literature. Most scheduling problems, however, relate to situations where there
is a much higher control over the processes being optimised and the individual tasks can be
included/excluded within the model structure. In the clinical environment however, the tasks are
essentially scheduled on the basis of clinical requirements and the level of control on use of resources
is limited. It is a characteristic, however, of Critical Care function that levels of activity will fluctuate
significantly. In terms of describing the mathematical function of variation of stamina, specific options
within ‘job shop’ models can be implemented as:
 Use of fatigue threshold (time of activity after which stamina tends to reduce)
 Function to simulate reduction of effectiveness with time
 Function to simulate increase of effectiveness with rest
Most clinical papers, however, which reference individual and group ‘effectiveness’, however, do not
model such factors within a mathematical framework.
3.10 Development of Individual Effectiveness Models
The effectiveness of staff remains a key consideration within the model of activity of staff within the
Critical Care environment. It is therefore necessary to establish an empirical model of individual
effectiveness based on specific elements identified within the literature. Within job shop models
factors such as staff resilience/fatigue are identified as being important in terms of achieving effective
production/processing. In the context of the model of staffing within an intensive care facility, for
example, consideration is required of specific parameters which can include:
 Identification of loss of effectiveness with time during shift working
 Identification of recovery of effectiveness following rest/quiescent periods
 Identification of influence on effectiveness of nature of workload
 Identification of influence on effectiveness of job stress
There is also the factor of more complex stress factors involving burnout and clinical depression as
described by Iacovides et al. (2003). While some work activity can be stressful due to the
nature/complexity of the activity, the development of ‘burnout’ can potentially trigger more significant
loss of effectiveness when the feeling of individual worth based on career expectations and
appreciation of personal competence are undermined and diminished. In terms of simulation of
‘burnout’ effects, this can be identified as developing and recovering over longer time periods such as
weeks and months, in contrast to shorter term effects during time scales of specific working shifts.
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These stress factors acting over longer term periods are identified but not implemented as factors
within the current risk model.
3.11 Summary of Parameters Affecting Individual Effectiveness
The broad range of literature relating to task effectiveness has been generated on account of a wide
range of objectives, but lacks the specific clarity to simulate task effectiveness within the Critical Care
environment. As an outcome of a review of relevant literature, specific functions listed in table 3.4 are
identified which are considered to impact on ‘individual effectiveness’.
It is proposed that a generic individual effectiveness function can be described as:
Eff = f ( Ens Eph Eem Eme Eh Eadm Esd Elt) (3.1)
Which signifies Eff as a function of the independent elements.
Specific functions are identified which relate to referenced parameter variations.
Reference Description
Ens Circadian rhythm day shift and night shift working
Eph Fatigue, based on physical exertion and based on task activities over a shift
cycle
Eem Fatigue, based on emotional/stress ‘exertion’ and based on task activities over
a shift cycle
Eme Fatigue, based on intellectual ‘exertion’ and based on task activities over a shift
cycle
Eh Effects related to handover at the start of a 12 hour shift
Eadm Effects related to admission of a new patient
Esd Effect due to sleep deficit
Elt Long term effect
Table 3.4. Parameters/factors affecting individual effectiveness.
3.12 Components of Intervention Independent Effectiveness
The functions identified with aspects of effectiveness have been further developed within chapter 6 to
a level for use within the risk simulation process. Specific functions identified as independent of
specific interventions include:
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 Handover function at start of 12 hour shifts (Eh )
 Effectiveness during night shift (Ens )
 Effectiveness reduction due to sleep deficit (Esd)
 Effectiveness reduction due to admission (Eadm)
 Effectiveness reduction due to long term effects(Elt)
For effectiveness functions which are not dependent on interventions, a specific function Eeff1 is
defined as the minimum value of component functions.
Eeff1 = Min( Eh Ens Esd Eadm Elt) (3.2)
The value of effectiveness with handover function, Eh, is referenced as:
Eh = (1-A0 e
-c1.(t –t0)
) (3.3)
Where t is time expressed in days relative to start of handover period at time t0 and A0 determines the
initial loss of individual effectiveness at the start of the shift and the value of c1 relates to the rate of
recovery of effectiveness values. Values of c1 and A0 are associated with the ‘level’ of patient
condition on a scale of 1 (least care required) to 5 (most care required). It is subsequently considered
appropriate to assign values of c1 and A0 for specific patients on the basis of patient severity ‘grade’
in range 1 to 5 and on the nursing band in range 5 to 7 of nurse assigned to the patient.
Figure 3.1. Details of typical function Eeff1 (Ens =1; Eadm=1) as the product of component functions
where the components indicated relate to the night shift element, morning handover and evening
handover.
In figure 3.1, the sleep deprivation component of the function shows a minimum value around 03.30
am which is a common feature described in studies referencing task effectiveness within shift work
systems. The handover periods at 07.30 am and 07.30 pm are classified by a sharp reduction in
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value followed by a period of recovery. Values of A0 and c1 as indicated in table 3.5 were chosen to
provide flexibility in model implementation.
A0 A0 A0 hr hr hr
band 5 band 6 band 7 band 5 band 6 band 7
grade 5 0.25 0.2 0.15 1.5 1.25 1
grade 4 0.275 0.225 0.175 2 1.75 1.5
grade 3 0.3 0.25 0.2 2.5 2.25 2
grade 2 0.325 0.275 0.225 3 2.5 2.5
grade 1 0.35 0.3 0.25 4 3.5 3
Table 3.5. Details of assigned values of A0 and time to 50% recovery (hr - hours) for specific severity
grade of patient (grade 1 most complex) and assigned nursing band.
For a given value of hr, the value of c1 is derived by:
c1 = (0.6913 ) / (24/hr) (3.4)
There is also an issue as the how separate functions contribute towards the combined effectiveness
function of an individual. Options include a minimum value, a product of components or a function
derived from fuzzy logic. Initial simulations of processes have utilised the minimum value of separate
identified functions. Section 6.15 outlines the use of fuzzy logic to derive a single effectiveness value
from component inputs.
The characteristics of the handover responses indicated in table 3.5 can be anticipated to relate in
some measure to the level of experience of the corresponding nursing staff, with initial loss of
efficiency being greatest for least experienced staff. This is based on empirical observations that
more experienced staff will experience less of a reduction in individual effectiveness at the start of the
shift and the recovery process will be faster.
A common theme of observations of day/night shift working is the loss of effectiveness during the night
shift - with a maximum loss occurring around 3.30 am but with a mode of recovery towards the time of
shift handover. While some variation is identified within the ‘day’ shift hours of the circadian rhythm,
this contribution is ignored. Equation 3.5 outlines the empirical function used to implement this
component of individual effectiveness and with relative value of function indicated in figure 3.2.
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In figure 3.2, ans=0.14583, bns = 250 and dns = 1 and t is the time within day cycle and expressed in
days.
At the time of least effectiveness, the value of Ens is 0.6667. Also, when the exponential terms
diverge to large values, Ens approaches unity. The value of ans is set to produce a minimum at 3.30
am. The value of bns is set to ensure that effectiveness returns to unity at shift changeover around
08.00 am.
3.13 Effectiveness Components: Physical, Emotional/Stress and Intellectual
(Intervention Dependent)
Specific effectiveness functions have been defined which relate to physical reserve, emotional
reserve and intellectual reserve. Each factor is associated with two specific constants, one related to
the reduction in parameters with each activity (at a specific point in time) and another with its mode of
relaxation back to higher levels. For example, the function identifying physical reserve is:
Eph(t2)= Eph(t1) + (1-PHval.PHwgt) (1- e-
rph.(t2-t1)
) (3.6)
Where PHval is the component of a discrete physical effort (PHval.PHwgt<1), rph is a recovery
parameter and PHwgt is a weighting value based on individual stamina, t1 is the time at which the
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effect is applied, t2 is the current time value and t2>t1. Units of t2 and t1 are in days. The value of
effectiveness experiences a ‘dip’ at each component of an intervention which is followed by a period of
exponential recovery towards a value of unity.
It is apparent that a younger, fitter person will have more physical stamina (smaller value of PHwgt,
greater value of rph) than an older, less fit person (larger value of PHwgt, smaller value of rph. It is
appropriate to identify ‘grades’ 1 to 5 to identify the grades of physical stamina as outlined in table 3.6,
with corresponding values of PHwgt and rph.
PHwgt
(PHval weighting)
grade 1 Physical stamina 1.5 20
grade 2 Physical stamina 1.25 20
grade 3 Physical stamina 1 15
grade 4 Physical stamina 0.75 10
grade 5 Physical stamina 0.5 5
50 % recovery time (minutes)
Table 3.6. Identification of characteristics of physical reserve as a function of ‘grade’ where grade 1 is
least physical stamina and grade 5 is greatest level of physical stamina.
The value of PHval is held within the main interventions file as the value with which the physical
reserve value is decremented each time the activity is undertaken for unity value of PHwgt. The
values of PHwgt and recovery times were empirically derived from observations of procedures
undertaken by nursing staff.
This function of effectiveness derived from physical effort is associated with variations within a specific
shift and where at the start of each new shift, a value of Eph(t) of unity is assigned.
A similar function can be defined for emotional/stress effort:




Eme(t2)= Eme(t1) + (1-MEval.MEwgt) (1- e-
rme(t2-t1)
) (3.8)
As previously indicated, the value of effectiveness experiences a ‘dip’ at each component of an




grade 1 EM stamina 1.5 15
grade 2 EM stamina 1.25 15
grade 3 EM stamina 1 15
grade 4 EM stamina 0.75 12.5
grade 5 EM stamina 0.5 10
50 % recovery time (minutes)
Table 3.7. Identification of characteristics of emotional/stress reserve as a function of ‘grade’ where
grade 1 is least emotional/stress stamina and grade 5 is greatest grade of emotional/stress stamina.
MEwgt
(MEval weighting)
grade 1 ME stamina 1.5 15
grade 2 ME stamina 1.25 15
grade 3 ME stamina 1 15
grade 4 ME stamina 0.75 12.5
grade 5 ME stamina 0.5 10
50 % recovery time (minutes)
Table 3.8: Identification of characteristics of intellectual reserve as a function of ‘grade’ where grade 1
is least intellectual stamina and grade 5 is greatest grade of mental stamina.
These functions are empirically derived based on observations of nursing staff within the Critical
Care Unit within University Hospital, Coventry. A specific shift was populated with interventions
associated with a post surgical level 3 patient (ventilated). Values were identified with depletion of
reserve values (physical, emotional and intellectual) for each intervention as indicated in table 3.9.





07:45 834 suction (vent) 4 4 3
07:50 1173 respond patient monitor alarm 1 2 4
07:55 526 respond to syringe alarm 1 2 5
08:00 11 hourly vital signs 6 4 6
08:05 1341 empty urine bag 4 2 4
08:15 833 monitor ventilation 1 2 4
08:20 872 implement nebulised drugs 3 3 5
08:25 524 administration IV (syringe) 3 4 5
08:30 194 check NG tube ph 3 4 5
08:35 834 suction (vent) 4 4 3
08:40 173 observe wound drainage 2 4 3
08:45 524 administration IV (syringe) 3 4 5
08:50 1173 respond patient monitor alarm 1 2 4
08:55 526 respond to syringe alarm 1 2 5
09:00 11 hourly vital signs 6 4 6
09:05 521 identify drug round 2 4 5
09:10 522 administer drug (drug round) 4 4 4
09:15 1221 update patient notes 2 3 6
09:20 331 routine ABGS (arterial bloods) 3 3 3
time Int.Ref Activity
Table 3.9. Extract from sample intervention entries of grade 3 patient (surgical) with identified
components of ‘reserve’ depletion for specific interventions. (Depletion values shown x 100).
The values of physical, emotional and intellectual reserve depletion are empirically derived
based on observations within the Critical Care Unit within University Hospital, Coventry and with
utilisation of mapping function structured within table 3.10.
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Depletion Value Physical Reserve Emotional Reserve Intellectual
Effort/Concentration
1 to 2 Light effort, short time period Low levels of stress for short
time period
Low levels of mental effort for
short time period
3 Light effort for medium time period Low level of stress for
medium time period
Low levels of mental effort for
medium time period
4 to 5 Moderate effort for short period Moderate emotional stress for
short time period
Moderate mental effort for
short time period
6 Moderate effort for medium time
period
Moderate emotional stress for
medium time period
Moderate mental effort for
medium time period
7 to 8 Significant effort for short time
period
Significant emotional stress for
short time period
Highly complex mental effort
for short time period
9 Significant effort for medium time
period
Significant emotional stress for
medium time period
Highly complex mental effort
for medium time period
10 Extreme physical effort Extreme stress Extremely difficult mental task
Table 3.10. Derived scale of depletion for physical, emotional and mental reserves based on activity
associated with interventions.
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Figure 3.3. Details of variation of grades of physical, emotional and intellectual reserves during a
simulated set of shift interventions (Physical : grade 3; emotional: grade 3; intellectual : grade 3).
The characteristics of the simulated specific ‘reserve’ function will vary significantly with the level of
clinical activity simulated. The dip in value of emotion and intellectual reserves between 08.00 am
and 09.30 am in figure 3.3 is due to a sequence of continuous interventions with no periods of
recovery. For the simulated series indicated in figure 3.3, physical depletion would not appear
significant, while that of intellectual effort would seem to vary more widely.
It is an observation that the stress and also intellectual effort of undertaking work will reflect to some
extent the relative competence of the individual, with competency gaps increasing the relative stress
and intellectual effort involved in completing tasks. At this stage in the model, coupling between
competency and stress levels has not been implemented. The function of ‘grade’ of stamina is
intended to relate to the intrinsic characteristics of the individual. It is likely, however, that the effect of
gaps in competency would ‘depress’ the grade of stamina applied to a emotional/stress reserve
because the task would be associated with greater stress. It is identified that more extensive review
of individual effectives functions as outlined in table 3.4 will arise from operation of the risk simulation
system. In general terms, the literature relating to workload analysis in the clinical environment does
not identify separate components of physical, emotional/stress and intellectual stamina/reserve to
aspects of staff effectiveness though it is considered important to introduce these separate factors
into the risk simulation model.
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3.14 Summary
This chapter has identified the model elements that describe individual effectiveness as a function of
contributing factors which include work activity, shift profile, admission activity and sleep deficit. The
following chapter addresses the task of simulating episodes of clinical activity based on both
observations within the Critical Care Unit at University Hospital Coventry and analysis of data related
to admission/discharge episodes and associated clinical interventions.
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Chapter 4: Characterising Clinical Activity
4.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines an approach of simulation of clinical activity within the Critical Care environment
based on analysis of patterns of admission/discharge activity and associated clinical interventions.
The specific patient ‘record’ can be considered to consist of a series of clinical interventions between
the point of admission and point of discharge, The exposure of risk to a patient is related to the type
and number of interventions experienced by the patient within this time.
The chapter describes two main simulation processes, one relating to admission/discharge episodes
and the other to the clinical interventions experienced by patients. The simulation of
admission/discharge episodes uses the framework of admission/discharge probabilities related to
activity within a normalised 168 hour element week. The process of simulation of patient
interventions is considerably more complex. One component utilises historical patient activity data
within a clinical activity data base to predict likely patterns of interventions as a function of length of
patient stay and specialty. A second component is introduced to include components of standard
nursing practice based on observation of activity within the Critical Care Unit within University Hospital,
Coventry.
4.2 Role of Interventions
Patients in the environment of a Critical Care unit undergo ‘interventions’. The majority of these are
carefully documented on a daily basis and appear within a patient’s clinical data record. Recording of
this data is facilitated by the Quality Sentinel (QS) data base system. A formal system for
classification of care delivered to the patient is by means of TISS (therapeutic intervention scoring
system) (see Appendix 2 and 3). This data provides both details of clinical information and a system
for cost recharge for the Critical Care unit. There is obvious importance for accurate updating of each
patient record. Each patient is marked up on a daily basis against this TISS data reference.
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When a patient is discharged from the unit, this is exported as an ‘episode’ entry to an Access ® data









Table 4.1 QS data base export file data: Key data entries
Interventions are also identified which represent structural functions within the unit, such as admission
processes and discharge processes. In addition, numerous basic nursing processes not referenced
within the TISS system require to be identified since they represent a significant component of nursing
activity. These have been identified by periods of observation within the unit in Coventry and are
referenced in Appendix 4.
4.3 Historical Sequences of Clinical Care Data
QS data are available from February 2002 but the more relevant data are available following the
opening of the Critical Care Unit within University Hospital in Coventry in July 2006 when the activity of
three Critical Care units was combined into a new single facility. Data set #1 is referenced as the set
of admission/discharge data TISS data relating to the pre-2006 move and within time frame 2002 to
2005. Data set #2 is the corresponding set between August 2006 to August 2008.
In addition, a more detailed TISS export data set based on patient day episodes has been extracted
separately for calendar years 2007 and 2008. This is referenced as data set #3. These data sets
are summarised in Appendix 1. Sets of data were analysed mainly using Matlab® though pivot tables
in Excel® have also been employed to examine specific sets of extracted data. A basic parameter of




ENT 17 0.43 1
General Medicine 735 18.55 2
General Surgery 785 19.81 3
Gynaecology 26 2.7 4
Neurosurgery 1261 31.8 5
Obstetrics 14 0.35 6
Oral 27 0.68 7
Orthopaedics 135 3.41 8
Other 102 2.57 9
Paediatrics 2 0.05 10
Renal Medicine 87 2.2 11
Trauma 681 17.19 12
Cardiology 69 1.74 13
Urology 21 0.53 14
Specialty Number Cases % of total
Table 4.2 . Summary of activity by speciality (data set #1)
Most of the activity for this data set is within the major specialties - General Surgery, General
Medicine, Neurosurgery, Trauma and Orthopaedics. When represented as a function of
length of stay, figure 4.1 indicates that the relative volumes of data associated with some
specialties is limited and cannot be used to derive characteristic measures for the indicated
specialty.
Figure 4.1. Graphical representation of bed stay by specialty for data set #1. Specialty codes
as allocated in table 4.2.
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For data set #2, a core set of specialties is identified as indicated in table 4.3 and where non-
listed specialties are mapped into these specific sets.








Table 4.3. Core set of specialties identified for simulation activities.
4.4 Deriving Simulated Sequences of Clinical Activity
A key part of the development of the Clinical Risk model is to derive simulated sequences of
clinical activity which mirror that of the available data sets. A key component of this is the
admission/discharge profile as a function of specialty. This is strongly associated with a time
within day component and also a day of week component by specialty. Typical ‘day of week’
patterns are identified in figures 4.2 to 4.3, indicating averaged activity for General Medicine
and General Surgery.
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Figure 4.2. Summarised admission
discharge activity: Data set #2 for
General Medicine.
Figure 4.3. Summarised admission
discharge activity: Data set #2 for General
Surgery.
In figure 4.3 there is an increased level of discharge on Friday for General Surgery patients,
while in General Medicine as indicated in Figure 4.2, the peak level of discharge is on
Tuesdays.
Of significance is the variation of admission/discharge activity within a typical day as indicated in figure
4.4.
Figure 4.4. Admission/discharge summary for Tuesday for all specialties: data set #1
Figure 4.4 indicates the activity of admission/discharge in each hour interval for all specialties for
Tuesdays. In simulating patterns of admission/discharge data, use is made of relative frequency of
admission within hourly intervals within a seven day (Sunday-Saturday) cycle on a specialty basis.
The available data provides also data relating to bed occupancy, as indicated in figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5. Bed occupancy levels as derived from admission/discharge dates/times (data set #2) - all
specialties.
Analysis is also possible of the relative levels of activity associated with an identified specialty - as
indicated in figure 4.6 - where the activity associated with General Surgery is displayed within a time
frame of around 600 days.
Figure 4.6. Bed occupancy levels as derived from admission/discharge dates/times (data set #2) :
General Surgery
This approach provides an insight into ‘understanding’ the data in terms of trends and variations within
the data set. It also provides structured probability distributions of activity to assist in the derivation of
simulated sets of data.
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Figure 4.7. Bed stay data for General Medicine
(data set #1)
Figure 4.8. Bed stay data for Neurosurgery
(data set #1)
A key observation, however, is the characteristic profile of bed stay as a function of specialty – as
indicated in figures 4.7 and 4.8.
4.5 Derivation of Simulated Admit/Discharge Activity Sequences
The aim of the model is to provide a framework of clinical activity to allow simulation of sequences of
clinical interventions. The model to simulate admission/discharge episodes has been structured to
take account of collective activity levels on an averaged week basis (all specialties) and with bed
occupancy subsequently structured on historical specialty patterns. Elements have also been
incorporated to include delay in bed availability after patient discharge. It is on these sets of
simulated data that characteristics of the risk model will be exercised. Such data sets will be used to
test derived risk models for specific indications associated with clinical risk. The derived algorithm for
driving the simulation component of admission/discharge is outlined in figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9. Process of generation of time sequence of admission/discharge data based on previous
clinical data.
The available data sets (initially #1 and subsequently #2) have been utilised to derive a range of
probability functions to simulate similar series of admit/discharge data. Figure 4.10 indicates how a
value of bed stay is ‘allocated’ based on derivation of random value in range 0 to 1. The relative
probability of selecting a value is inversely proportional to the gradient of the function value.
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Figure 4.10. Derived bed stay
(Orthopaedic Data) as a value of ‘relative
function’ derived from random number
selection. (total admissions = 136).
Figure 4.11. Variation of percentage difference
(simulated - historical) for specific specialties and
sets of simulated data. Maximum number of
beds = 8.
A key part of the simulation module is to incorporate values of performance measure to determine the
suitability of modelled parameters. Figure 4.11 compares the series of a simulated series
admission/discharge sequences as a function of specialty. This indicates a convergence to initial
data set for increasing number of episode simulations. This confirms that the ‘historical’ sequence of
admission within specific specialties appears to be replicated in the simulated sequence. Evaluation
has also been undertaken of the degree of overlap within the 168 hour week cycle between the
historical data set and a finite sequence of simulated episodes as indicated in figure 4.12.
Figure 4.12. Variation of percentage admission rates within the ‘normalised’ week of 168 hour
intervals for historical set #1 and simulated set.
Figure 4.12 indicates the percentage admission rate in 168 hour intervals for the historical set of
admission data and also for the set of data for a modelled number of episodes. In general terms the
simulated profile appears to follow the historical reference data.
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In developing the corresponding algorithm for discharge activity, the time of discharge has to take
account of the actual discharge profile, rather than use the admission profile plus information relating
to length of bed stay. This is shown in figure 4.13 where the simulated discharge activity appears to
overlap with the actual clinical data set. Various measures of conformity have been derived to
evaluate functional overlap between the two data sets.
Figure 4.13 Details of percentage value for discharge sequences, with comparison of data set
#1 and simulated sequence of 1474 episodes, with improved overlap between data sets.
Table 4.4 outlines sets of typical data derived through admission/discharge activity simulation.
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Admit Discharge Bed Occupied
Time Time No. beds
1 2.5612 6.4218 3.8606 5 1 7 1 0.074754
2 2.7096 11.8253 9.1157 12 1 3 2 0.080125
3 3.0791 7.6916 4.6124 3 1 1 3 0.074755
4 4.6862 5.423 0.73684 5 1 8 4 0.046945
5 6.6042 13.6461 7.0419 12 1 2 3 0.029379
6 6.7973 22.4225 15.6252 3 1 8 4 0.021793
7 8.6256 11.0854 2.4598 5 1 1 4 0.082987
8 9.2273 22.8241 13.5968 9 2 7 5 0.034296
9 9.9006 22.6899 12.7894 3 2 6 6 0.030729
10 11.0339 12.8239 1.79 11 1 4 7 0.08161
11 11.9218 20.6002 8.6784 5 1 1 7 0.069916
12 15.9752 32.0007 16.0255 5 1 2 5 0.042485
13 16.5307 21.4682 4.9375 12 1 4 6 0.056841
14 16.8509 66.9133 50.0624 3 1 5 7 0.074457
15 18.7859 21.5122 2.7264 5 1 3 8 0.063646
16 21.1312 23.6012 2.4701 3 1 1 8 0.031862
17 21.9273 47.737 25.8097 3 1 4 7 0.044202
18 22.1007 37.1279 15.0271 2 2 3 8 0.041338
Outcome DelayEpisode Duration Spec.
Table 4.4 . Start Sequence of Core Admit/discharge activity – data set #1: (outcome 1 =
survival; outcome 2 = non-survival ; Delay = time after discharge of bed unavailability).
Figure 4.14. Summary of process of derivation of simulated data sets for admission/discharge
episodes.
Figure 4.14 indicates the details process of simulation of admission/discharge profiles based
on patterns of historical patient activity.
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4.6 Simulation of Patient Interventions
A key component of implementation of a risk model within the Critical Care environment, and indeed
any clinical environment, is to identify the interventions which patients undergo. In the first instance,
this can be considered essentially as a functional model of sequential interventions, such as
establishing ventilation, taking routine blood sample etc. as listed in Appendix 2. These are
subsequently expanded into a more extensive set as indicated in Appendix 3 and where a specific
TISS element is expanded to a related sub set of components.
Within the context of risk analysis, however, abstract ‘interventions’ are included such as review of
patient admission notes, construction of patient care plan, communication of patient care plan and
review of patient care plan. The significance of many of these interventions is reinforced within the
relevant medical literature. In addition, observation of actual clinical activity within the Critical Care
Unit at University Hospital, Coventry has allowed additional components of activity, as referenced in
Appendix 4, to be identified.
In depth analysis of TISS activity has been obtained through a specific export from the QS data base
system where each day episode of a patient stay is tagged with TISS activity (data set #3). While
data has been essentially analysed using Matlab ®, a useful mode of inspecting data is that of Pivot
table analysis within Excel. Figure 4.15 indicates the relative frequency of episodes of specific
duration (days) with and without ventilation for General Medicine specialty and as a function of
episode duration.
Figure 4.15 Variation of number of episodes of ventilation for General Medicine (GM – 1
(ventilated)) and non ventilated episodes for General Medicine (GM – 0 (not ventilated) ).
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Figure 4.16 Variation of number of episodes of ventilation for General Surgery (GS – 1 (ventilated))
and non ventilated episodes for General Surgery (GS – 0 (not ventilated)).
These figures indicate that longer stay patients tend to have a higher incidence of ventilation. This
reflects the pattern of activity of patients who are ‘passing through’ Critical Care with normal
recovery patterns and a core of patients whose recovery is more problematic and prolonged.
Figure 4.17. Variation of number of episodes of ventilation for Neurology (NU – 1 (ventilated))
and non ventilated episodes for Neurology (NU – 0 (not ventilated))
From the distribution of data within Neurology patients, there is increasing likelihood of ventilation for
episodes in excess of 5 days. Analysis of data using Pivot Table methods allows rapid verification of
sets of data extracted from within Matlab® programming.
Within the main set of TISS activity identified within Appendix 2, various elements are either inactive or
are applied to all patients, so detailed analysis of relative frequency of occurrence of all components is
not required. Also, only the most ‘populated’ seven specialties are included in the TISS analysis
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process. For TISS elements which are active, three separate file structures are identified. These are
‘episode’, ‘frequency’ and ‘time’. The details of ‘episode’ data is outlined in figure 4.18.
Figure 4.18. Array structure of TISS data where specialties 1 to 7 occupy separate rows and relative
frequency of occurrence by episode length in days is written across columns. Within a component
describing a given TISS component of a given length of episode, fv = TISS not present + not
ventilated, fV = TISS not present and ventilated, Fv = TISS present and not ventilated, FV = TISS
present and ventilated.
For episodes which have an active TISS parameter, the relative frequency of activity of a given TISS
element is structured by relative frequency by day element within a sequence of days. Thus for a
given episode of say 5 days, the frequency within day #1, day #2, day #3, day #4 and day #5 is
identified for day elements which have or have not ventilated activity for each day. This is indicated in
figure 4.19.
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Figure 4.19. Data representation of specific TISS element activity for a given specialty and for
episode of given duration and day element within a specific episode. Data is written in blocks of
columns per specific specialty - e.g. columns 1 to 200 relate to specialty #1 and specialty #2 relates
to column entries 201 to 400 etc.
In addition a separate mode of data analysis, a separate data file for each TISS parameter is created
based on the frequency of number of occurrences of a specific parameter within a specific episode
length as indicated in figure 4.20.
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Figure 4.20. Structure of data format of file to represent relative frequency of TISS activity –
where element Fv in day element #n, is the number of times the TISS element is present (non
ventilated episode) and FV is the corresponding number for a ventilated episode. In this
context, a ventilated episode is one where at least one day is ventilated.
The identification of TISS activity and associated general clinical activity allows ‘interventions’ to be
written into the patient clinical activity record which is structured to contain 288 slots per day, each of a
nominal 5 minute duration, as indicated in table 4.5. A separate Matlab ® programme for every active
TISS parameter is used to produce these array parameters and with data being stored within a
corresponding data file.
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Episode Time TISS Reference Activity












85 07:00 11 hourly observations
86 07:05 0




91 07:30 1011 Handover ON shift
92 07:35 833 Respond ventilation alarm
93 07:40 1012 Handover OFF shift
Table 4.5. Structure of TISS activity within admission/discharge episode – indicating how elements of
activity are expressed within the patient episode.
The maximum episode set for such simulated patient activity is 50 days, corresponding to a maximum
of 14400 interventions. Within a specific episode, key components associated with admission are
included as a ‘bundle’ of discrete interventions as indicated in table 4.6. The number of interventions
per day per patient will vary as a function of specialty, ventilation status of patient and derived level of
‘severity’ of condition of patient. Additional interventions tend to be undertaken at patient admission
and discharge.
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Episode Time TISS Reference Activity
46 03:45 1211 review admission notes
47 03:50 1091 general admission
48 03:55 352 collect non specialist sample (mic)
49 04:00 1171 initiate basic monitoring
50 04:05 1151 structure care plan
51 04:10 1101 initiate QS record
52 04:15 1111 weigh patient
53 04:20 1161 communicate care plan
54 04:25 151 Urine catheter (female)
55 04:30 271 assess bed requirement
56 04:35 101 Establish arterial line (arm)
57 04:40 322 routine blood sample
58 04:45 381 urine analysis
59 04:50 355 microbiology screen
Table 4.6. Core elements of clinical activity on admission with elements written within 5 minute
‘slots’ within the active day.
Hourly observations are then written into the activity matrix, followed by additional
TISS/intervention components and followed at the close of the episode by standard discharge
elements as indicated in figure 4.21.
Figure 4.21. Summary of derivation of patient activity using key elements of TISS activity.
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4.7 Structuring of Sequences of Simulated Interventions
An initial test sequence of simulated interventions was derived using this technique for validation of
the risk simulation model described in subsequent chapters. Figure 4.22 indicates a normalised
distribution of frequency of nursing interventions of a year’s simulated activity where the
intervention reference relates to the sequence number of the entry within the main intervention
description file. Within this initial data set, around 52% of the indicated interventions are blank,
indicating that the complex process of simulating interventions required further development.
Figure 4.22. Normalised frequency distribution of interventions within set #1 of simulated
interventions used for initial validation of risk simulation model.
Table 4.7 indicates the seven interventions recorded at highest frequency level.
90 833 Respond to ventilator alarm 0.2672
89 832 Establish appropriate patient ventilation 0.2071
1 11 TISS hourly vital signs 0.1445
13 1172 Establish basic monitoring alarms 0.1413
43 274 Bed sore management 0.0664
91 834 Routine suction ventilated patient/airway 0.0467
54 323 Request clotting factor 0.0429
Sequence Reference Intervention Description Frequency
Table 4.7. Details of interventions referenced in figure 4.20 at highest frequency level.
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The structuring and simulation of clinical interventions within the Critical Care Unit is identified as the
most time consuming and complex stage of the development of the whole risk simulation process.
The initial set of simulated interventions was identified as requiring revision due to ‘missing’
interventions though at this stage in the overall project it was considered relevant not to delay
development of the main risk simulation module. The initial set of simulated interventions was,
however, considered adequate to validate the function of the main risk simulation module.
4.8 Multiple Repeat Interventions
The indication of intervention activity levels is also used to determine the degree of ‘busyness’
associated with a patient. For some activities, such as ‘chest x-ray’, this is an intervention which is
relatively of short duration. For other activities, such as ventilation, an episode is initiated with a
marker element and terminated with a corresponding ‘end ventilation’ marker to indicate when the
episode completed. During a specific period of patient ventilation, for example, there is a finite
probability for suction of airways. The model also identifies a finite probability in each 5 minute ‘slot’
for the requirement of this intervention. Similar probability functions are implemented to reflect activity
of attention to ventilator alarm or infusion device alarm. This is a characteristic of clinical activity
which requires an on-going level of nursing/clinical care and attention. The number of interventions
created in this way is highly dependent on the values of relative probability associated with such
activities. These types of intervention will tend to dominate the ‘intervention’ activity pattern.
4.9 Summary
This chapter describes the mechanisms for simulating patient admission/discharge episodes and also
the population of such episodes with clinical interventions/activity. The following chapter describes
how a sub structure is identified with each clinical intervention, where elements of linked competency
and adverse effect are identified.
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Chapter 5: Structuring Clinical Interventions as
Competency/Risk Data Sets and Review of Adverse Events in
Critical Care Medicine
5.1 Introduction
The chapter describes how clinical interventions can be expressed as a series of linked
‘competencies/adverse effects’ and ‘preventive measures’. This represents the level of activity at
which evaluation of risk is subsequently undertaken. In addition, sub structures relating to task
complexity, team involvement and supervision mode are identified within competencies/adverse
effects to alter the mode of function of risk evaluation. The chapter also focuses on clinical studies in
the Critical Care environment which identify features and trends related to adverse clinical incidents
and general risk causation. The review of such studies is also used to identify how key parameters
such as supervision, distraction and competency mismatch can be identified as input functions for a
‘risk engine’ to estimate the level of risk associated with the adverse effect.
The identification of the interventions experienced by patients in the Critical Care environment is a
necessary part of the process of analysis of associated adverse effects. Further, it is identified that
an ‘intervention’ undertaken by an individual can be described as a subset of competencies
possessed by the individual, as indicated in figure 5.1. Each sub task is associated with a required
level of related competency.
Figure 5.1. Schematic representation of an intervention as a subset of individual competencies. With
identification of eight general competencies, a specific task identified in the figure requires input from
five of these at varying levels of competence.
70
The expression of an ‘intervention’ as a ‘basket’ of competencies of varying types and levels as
referenced in equation 5.2 and figure 5.2 provides an increased level of ‘quantisation’ of skill
description and measurement and is the basis for all subsequent work described in the Thesis.









where ak = value assigned for an individual for the specific identified competency Ck. The set of
competencies Ck is therefore the entire set used for undertaking clinical duties. These identified
‘competencies’ are differentiated from ‘tasks’ which can be considered as requiring a ‘basket’ of
identified competencies. In the model subsequently developed, the number of ‘competencies’
required for a specific ‘task’ can vary from one to as many as seven. This value of ak is notionally
identified as unity value at the highest competency level. A summary of staff groups and associated
grades are indicated in Appendix 5.
The competencies required with a specific task Ctask are a subset of the main set of competencies.
Ctask = bl Cl. + bmCm + bnCn + boCo + bpCp + bqCq + brCr (5.2)
where values bl to br are the required levels of associated competence for competencies
Cl to Cr. Figure 5.2 essentially shows levels of competency required for a specific task and
competency levels available from a specific individual. Increased risk is associated with increased
lack of matching of required levels of competency.
Figure 5.2. Comparison of required levels of competency for a specific task and available levels of
competency of specific individual.
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Figure 5.3. Concept of risk arising out of mismatch of required competency and available competency
for specific task.
The simulation model subsequently develops the notion of ‘competency mismatch’ as the parameter
which is used in risk estimations involving individual competency. This is developed in chapter 6
within the structure of Fuzzy Logic functions (section 6.4). In structuring a set of competencies
required to carry out a specific clinical procedure, basic competencies are ‘paired’ with ‘Linked






Dialysis does not proceed at indicated Treatment rate
Interpret patient condition in the context of
dialysis treatment
Patient metabolism is not maintained at optimum level
Communicate observations
where appropriate to more senior staff
Patient condition not managed appropriately
Linked Adverse Effect
Observe sterile procedure
Tissue injury at needle entry site
Set up dialysis unit Correctly (filter, cannulae,
infuscate)
Table 5.1 Example of set of listed competencies with linked adverse effect relating to set up of a
dialysis system.
Table 5.2 outlines comparable competencies/adverse effect for arterial blood sample analysis.
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Competency Linked Adverse Effect
Observe sterile procedures Infection at cannula site
Sample blood from arterial line using
correct sample
Blood clots in system due to
unheparinised sample
Enter patient ID into analyser system Wrong patient ID entered
Load sample into analyser system Blood can be sprayed onto individual
Evaluate blood gas parameters Misinterpret patient blood gas parameters
Communicate findings where
appropriate to more senior staff
Patient condition not managed
appropriately
Table 5.2 . Example of set of listed competencies with linked adverse effect relating to blood gas
analysis of arterial sample.
Thus there is not a ‘single’ competency relating to correct use of a blood gas system. Such ‘adverse
effects’ can present a direct and high risk to the patient or present a condition which has the potential
when combined with another factor to cause actual harm. The process of structuring the ‘competency
/ adverse effect’ details for a single intervention is not inherently difficult but requires careful cross
reference with relevant clinical staff. Issues of complexity arise due to the sheer number of
interventions identified. Herein lies the complexity of clinical risk.
Based on all identified TISS and associated activity, it is possible to establish a master file of all











Validate QS parameters (hourly TISS) 2 2 1 1
Check progress of all infusions (hourly TISS) 3 2 1 1
Determine/monitor fluid balance of patient (Hourly TISS) 4 2 1 1
Notes of patient are written up appropriately (hourly TISS) 5 2 1 1
Determine patient neurological status (Hourly TISS) 6 2 0 0
Determine net intake and output volume (nurse) 7 2 1 1
Interpret fluid balance (nurse) 8 1 1 1
Interpret fluid balance (medic) 9 1 0 1
Alter patient fluid balance (nurse) 10 1 1 1
Table 5.3. Extract of identified nursing competencies.
Specific attributes are introduced at the level of the individual competency. The level of complexity
ranges over a scale of 1 to 3 to describe a level associated with carrying out the specific competency
and where 1 is the least complex and 3 is the most complex. This factor is subsequently utilised in
the functionality of the ‘risk engine’ as described in figure 6.1. In addition, the ‘Supervision flag’
identifies if a specific competency is moderated by supervision of other staff (Supervision flag = 1) and
if the competency is moderated by competency sharing (Ability to ask flag =1).
A subset of adverse effects is outlined in table 5.4.
Description Ref
Patient QS data is unavailable/unreliable (hourly vital signs) 2
Error in prescribed infused drug delivery (hourly vital signs) 3
Patient fluid balance is less than optimal (hourly vital signs) 4
Patient notes contain missing or incorrect data (hourly vital signs) 5
Patient neurological status is incorrectly determined (hourly vital signs) 6
Error in fluid balance measurement:Patient fluid balance not optimised (nurse) 7
Error interpretation of fluid balance:Incorrect fluid management (nurse) 8
Error in fluid input adjustment: patient fluid balance less than optimal (nurse) 9
Error in interpretation of fluid balance: Incorrect fluid management (medic) 10
Fluid balance inappropriately modified (nurse) 11
Incorrect items used (peripheral IVs – nurse) 12
Infection at peripheral IV site (nurse) 13
Inappropriate peripheral IV site selected (nurse) 14
Problem at peripheral IV site on insertion (nurse) 15
Incorrect items used (peripheral IVs - medic) 16
Table 5.4. Subset of entries describing Adverse Effects. A total of 521 adverse effects are currently
identified for specific set of patient interventions.
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Table 5.5 indicates a form used to structure competency factors, competency text and adverse effect
associated with a specific intervention.
Intervention Number 91 Staff Group 2 (medic)




Competency factor #1 0.8 Table entry





Delay in undertaking CVP procedure - medic 21
Competency factor #2 0.8 Table entry
Competency
(text/code)
Observe sterile precautions CVP site (medic) 8
Adverse outcome
(text/code)
Infection at CVP site - medic 22
Competency factor #3 0.8 Table entry
Competency
(text/code)
Insert CVP line (medic) 9
Adverse outcome
(text/code)
Inappropriate CVP placement : waveforms
inappropriate
23
Competency factor #4 0.8 Table entry
Competency
(text/code)
Insert CVP line (medic) 9
Adverse outcome
(text/code)
Tissue damage at entry site : CVP line 24
Competency factor #5 0.8 Table entry
Competency
(text/code)
Insertion CVP line (medic) 9
Adverse outcome
(text/code)
Adverse patient reaction : CVP insertion 25
Table 5.5. Structure of an intervention as a series of elements linked to identified competencies and
adverse effects. The values under ‘Table Entry’ are the specific entries in the identified staff group
competency table and the global adverse effect table.
The staff group identifies which table of competencies to access. Interventions can be subsequently
represented as a series of numeric arrays, with separate description of competency factors, identified
competency and associated adverse effect, as indicated in table 5.6 where up to five components are
indicated.
75
Table 5.6. Structure of intervention array, indicating level of required competency CFi, referenced
competency (Ci) and associated adverse effect (Ai) ; i=1,5. No is intervention reference, SG is
reference for staff group. Ph, Em and Me are physical effort, emotional/stress effort and intellectual
effort components as percentage values of reduction from pre-existing values.
Additional codes have been identified with adverse effects. These include a specific ‘intrinsic risk’
code which identifies an adverse effect whose likelihood is essentially independent of the
skill/competency level of the responsible staff. A description is included of the ‘reversibility’ of the
adverse effect and also of its relative severity. Components of these codes are summarised in table
5.7.
Code Values Description
Intrinsic Risk 0 & 1 1 indicates that the outcome is intervention independent
Reversibility 1 to 5 1 easily reversed ;5 almost irreversible - see table 5.8
Severity 1 to 5 1 insignificant ; 5 immediate risk to patient – see table 5.9
Type event 1 to 43 See table 5.10
Table 5.7. Details of additional codes linked with adverse effects.
Additional details of codes for severity and reversibility are outlined in tables 5.8 and 5.9. These
codes are relevant for additional modes of analysis of derived values of adverse effects.
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Code element Description
1 Very easily to reverse
2 Relatively easy to reverse
3 Moderately difficult to reverse
4 Significantly difficult to reverse
5 Almost impossible to reverse
Table 5.8. Levels of reversibility associated with adverse effect.
Code element Description
1 Insignificant risk to patient
2 Relatively low level of risk to patient
3 Moderate level of risk to patient
4 Relatively high level of risk to patient
5 Very high risk to patient
Table 5.9. Levels of severity associated with adverse effect.
There is, however, a structural difference between the nature of ‘adverse events’ referenced in the
literature and the nature of ‘adverse effects’ identified within the risk simulation system being
described. Based on the nature of the associated reporting system, ‘adverse events’ tend to relate to
instances where there is tangible evidence of either patient harm or a near miss such as accidental
ventilator disconnection or medication error. An adverse effect associated with ventilation could
relate to an event of lesser significance such as ‘tracheotomy tapes not made secure’ which indicates
the potential for development of a more serious incident.
Table 5.10 identifies a structure of classification of ‘types’ of adverse effect which is broadly based on
classification systems subsequently referenced in this chapter (Giraud et al. (1993), Bracco et al.
(2003), Rothschild et al. (2005)). The classification of type of adverse effect provides a comparative
measure for checking outputs of simulated sets of data with such referenced sets.
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Code Description Code Description
1 Medication 23 Central lines
2 Nutrition 24 Arterial lines
3 Monitoring 25 epidurals
4 Airway 26 analgesia
5 Communication to team 27 Patient involvement
6 Communication patient/rel 28 Intra cranial pressure
7 Acquired infection 29 Chest drains
8 Handover processes 30 EVDs
9 IV infusions 31 Lower digestive tract
10 Patient records & ident. 32 Patient/bed restraints
11 QS system 33 Renal function
12 Logistics of supply 34 Lumbar puncture
13 Pathology/patient samples 35 Dermatological support
14 Blood products 36 Cardioversion
15 Radiology 37 Defibrillation
16 Tissue viability 38 Traction
17 Fluid balance 39 TPN
18 Use of consumables 40 Basic patient care
19 Patient observations 41 Staff injury
20 Catheters 42 Unit disruption
21 Wound management 43 Patient pathway
22 Enteral feeding
Table 5.10 Types of adverse effects identified.
This set of types of adverse effects has been derived for the specific set of interventions relevant
within the Critical Care Unit at University Hospital, Coventry. There will be finite differences in coding
between similar units in other healthcare facilities. Significantly different sets of types of adverse
effects would be in evidence for different clinical environments such as Accident and Emergency and
Cardiothoracic Intensive Care.
Subsequent analysis describes distributions of frequency of types of adverse events for simulated
sets of patient activity. Such analysis can also include distributions weighted by individual likelihood
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of component adverse effects, so that the resultant distribution reflects patterns of simulated risk.
Table 5.11 outlines details of previously described codes associated with specific adverse effects.
Description Ref Intr. Revers. Severity Type
Patient QS data is unavailable/unreliable (hourly vital signs) 2 0 1 2 3
Error in prescribed infused drug delivery (hourly vital signs) 3 0 1 3 9
Patient fluid balance is less than optimal (hourly vital signs) 4 0 1 2 17
Patient notes contain missing or incorrect data (hourly vital signs) 5 0 1 3 10
Patient neurological status is incorrectly determined (hourly vital signs) 6 0 1 3 19
Table 5.11. Example of codes assigned to specific adverse effects. ‘Intr.’ Indicates status of ‘intrinsic’ risk
of the specific sub task (table 5.7).
5.2 Representation of Levels of Staffing Competency
At the level of the greatest detail, the competencies available within a Critical Care Unit would be
described at the level of the individual, where specific competencies related to the set of identified
competencies are established for each individual staff member. For nursing staff at the Critical Care
Unit at University Hospital Coventry, this would correspond to a core nursing group of around 150 staff
members. A simplification of this model which preserves the element of variation in levels of
competency is to establish available competencies according to ‘sub bands’ within the nursing grade
structures as outlined in the ‘Agenda for Change’ agreement (Department of Health 2004c). Table
5.12 identifies how for each of the main nursing grades a series of 5 sub grades of competency
description are assigned.
Table 5.12. Schematic representation of assigned competency levels for nursing co-workers within
designated grade structures linked with specific identified competency.
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These assigned values of competency are essentially the levels of competency associated with
specific individuals on the basis of sub grading and where for basic tasks the lowest staff grade
(band 5a) is empirically set at the required competency level of value 0.8. For more complex
tasks the required competency level of 0.8 is set at higher grading levels. In this simplified
model, all staff of the same sub grading level have the same competency for any referenced sub task.
Levels of competency required for specific sub tasks are separately determined (see table 5.6) and
the difference between the assigned level of competency for a specific sub task to an individual on a
specific sub grade and that identified to undertake a specific sub task is the basis for calculation
potential competency mismatch.
In practice the levels of competency within a staff group will be a dynamic quantity, as staff leave,
new staff are recruited and on going processes of staff training are implemented. Also, various types
of activity will reinforce competency by practice. Less frequently undertaken procedures may suffer a
reduction in available competency though the risk model currently does not support this mode of
dynamic skill monitoring.
5.3 Preventive Measures
Interventions have been structured as a series of linked sub competencies and adverse effects with up
to seven such pairings being incorporated into a specific intervention. The value of seven has been
found to be sufficient for identified clinical activity though could readily be expanded if
considered necessary. At the same level of description of competency and risk, it is also possible to
identify ‘preventive measures’ which can be described as factors which would tend to reduce the
likelihood of the adverse effect taking place.
Table 5.13 outlines a generic example where ‘preventive measures’ relate to changing a tyre on a
vehicle. This indicates the role of ‘preventive measures’ in identifying positive actions to reduce risk.
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Availability of warning signs
to alert
oncoming traffic.
Ensure car is immobile
prior to jacking up
of car
Car may move
when jack is applied





Spare tyre may be
under inflated
Availability of air pump.
Jack up car
appropriately




Availability of material to insert under






Availability of checklist for tyre
replacement.
Table 5.13. Indication of set of preventive measure linked with specific pairings of sub competency
and adverse effect for ‘generic’ task.
In the context of clinical interventions, it is identified that preventive measures can also be linked to
specific ‘sub competency/adverse effect’ items as indicated in table 5.14. It is also identified that
more than one preventive measure may be linked to a specific ‘sub competency/adverse effect’.
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Competency Linked Adverse Effect Preventive Measures
Observe sterile
procedures





Blood clots in system due to
unheparinised sample
Provision of syringes which
are pre-heparinised.
Local control to ensure
correct syringes are
available.
Enter patient ID into
analyser system
Wrong patient ID entered Reduce risk of ID error by




Blood can be sprayed onto
individual
Wear gloves while handling
sample.
Ensure all equipment users
are appropriately trained.
Restrict machine access to






Provide update training on
blood gas parameter
interpretation.
Evaluate skill level of team






managed appropriately Encourage team
communication.
Highlight findings in patient
notes.
Table 5.14. Indication of set of preventive measures linked with specific pairings of sub competency
and adverse effect for specific clinical task of taking and processing an arterial blood gas sample.
Figure 5.4 outlines the structure of how such preventive measures are linked from a master file of
individual preventive measures.
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Figure 5.4. Incorporation of preventive measures pm1, pm2, pm3 and pm4 into a specific linked sub
competency (sc) and adverse effect (ae).
Thus where a set of ‘competency sub task/adverse effects’ are processed and a finite probability value
associated with each adverse effect, these probability values can be linked with the sub set of
identified preventive measure. This allows preventive measures to be evaluated on the basis of
identified risk values across the given range of clinical activities and allowing a targeted risk reduction
strategy within the clinical area. Elements of analysis of preventive measures can relate to a specific
sub task process, a specific intervention of several such items or extend across the entire set of
structured interventions. It is also relevant to review preventive measure distribution by type of
adverse effect.
The incorporation of details of preventive measures into the intervention array is therefore achieved by
the incorporation of four additional columns per specific ‘sub competency/adverse effect’. Thus a
specific sub task for a specific sub group is referenced by the set level of competency, the
competency reference, the adverse effect reference and four references to relevant preventive
measures. This represents an expansion of the structure previously indicated in table 5.6.
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This process is then providing a derived focus on preventive measures to reduce the incidence levels
of clinical risk. This is identified as a novel process which has the potential to target risk prevention.
Processes of creation of the generic preventive measure file, the revised intervention array and
modification of the main risk simulation module accordingly to weight preventive measures with risk
are outlined in the context of further work in chapter 8.
5.4 Review of Adverse Events in Critical Care Medicine
It is certainly necessary to extract as much relevant information as possible from available literature
relating to adverse events in Critical Care medicine in the development of risk causation models. The
general nature, however, of contributions from the literature is to provide insights into these factors
within the context of a specific Critical Care Unit and which relates to a specific subset of data within
the unit. Definitions of what constitutes an adverse event will also vary subtly. In addition, the
reporting of the relative frequency of events can be described as ‘events per 1000 patient days’ which
does not provide useful information, for example, relating to the chance of a medication error per
specific administration of medication to a specific patient. Such an analysis of available literature,
however, provides an essential framework within which models of risk causation can be developed.
Sinopoli et al. (2007) describe a study comparing the relative incidence of ‘safety incidents’ between
patients in ITUs predominantly containing ‘medical’ patients and also ‘surgical’ patients, with the initial
assumption that such ‘different’ sets of patients would have separately identifiable patterns of such
‘safety incidents’. In fact no such ‘differentiation’ was observed between the set of 646 events from
medical patients and 707 events from surgical patients. The study, however, provides a useful
analysis of causative factors identified with identified ‘safety incidents’ as outlined in table 5.15 and
where a specific incident can have more than one causative factor.








Table 5.15 Distribution of factors contributing to safety incidents - after Sinopoli et al. (2007)
The specific classification of type of safety incident reported by the authors is reproduced in table
5.16.
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Medical (N=646) Surgical (N=707)
Communication 60 56
Clinical management 53 56
ICU management 51 54
Therapeutic 46 42
Hospital management 23 19
Equipment/devices 14 19
CPOE 13 6
Line, tube, drain 8 13
Diagnostic testing 8 6
Airway 7 7
Skin breakdown 6 5
Table 5.16. Distribution of types of safety incident - after Sinopoli et al. (2007).
The conclusion of the authors from a risk perspective was that there was little to be gained by
‘separating’ medical and surgical cases within physically separate ITU facilities. Also, the two most
important causative factors relate to ‘training’ and ‘team’. Cullen et al. (1997) describe in detail the
typical framework within which adverse drug events take place as part of a general study comparing
intensive care and also general care facilities. Initial expectations anticipated that incidents of such
adverse drug events would be associated with periods of above average stress levels or elevated
levels of work activity. As part of the study, detailed ‘debriefing’ of staff associated with the adverse
drug event was undertaken where a total of 28 factors within groupings which included Team Status,
System Factors, Patient Status and Prevailing Circumstances were recorded on a 1 to 5 analogue
scale. It was identified, however, that the majority of such incidents were associated with staff who
were working within a ‘normal’ work environment within which there were no significant issues of
stress or workload. This would seem to imply that a component of error is originating from
deficiencies in how ‘medication’ tasks are structured.
The number of preventable adverse drug events and potential adverse drug events within ITUs was at
a level of 29 and 77 respectively for a total of 5574 patient days, providing a value of 19 such events
per 1000 patient days. With an average of 15 drugs administered within a 24 hour period, this
indicates an absolute adverse drug event probability of 0.0013. Also, when comparisons were made
with levels of incidence within general hospital units, results showed similar levels to those within ITUs
where allowance was made for the relative rate of drug prescribing within both areas.
In order to determine outcomes within ITUs as a possible function of level of throughput, Durairaj et
al. (2005) describes a review of 196,097 consecutive admissions within 29 hospitals in Northwest
Ohio between March 1991 to March 1997. The study found no significant differences with level of
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activity for pulmonary and neurologic diagnoses but did identify lower mortality in high volume units
for patients with gastro-intestinal diagnoses. The study has somewhat greater significance in the
USA, where greater options exist for selection of hospital care and where larger units would
potentially attract higher levels of referrals if a link between improved outcome and level of patient
throughput was established. The authors conclude that a much more significant effect would be to
improve the level of ‘intensivist’ participation/involvement within ITUs, after the analysis of Young
(2000), which indicates that implementation of the Leagfrog Group recommendations could possibly
save 53,850 lives a year in the USA.
The evaluation of risk within the critical care environment relates not only to the risk of procedures
that are undertaken, but also to the risk of procedures that are either delayed or not undertaken. A
classic study by Kollef et al. (1999) to determine the significance of inadequate antimicrobial
treatment of infections determined that the risk of hospital mortality was four times as great among
infected patients receiving inadequate antimicrobial treatment compared with patients not exposed to
this risk. This identifies, therefore, that for this specific component of patient management, delay or
inappropriate antimicrobial treatment is a risk factor which is significantly influenced by ITU clinical
management policy.
The study of Giraud et al. (1993) into adverse effects in ITUs highlights some effects which remain
valid and others which have been modified to some extent by changes in prevailing clinical practice,
such as more intensive patient monitoring and which would reduce the dependence on direct
clinical observations. The patient group comprised 382 patients corresponding to 400 consecutive
patient admissions. A total of 124 adverse effects were identified (31%) and with 107 of these
identified as ‘major’, with three leading to death. Drug related adverse events were excluded from
the study.
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Intervention Total Major Intervention Total Major
Mechanical ventilation 130 64 Nursing 9 2
Intubation, oxygenation 16 14 Haemodialysis 6 5
Extubation 13 11 Bronchoscopy 4 3
Drugs 30 17 Equipment 14 42
Transfusion, nutrition 8 1 Peripheral venous
catheter
36 4
Central venous cath. 12 5 Central venous catheter 13 8
Venous, arterial puncture 11 - Arterial catheter 4 1
Pleural drainage 4 2 ET tube 33 11
Urinary, gastric drainage 3 - Ventilator (equipment) 3 -
Drainage material 23 2 Syringe pump 15 13
Haemodialyser,mattress 6 9 Iv catheter/other pump 8 3
Table 5.17. Distribution of adverse events after Giraud et al. (1993)
What the study and similar types do not derive is the relative probability per specific patient intervention.
The number of events detected is important to assess overall risk but comparisons between units is
made difficult due to the different nature of clinical protocols undertaken. A summary of identified
associated factors is shown in table 5.18.
Identified associated factors Total Major
Insufficient surveillance (sum) 68 33
- Nurses 54 27
Junior physicians 4 3
Senior physicians 7 2
Others 3 1
Inadequate experience (sum) 33 9
- Nurses 12 4
- Junior physicians 16 3
- Senior physicians 4 1
- Others 1 1
Equipment malfunction (sum) 29 14
- Venous catheters and IV catheters 15 7
- ET tubes 5 4
- Syringe pumps 2 2
- Others 1 1
Inadequate equipment (sum) 9 7
- Syringe pumps 7 7
- Mattresses 2 0
Table 5.18. Summary of associated factors with identified adverse incidents after Giraud et al. (1993
Subsequent development of patient monitoring technology has significantly changed some of the risk
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factors identified in this study, with continuous monitoring of an extended range of patient parameters
now identifying deterioration of patient condition more rapidly. Also, in the study, a high incidence of
bed sores is identified but not matched to specific causes. The authors compare their rate of adverse
events of 13% with a contemporary value of 9% in the USA after the study by Steel et al. (1981).
A more recent Swiss study undertaken by Bracco et al. (2003), reviewed the incidence of adverse
clinical events and related causation of a set of data relating to 1024 patients in a prospective
organisational study. In addition, the consequence of adverse effects was graded using a derived
scale. Table 5.19 identifies summary findings, with type of error linked with cause of error.
Type of error Planning Execution Surveillance Total ( n (%))
Venous lines and catheters 2 29 24 55 (23)
Respiratory system 15 14 18 47 (20)
Cardiovascular system 14 14 11 39 (16)
Drugs-related complication 8 19 3 30 (12)
Neurological system 11 5 6 22 (9)
Urinary system 1 4 2 7 (3)
Gastrointestinal system 4 0 2 6 (2)
Skin and muscular system 0 0 2 2 (1)
Management complications 20 3 10 33 (14)
total 75 88 78 241 (100)
Table 5.19. Summary details of type of error and cause of error after Bracco et al. (2003) identified as
due to human factors.
The authors conclude that the causes of error were evenly distributed between planning, execution
and surveillance. A significant component of ‘planning’ related to the initial diagnosis of patient
condition. Table 5.20 summarises the resulting severity of consequences of adverse outcomes.
Classification Number %
Without consequences 38 16
Adding minor morbidity 138 57
Prolonging ITU stay 62 26
Permanent sequelae 2 0.8
Death 1 0.4
Table 5.20 Summary of severity of consequences after Bracco et al. (2003).
In general, more severe outcomes of adverse incidents were associated with the errors linked with
planning. The result of adverse effects was in general to prolong the stay of patients in the ITU. This
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was considered equivalent to 15% of the total patient stay time within the period of the study.
Although these effects certainly adversely affect the mortality results of the ITU unit, the effect of
prolonging bed stay implies that patients who could have been treated within the ITU unit (e.g.
emergency cases) were in fact not treated or experienced a delay in treatment if transferred to an ITU
in another hospital. A significant review of safety within the ITU environment has been provided by
Valentin and Bion (2007) in which key topics such as error causation, error prevention,
standardisation, work environment and safety climate are reviewed. This provides a focused
summary of concerns and remedial approaches to risk reduction within Critical Care Units in the
UK.
A review by Rothchild et al. (2005) analysed levels of error corresponding to 391 patients within 1490
patient days. Within their study, an ‘adverse event’ is identified as any injury due to medical
management, rather than the ‘underlying disease’ and ‘serious medical error’ is identified as ‘a
medical error that causes harm (or injury) or has the potential to cause harm’. The study found a level
of ‘adverse event’ of 120 in 79 patients for 1490 patient days, indicating a level of 80.5 per 1000
patient days. The comparable level for ‘serious medical errors’ was 149.7 per 1000 patient days.
The study in particular provides details of relative frequency of occurrence within the specific
classification of serious medical errors. Table 5.21 summarises prevention/diagnostic errors and
treatment and procedure errors.




Clinical Activity All serious
medical
events
Prevention and diagnostic errors Treatment and Procedure
errors
Failure to take precautions or follow
protocol to prevent accidental injury
30 Medication error in ordering
or execution of treatment
170
-Medication related 13 -Wrong dosage 62
-Premature self extubations 3 -Duplicate order 21
Avoidable delays in diagnosis 13 -wrong medication 15
Failure to use indicated test or act on
test results
10 -Failure to discontinue a
medication order
14
Inadequate patient assessment 8 -Wrong rate or frequency 12
Other prevention or diagnostic error 6 -Wrong route 8
Total (Prevention and diagnostic
errors)
67 -Omitted medication 8
-Wrong patient 8
-Other medication error 22
Table 5.21 Summary of all serious medical errors for categories of Prevention and diagnostic errors
(left columns) and Medication Errors (right columns) after Rothschild et al. (2005). (Note: More than
one factor may be indicated for a given serious medical error.)
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A striking observation from table 5.21 is the relatively high level of serious medical errors
arising from lapses in medication protocols.
Clinical Activity: System factors All
serious
errors
Treatment and procedure errors - continued
Failure to take precautions or follow protocol to prevent accidental injury 22
Preventable hospital acquired infection 0
Inadequate training or supervision 5
Inadequate reporting or communication 5
Avoidable treatment delay 3
Failure to check equipment or defective equipment 1
Other treatment or procedure error 1
Total (Treatment and procedures) 207
Monitoring and reporting errors




Do-not-resuscitate order did not match true code status 8
Test result 5
Total (Monitoring and reporting errors) 55
Table 5.22 Details of Other Treatment and procedure errors and Monitoring and Reporting errors, after
Rothschild et al. (2005).
This study highlights the advantage of an increased level of description of system factors associated
with medical errors. Such studies, however, tend to provide a distribution of effects which relate to
prevailing condition of patient workload and illness severity and the internal processes of running such
units. They still, however, provide valuable insight into cause and effect of risk within the critical care
environment.
In order to identify factors that have commonality between different units, the SEE (Sentinel Events
Evaluation) study, Valentin et al. (2006), was structured by the European Critical Care Network.
Within the study, a ‘sentinel event’ was defined as ‘an occurrence that harmed or could have harmed
the patient’. A total of 220 ITUs worldwide participated with ‘measurement’ taking place within a 24
hour period on January 21
st
2004. The contributing ITUs were mainly European. Such a study has
the advantage of number of Critical Care Units taking part but the disadvantage of variation in
key areas such as staff shift patterns, case mix, clinical protocols and staffing ratios. For a total of
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1913 patients a total of 584 sentinel events were identified affecting 391 patients. A summary of the
observed rates of such events within identified categories is indicated in table 5.23.
Category of event Events per 100
patient days (%)
Lines, catheters, drains 14.5 (37.4)
Medication (prescription) 5.7 (14.7)





Table 5.23. Observed rates of sentinel events - after Valentin et al. (2006).
The main conclusion of the authors of the SEE study is that results are broadly in line with previous
findings undertaken for longer studies within specific ITUs. The study, however, did not seek to
assign underlying cause of such levels of activity such as in planning or communication which would
have added to the value of the study. The authors in particular identify the urgent need to reduce
errors associated with lines, catheters and drains and also activities related to medication, which
account for around 64% of reported sentinel events. The implication is that procedures need to be
revised in order to reduce the identified effects and or training issues need to be revisited. The
incidence of airway events is somewhat lower than reported in other studies, such as that of Bracco et
al. (2003) and Giraud et al. (1993). A more detailed analysis of sentinel events relating to lines,
catheters and drains is outlined in table 5.24.
Unplanned dislodgement Inappropriate
disconnection
Number patients (%) Number patients (%)
Arterial line 1214 27 (2.2) 12 (0.9)
Central venous line 1368 19 (1.4) 12 (0.9)
Pulmonary artery catheter 105 4 (3.8) 0
Dialysis catheter 159 6 (3.8) 3 (1.9)
Foley catheter 1579 24 (1.5) 13 (0.8)
Enteral nutrition probe 1050 47 (4.5) 11 (1.0)
Intracranial probe (drain) 67 1 (1.5) 0
Chest drain 264 4 (1.5) 4 (1.5)
Others 455 12 (2.6) 9 (2.0)
Item Total number of
patients
Table 5.24. Analysis of sentinel events associated with lines, catheters and drains - after Valentin et
al. (2006)
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For this set of observations, it is not clear what is causing the levels of dislodgement or disconnections
of lines. Possible causes include inappropriate initial insertion, patient movement/involvement,
accidental contact (clinical staff), unauthorised removal (due to poor communication) or failure of the
line ( blockage). This indicates that a risk model based on specific interventions at specific times of
day will be able to estimate the risk of adverse events based on the scope of the specific intervention,
such as if a line was inserted correctly or not. If at a later stage, a ‘satisfactory’ line is accidently
disconnected, then this adverse event is essentially unrelated to the circumstances of its initial
insertion. The SEE study also provided a summary of chronological distribution of sentinel events.
This provides therefore a time line averaged over activity cycles for the 220 units participating in the
study. The peaks at around 9.00 am and 11.00 am are considered to co-incide with the period of
nursing shift changeover and peak levels of activity generally. This effect was initially observed by
Donchin et al. (1995). The SEE study, though limited by the scope of its data set, identifies a strong
prevailing interest within ITUs to identify and reduce/eliminate levels of such sentinel events.
The study by Kern and Kox (1999) describes the effect of implementation of standard procedures
within an ITU dealing primarily with patients undergoing cardiac surgery. In general, the structure of
procedures associated with cardiac intensive care is less diverse than that of a medical/surgical ITU.
Once it was identified that there was a requirement to reduce levels of overall mortality rates, clinical
procedures were restructured to improve the consistency and quality of received care according to
identified clinical needs. Table 5.25 summarises the changed patient mortality in patient groups for a
series of three six month periods and where improved procedures were put in place after the first six
month period. The mortality rate of 6.6% is essentially identified as a baseline level.
Time interval Apache II Risk of Death Mortality % Total patients in
study period
6/96-12/96 10.8 8.5 6.6 541
1/97-6/97 10.7 8.6 4.3 456
7/97-12/97 11.9 10.9 4.8 414
Table 5.25. Variation in patient group information for consecutive six month intervals – Kern and Kox
(1999). (Standards implemented at end of first six month interval.)
Table 5.25 indicates an improvement in patient outcomes with implementation of set standards
designed to provide a greater level of consistency in patient management and care. The index of
severity of patient condition described using the Apache II score and associated ‘risk of death’ factor
indicate comparable levels in the first two 6 month intervals and a higher level of severity of condition
in the third six month period. Standardised procedures were grouped into organisational structure,
post operative care and Intensive care in long term ITU patients. Aspects of post operative intensive
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care management implemented within the revised framework of increased standardisation are
identified in table 5.26.
Safety of patients’ transportation using on-line monitoring
Standard procedures on admission at the ICU
Standardised sedation regimen using sedatives and α2 antagonist separately
Time schedule for in-unit medical staff
Standard hygienic procedures
Maintenance of safety standards
Standard procedures with regard to patients’ relatives and Ethical standards
Table 5.26. Structure of procedures for post operative care – after Kern and Kox (1999)
Legislation was passed in 1999 in California to mandate a minimum patient-to-nurse ratio of 6:1 for
medical and surgical patients by July 2003. A study by Aiken et al. (2002) reviewed the patient
discharge data from hospitals in Pennsylvania and matched these to both details of corresponding
patient-to-nurse staffing ratios and also nurse satisfaction surveys. An odds ratio analysis determined
that an increase of one patient per nurse to a hospital’s workload would increase burnout and job
dissatisfaction by factors of 23% and 15% respectively. Similarly, for an increase of one patient per
nurse to a hospital’s workload would increase mortality by 7%. Thus comparing a system with a
patient-to-nurse ratio of 4:1 and 8:1, this would result in an increase in mortality of 31%. While this
study relates largely to non-ITU environments, it indicates a general characteristic of nursing staffing
profiles. Also, the significantly increased complexity and mortality within ITUs would tend to reinforce
the effects identified by this study.
A relatively recent study undertaken in Germany by Graf et al. (2005) determined the incidence of
adverse events within a 64 day period, during which a total of 50 errors were identified involving 32
patients and based on a total patient set of 216. The level of incidents per eligible patient day was
determined to be 0.07 per day. The authors also indicate that there probably was an element of
under recording of events. For some reason, incidents were most likely to occur on Wednesdays and
Thursdays. Graf et al. (2005) describe a summary of ‘human failures’ - as listed in table 5.27.
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Type of Error Number (%)
Staff-related 59 (73)
Disregard of standards, rules and orders 13
Communication insufficiency, misunderstanding 11
Wrong, incomplete or delayed ecg assessment 7
Delayed intervention 7
Overwork, lack of time 7
Lack of experience 6








Very ill/complex patient 2
Total 81(100%)
Table 5.27. Summary of human failures - after Graf et al. (2005).
After identification by the study of Graf et al. (2005) of high levels of ‘disregard of standards, rules and
orders’, the clinical group subsequently implemented processes to provide greater clarity within
designated procedures and also improved specific levels of staff and team communication. The
results of this tightening of procedures are not reported. The authors conclude, however, that the
focus of error and incident monitoring is to determine how such incidents arise and why the relevant
precautions failed. The emergence of a culture of ‘practice review’ is identified by Levy (2006) as the
way towards reduction of adverse outcomes which has less emphasis on aspects of reporting
outcomes.
The omission of specific recommended treatments and therapies is often identified as an indicator of
less than optimal care. Several studies have shown that while set treatment/diagnostic processes are
recommended/advocated, it is often the case that such processes are not included in the care of the
patient. In a detailed study, McMullin et al. (2006) describes the change in levels of compliance
relating to administration of heparin for prevention of venous emboli. In an initial phase, normal
practice was identified. In phase 2, a process of education, prompting and performance feedback
relating to heparin administration was implemented which was followed by a third phase which
retained computer prompts. The rates of adherence to thromboprophylaxis within phases 1, 2 and 3
were 60%, 90.9% and 100% respectively. The main conclusion of the study was that basic functional
elements of clinical practice can be altered when a specific focus is provided to initiate and direct
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change. While monitoring of level of venous thromboembolism and deep vein thrombosis was
undertaken using ultrasound, the rates on incidence was identified to be similar in phases 1, 2 and 3.
The study by Schuerer et al. (2006) relating to implementation of a local hospital adverse incident
reporting system (SAFE) provides a focus relating to management and implementation of the scheme
and also some of the basic findings of the study. Initially an on-line system provided a level of uptake
of around 20 responses per 1000 patient days. This increased to a maximum of around 50 responses
per 1000 patient days with the introduction of a locally managed card system which indicated that the
level of reporting of incidents was dependent on human factors. Table 5.28 summarises the findings
of a sequence of 230 completed reports using the SAFE system.
Event Type Events Caused harm
Medication error 89 (38.7) 15 (17)
Test/treatment/episode 57 (24.8) 22 (30)
IV complications 13 (5.7) 7 (54)
Laboratory 12 (5.2) 2 (17)
Equipment/product 11 (4.8) 3 (27)
Fall 8 (3.5) 1 (13)
Blood products 5 (2.2) 0 (0)
Behavioral/psychiatric 4 (1.7) 3(75)
Surgery 3 (1.3) 0 (0)
Other 28 (12.2) 8 (29)
Total 230 (100) 61 (27)
Table 5.28. Summary of report types and percentage (brackets) that resulted in patient harm, after
Schuerer et al. (2006).
This study indicates that the rate of detection of adverse events per patient is typically in the mid range
of values compared with other studies. It also reinforces the importance of issues relating to
‘disregard of standards, rules and orders’. In the context of work by Kanji et al. (2004) and McMullin
et al. (2006), this factor is probably due to a collective lack of awareness of indicated practice rather
than intentional disregard to follow set guidelines. The keynote of determining and implementing
procedural policy, however, comes from the clinical director of the specific Critical Care Unit. This
implies that the clinical director has a key role not just in managing the care of specific individual
patients but for setting goals and improving generic levels of practice throughout such a unit.
Aspects of time of admission into the Critical Care environment and the resulting clinical outcome has
been studied by Sheu et al. (2007) in which patients admitted during ‘office hours’ (08.00 am -06.00
pm on weekdays) and ‘non office hours’ (06.00 pm -08.00 am on weekdays and all times on
weekends) were examined for differences in levels of mortality. It was determined that 39.1% of
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patients (239) were admitted during ‘office hours’ and 60.1% of patients (372) during ‘non-office’ hours
with the ICU mortality rate for the two groups being 27.2% and 27.4%. The differences between the
two groups are not significant and was attributed to the provision of a consistent level of clinical
management. This result is contrasted with the studies reported by Wunsch et al. (2004) and
Ensminger et al. (2004).
A review of factors influencing events associated with airways as part of the Intensive Care Unit Safety
Reporting Study (ICUSRS) as reported by Needham et al. (2004) is outlined in table 5.29.
Main Factor Sub factors
Medical condition and complexity
Language and communication
Personality and social factors
Knowledge skills and competence
Fatigue
Motivation and attitude
Physical or mental health





Verbal/written communication during crisis
Supervision and seeking help
Team structure and leadership
Knowledge, skills and competence
Failure to follow established protocol
Supervision and seeking help
Availability of protocols
Availability of test results




Equipment availability or maintenance




Organisational factors: Decision (or indecision) by
management that contributes to adverse event
Patient Factors: Clinical or social characteristics of a
patient that contribute to adverse event
Provider factors: Characteristics or state of a clinician that
contributes to adverse event
Team factors: Characteristics of the team that contribute
to adverse event
Training factors: Characteristics of staff training (or lack
thereof) that contribute to adverse event
Task factors: Characteristics of a specific task that
contribute to adverse event
Management factors : Characteristics of the work
environment that contribute to adverse event staffing
Table 5.29. Set of principal factors and associated sub factors identified by the ICUSRS for
characterisation of adverse medical events, after Needham et al. (2004).
96
Univariable analysis was used to evaluate relationships within the data set for airway and non-airway
reports based on 78 airway events and 763 non airway events. This identified that the impact of such
events could be reduced by appropriate staffing and personnel factors, including assistance from
appropriately trained colleagues. In particular, the study identified additional risk for airway events for
ages less than one year which reflected the logistic and technical difficulties of establishing and
managing airways in the very young. The specific review of resultant patient harm is outlined in table
5.30 for airway and non-airway events.
Patient harm Airway (n=78) Non-airway
(n=763)
Death 1 0.7
Physiologic change 54 30
Discomfort 38 78
Psychological distress 39 16
Dissatisfaction of relatives 38 20
Physical injury 22 21
Prolonged hospital length of stay – anticipated or actual 19 14
Table 5.30 Summary of patient harm for initial set of data after Needham et al. (2004).
Thus although airway events are fewer in number than non-airway types, they contribute more
significantly to measures of resultant patient harm and presumably to extended length of stay within
the unit. The study does indicate, however, the importance of appropriate airway management in
order to minimise the level overall severity and level of incidence of adverse events in the ITU. This
reinforces the concept of adverse effects being associated with an impact on patient mortality.
The requirement for increased objectivity in use of point-of-care systems (and indeed in terms of all
diagnostic equipment) is outlined by Corstjens et al. (2006) in respect of blood glucose analysis
systems in the critical care environment. Comparisons were made between the hospital reference
laboratory and measurements on the Critical Care blood gas system (ABL715), a point-of care meter
(Precision PCx) and continuous sampling system (CGMS Gold). The correlation with the ABL715
was good though results were consistently 18% higher than laboratory values. At a clinical level, it
was identified that where accepted ‘normal’ ranges are identified, the accuracy of the indicated system
has to be determined to be consistent with device specifications. In terms of calibration of specific
systems, the ABL715 is described as being regularly calibrated by the hospital laboratory service, the
CGMS system is calibrated at least four times a day and with the accuracy of the Precision PCx
system relying inherently on the consistency of manufacture of each reagent strip. This identifies
possible classification of risk associated with use of medical equipment based on the stability/accuracy
of monitoring/treatment facility.
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Jain et al. (2006) describes the effect of introduction of a process of quality improvement upon
acquired infections and adverse events. The specific improvements added included:
 Multidisciplinary rounds
 Hand hygiene protocol
 Ventilator ‘bundles’
 Urinary tract infection ‘bundles’
 Central line ‘bundles’
 Bed flow meetings
 Culture change - non ‘vertical’
where a ‘bundle’ is a set of protocols to define specific procedures to be followed for a specific
intervention. The level of daily adverse events was observed to fall from around 25 per day to under
5 per day. Table 5.31 summarises resultant changes in levels of hospital acquired infections. This
shows significant reductions in levels of acquired infections with implementation of the quality
package. In addition, the rolling average length of stay per patient fell from 5.92 days to 4.71 days
over the study period (2001- 2004).
Baseline (2001-2) 2003
Ventilator days 3471 2180
VAP per 1000 days 7.5 3.2
Central line days 6773 4576
Infections per 1000 line days 5.9 3.1
Foley catheter days 7691 5780
UTI per 1000 catheter days 3.8 2.4
Mortality 8.7 8.9
Table 5.31. Change in levels of hospital acquired infections (VAP = ventilator acquired infection; UTI –
urinary tract infection) after Jain et al. (2006).
It is appropriate to reflect on the impact of staffing structures/staff and moral with the successful
implementation of more structured procedures to reduce the level of infection. This will tend to
reduce some components of stress related to patients acquiring infections but potentially increase
others due to the increased level of adherence to protocols. Also, with the patient length of stay
decreasing, this will tend to lead to higher patient throughput.
Binnekade et al. (2001) describes a system of relating potential risk to nurse staffing. An initial
‘Critical Care Nursing Situation Index’ (CNSI) was developed which comprised a series of 84 ‘gaps’ in
patient care and which was sub divided into groups of factors. These ‘gaps’ were identified as having
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the potential to cause harm rather than having given rise to an adverse event. A specific observation
was made by identifying ‘true’ items and ‘false’ items and with the sum of ‘true’ and ‘false’ elements
constituting the number of ‘items at risk’. Nursing time availability was characterised as less than or
equal to thirty minutes or greater than thirty minutes per hour per patient. The study found that there
were significantly more critical situations for the group with less than 30 minutes per nurse where a
level of 30 minutes per hour per patient indicates a nurse/patient ratio of 1:2. Summary findings are
indicated in table 5.32.
Critical situations Items at risk Critical
situations
Items at risk
Basic nursing care 282 1082 147 846
Care of mechanical ventilation 231 1512 213 1277
Care of intravenous lines 151 983 86 756
Administration of fluids 27 366 13 280
Monitoring of cardiac rhythm and circulation 123 844 91 637
Administration of medication 54 821 20 647
Care of enteral nutrition 59 346 32 290
Hygienic care and control of devices 80 906 35 688
Total 1007 6860 637 5421
Nursing time ≤ 30 min Nursing time  ˃30 min
Table 5.32. Summary of findings of Critical situations after Binnekade et al. (2001) and items at risk
related to available nursing time per patient.
The study by Reader et al. (2007) describes a specific process of evaluation of interdisciplinary
communication within four ITU units in Scotland. Use was made of a modified questionnaire
developed initially in the USA by Shortell et al. (1994). Based on the sample of 48 doctors and 136
nurses, nurses reported lower levels of communication openness between doctors and nurses.
Trainee doctors tended to report lower levels of communication with more senior doctors. In addition,
the extent to which openness was identified between ITU team members tended to predict how well
patient care goals were understood. Factors were scored using a 1 to 5 visual analogue scale. The
specific categories of survey scale adopted were identified as:
 Communication openness between nurses and doctors
 Communication openness within groups
 Communication accuracy between nurses and doctors
 Communication accuracy between groups
 Shift communication between groups
 Shift communication within groups
 Unit communication timeliness
 Satisfaction with nurse and doctor communication




 Perceived unit effectiveness
The risks and dangers associated with mechanical ventilation are identified in several studies as
warranting specific investigation. The study by Auriant et al. (2002) reviewed the nature and origin of
clinical incidents due to mechanical ventilation within a three month observational period involving 137
patients in two ITUs. For activities associated with intubation, events were categorised as
‘immediately life threatening’ or ‘secondary life threatening’ depending on severity of impact of the
clinical incident. For the ‘monitoring’ phase of ventilation, a category of ‘non life threatening’ was
added. For the intubation phase, the total number of ‘ILT’ and ‘SLT’ events were 36 and 14
respectively. For the ventilation phase, the number of ‘ILT, ‘SLT’ and ‘NLT’ events 67, 138 and 223
respectively. A summary of identification of cause is outlined in table 5.33.




Human error and failure to follow rules 60.9 50.2 50.6
Patient 45.7 36.2 4.4
Equipment 14.2 13 46.5
Preventable 66.6 57.3 98.2
Physician involvement 31.5 0.03 33.6
Nurse involvement 31.5 62.3 55.6
Table 5.33. Summary of findings related to mechanical ventilation - after Auriant et al. (2002).
In addition, a total of 62 types of clinical incident were identified to describe all events identified.
Analysis of data identified a level of clinical incident associated with mechanical ventilation of 0.004
per patient per ventilated day. This could be further analysed to separate intubation from the
surveillance mode with a level of 0.365 clinical incidents per patient intubation and a level of 0.0029
per patient per ventilated day. The authors indicate that little objective evidence is available to
compare values between different ITUs. Such studies, however, are important for determining base
line levels of adverse incidents for comparison with simulations of such events.
Aspects of shift patterns are discussed by Donchin and Seagull (2002) where comparison is made
between ‘short’ or ‘long’ rotations where short rotations involve a scheduled set of around three night
shifts in a row and long rotations involving periods of between 4 to 6 weeks. In the context of short
rotations, the individual is never properly adjusted to the normal circadian rhythm though it has been
identified that the impact of such short term disturbances to normal sleep pattern can be minimised by
a day shift followed by an evening shift followed by night shifts. In addition, the authors emphasise
the elements of human factor engineering within critical care as a potential factor influencing the level
of incidence of risk based on such ergonomic factors and which will contribute towards the level of
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adverse events. Few if any studies, however, have listed ‘human factor engineering’ as a key causal
factor within adverse events within the Critical Care environment.
Systems of evaluation of severity of patient illness and nursing workload find significant application
within Critical Care Medicine. The review by Miranda et al. (1996) of the development and current
significance of the TISS (Therapeutic Intervention Scoring System) highlights specific issues within
Critical Care of the use of such scales. More importantly, within the context of simulating clinical
activity within the Critical Care Unit, the TISS-28 items provide a useful indication of range of core
nursing activities as outlined in table 5.34. This version of TISS was devised from the structure of
TISS-76 which utilises a total of 76 input factors. This study relates the TISS score system to actual






1 Standard monitoring: Hourly vital signs, regular registration, review fluid balance 5
2 Laboratory. Biochemical and microbiological investigations 1
3 Single medication: Intravenously, intramuscularly, subcutaneously and/or orally 2
4 Multiple intravenous medication. More than one drug, single shots or continuously 3
5 Routine dressing changes: Care and prevention of bed sores, daily dressing change 1
6 Frequent dressing change: Frequent dressing change (at least one time per shift) and/or extensive wound
care
1
7 Care of drains. All (except gastric tube) 3
VENTILATORY SUPPORT
8 Mechanical ventilation. Any form of mechanical ventilation/assisted ventilation with or without PEEP, with or
without muscle relaxants: spontaneous breathing with PEEP
5
9 Supplementary ventilatoty support: Breathing spontaneously through ET tube without PEEP, supplementary
oxygen any method if 8) applies.
2
10 Care of artificial airways. ET tube or tracheostomy 1




12 Single vaso-active medication. Any vaso active drug. 3
13 Multiple vaso-active medication. More than one vaso active drug, disregarded type and dose. 4
14 IV replacement of large fluid losses. Fluid administration> 3 L/m2/day, disregarded type of fluid
administered.
4
15 Peripheral artery line 5
16 Left atrium monitoring. Swan Ganz catheter with or without cardiac output measurement 8
17 Central venous line 2




19 Haemofiltration techniques. All. 3
20 Qualitative urinary output measurement eg by urinary catheter 2
21 Active diuresis eg Furosemide >0.5 mg/Kg/day for overload 3
NEUROLOGICAL SUPPORT
22 Measurement Intracranial Pressure 4
METABOLIC SUPPORT
23 Treatment of complicated metabolic acidosis/alkalosis 4
24 Intravenous hyperalimentation 3
25 Enteral feeding. Through gastric tube or other GI route ( eg jejunostomy) 2
SPECIFIC INTERVENTIONS
26 Single specific intervention in the ICU. Eg naso or orotrachael intubation, introduction of pacemaker,
cardioversion, endoscopes, emergency surgery in the past 24 hours, gastric lavage - (X-rays ultrasound,
ecg, dressings, introduction of venous or arterial lines are not included)
3
27 Multiple specific interventions in the ICU. More than one as described in item 26 5
28 Specific interventions outside the ICU - eg surgery or diagnostic procedures 5
Table 5.34. Description of TISS 28 scoring system - after Miranda, de Rijk, and Schaufeli (1996)
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The review by Shortell et al. (1994) into the role of good management in the operation and
performance of a Critical Care environment identifies specific factors which are likely to have an effect
on outcomes of such units. Specific factors identified as inputs to the system include:
 Technological availability
 Task diversity (diagnostic diversity)
 Nurse staffing
 Caregiver interaction (culture, leadership, communication, co-ordination, problem solving,
conflict management
The study identifies not just communication within a specific Critical Care unit but the communication
of the unit to all relevant services within the core hospital unit. Within the data collecting element of
the study, information was collected on 17,440 patients from 1691 hospitals in the USA with findings












Technological availability -0.42 -0.03 -0.25 0.11 -0.26
Diagnostic diversity 0.46 0.06 -0.07 0.03 0.15
Nurse/patient staffing ratio 0.14 0.06 -0.04 0.1 0.11
Caregiver interaction 0.09 -0.34 -0.36 0.81 0.74
Table 5.35. Ordinary least squares regression results (standardised coefficient) of variables, after
Shortell et al. (1994).
Two significant findings relate to the relationships of technological availability and diagnostic diversity
to the risk adjusted mortality. Thus with increased technological availability, risk adjusted mortality
falls while with increased diagnostic diversity, risk adjusted mortality increases. The negative
correlation between technological availability and ability to meet family member needs is noteworthy,
indicating that the use of increased technology offsets development of intrapersonal skills. The
negative correlation between caregiver interaction and risk adjusted ICU length of stay implies a
mechanism through more carefully implemented/monitored levels of care.
For any model specifically developed to simulate input factors of care and output measures of risk,
one evaluation of its performance would be to evaluate equivalent regression coefficients.
103
A review of errors within the paediatric intensive care unit (PICU) environment by Tibby et al. (2004)
links the level of incidence of adverse events on a range of factors. Data for the one year study was
abstracted from information data sets routinely used for patient management and where adverse
incidents had been identified since 1993. A specific series of potential risk factors leading to the
occurrence of an adverse event were identified. These included temporal factors of day (08.00 am to
08.00 pm), night shift, weekend/bank and holiday staffing compared with the day shift activity.
Factors related to patient activity included the bed occupancy at the start of a shift, the number of
admissions and discharges during a shift and the level of patient dependency within a shift. Such
patient dependencies were based on the recommendations of the UK Paediatric Intensive Care
Society (2001). One factor related to nursing staff mix was the percentage of F grade and G grade
nurses on duty within a specific shift. A factor related to composition identified the percentage of staff
working as permanent rostered staff and permanent staff working as either rostered and non rostered
staff. This factor was included to identify the role of staff who may have been fatigued by working
additional shifts.
In addition, a supervision factor was included to verify if the nurse in charge of a shift was a G grade
(most senior). A ‘difficulty’ scale was also devised to measure occurrences (e.g. death of a patient)
which may compromise the ability of the supervising nurse to carry out his/her duties.
It was identified that a total of 284 adverse events took place on 220 of 730 shifts. Of these 103 were
identified as being unit related and 181 patient related, with these occurring at a rate of 6.0 per 100
patient days. These were subsequently broken down to drug error (55), intravenous /arterial line (37),
equipment (32), patient injury (26), patient care (21) and accidental extubation (10). With incidents
being coded as serious/moderate and actual/near miss, there were 83 serious adverse incidents
(actual 49, near miss 34) and 98 moderate adverse events (actual 85, near miss 13).
A statistical analysis of the study data identified some obvious effects related to generic activity but
also some important observations for evaluation of nursing supervision. With increased percentage
of F and G grades on duty, there was a reduction in number of total adverse events. With an
increase in the percentage of shifts with an F grade in charge there was a reduction in level of serious
adverse events. This is presumably mainly a supervisory effect. With an increase in the level of
permanent rostered staff, there was a decrease in level of actual adverse events. This implies that
staff undertaking additional shifts may not be as effective as rostered staff due, for example, to sleep
deprivation or fatigue effects. There was not a direct link with the number of admissions/discharges
during a specific shift and in fact the odds ratio fell. It may have been relevant to separate these two
factors, since additional work may be associated with admissions compared with discharges. Also, in
relation to new medical residents, the level of adverse events actually fell with their deployment. This
suggests that such staff may have had higher levels of supervision during their initial deployment.
There was identified also that the incidence of adverse events associated with equipment reduced
104
with the G grade nurse in charge, indicating that training factors in the use of equipment may be
involved. The expected effect of increased level of events with increased patient dependency was
also identified. In general, the study identifies several key factors that would be expected to relate to
levels of adverse events within Critical Care units within the UK and provides useful insight for
development of a simulation model of risk within this environment.
A separate multivariate analysis further differentiated effects on adverse events by pairing sub
categories of variable. This confirmed effects of bed occupancy with patient dependency and level of
rostering with levels of F and G grades on duty. It is highly relevant, however, to relate reporting
structures of simulated adverse effects within the Critical Care environment to peer reviewed medical
literature of the Critical Care environment. What has been previously identified, however, is the non
standard way in which such incidents are defined and the relative frequency of such incidents
described. Table 7.14 summarises some key characteristics of relevant studies previously
referenced, including classification of incidents and frequency of occurrence reference.
5.5 Review of Classification of Incidents and Frequency Reference
Table 5.36 confirms the diverse processes of categorisation of adverse incidents associated with
Critical Care activity as reported in the literature. Studies with relatively high numbers of
classifications include Rothschild et al. (2005) (31) and Giraud et al. (1993) (22). Studies with
relatively low numbers of classifications include Tibby et al. (2004) (6) and Binnekade et al. (2001) (8).
This confirms the set of ‘types of adverse effects’ structured in this research, as outlined in table 5.10,
as being greater than that typically used in such studies. It is identified, however, that this set of
‘types of adverse effects’ originates from an in depth analysis of interventions undertaken within the
Critical Care environment while the listed studies derive classifications from evidence of Clinical
Adverse Events. Thus activity which does not result in clinical adverse events would tend not to be
reported. The adoption of a set of types of adverse effects with 43 classifications is therefore
considered justified.
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Study Classification of incidents Frequency Reference
Sinopoli et al.
(2007).
11 classifications, no specific reference
medication errors and ventilator
components
Number of safety incidents per
group of medical (N=646) or
surgical patients (N=707)
Giraud et al. 1993 22 classifications based largely on high risk
interventions such as arterial catheter,
pleural drainage etc.
Described as number of incidents




Summary of 9 general classifications such
as respiratory system, venous lines and
catheters etc.
Referenced as components of
planning, execution and




Listing of 7 general categories, 10
categories relating to medication errors and
additional 14 categories




Total of 6 generalised categories such as
airway, alarms and equipment.




Sub division of sentinel events associated
with lines, catheters and drains within 9
groups.
Referenced events as numbers
per group and total patients per
group
Graf et al. (2005). 15 summary of human failures 3 main
groupings of human error staff related, drug
and various with total of 13 sub divisions
Number of events in study
Schuerer et al.
(2006)
Total of 10 report types such as medication
error, blood products with
number of detected events and
number which caused harm
Jain et al. (2006). Infection rates VAP, central lines and
catheters




Identification of 8 main categories such as
enteral nutrition, fluid administration
Descriptions of number risk
situations and number critical
situations
Tibby et al. (2004) 6 main categories such as equipment drug
error
Rate referenced as number
events per 100 patient days.
Table 5.36. Summary of key characteristics of relevant studies previously referenced, including
classification of incidents and frequency of occurrence reference.
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5.6 Clinical Review of Interventions
Clinical medicine is in a continual process of reviewing and revising procedures for patient benefit.
These are often some of the more basic procedures undertaken. The study by Corwin, Parsonnet
and Gettinger (1995) reviewed the intrinsic reasons for providing blood transfusions. In a study of
609 patients, a subset of 142 patients had a length of stay greater than one week and where 121 of
these patients received a blood transfusion. One factor relating to the level of blood transfusion is the
volume of blood lost to blood sampling which in the study undertaken is typically around 40 ml per day
or higher. Approximately 30% of this is accounted for via phlebobomy. Analysis of administration of
blood transfusion within the study group, however, indicated that no formal indication was identified for
29% of infusions. The study identified that proper evaluation of the need to provide a blood
transfusion can probably reduce the requirement to provide such infusions. Also, a reduction in the
level of blood taken due to phlebotomy will also contribute towards lower levels of transfusion and with
reduction in levels of associated adverse events.
The level of caution in use of blood transfusions is justified according to the review of Walker (1987)
where an extensive range of transfusion risks are identified. The analysis of adverse effects is
characterised as ‘serious adverse effects’ with a probability of 1 in 190 and ‘troublesome adverse
effects’ with a probability of 1 in 5. The greatest clinical risk was identified as viral hepatitis though
subsequently this factor has been significantly reduced due to improved screening processes. This
study is an excellent example of levels of risk of a specific clinical intervention being quantified based
on processes of clinical audit from a wide range of medical investigators.
5.7 Analysis of Adverse Incidents: Causation and Prevention Factors
While most of the clinical studies relating to adverse incidents are seeking to identify the effects of
such incidents, there is also a trend for developing processes to examine risk causation and
prevention in greater detail. The review by Stockwell (2006) provides a detailed scoping of
techniques for analysis of errors as part of a ‘safety toolbox’. Specific modes already in wide clinical
use are incident reporting, morbidity and mortality conferences and peer review. Less widely used
techniques in healthcare but which find wider application in engineering sectors include Root Cause
Analysis (RCA), failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and
Six Sigma. Root Cause Analysis has been developed within the healthcare community in the
UK as a process for in depth analysis of significant clinical adverse events. This tends to take
the form of an intense team based analysis. Such detailed analysis of incidents, however, does
not provide a systematic review of procedures/protocols on a preventive basis. A key
observation is that the level of reported ‘adverse events’ is likely to be the ‘tip of the iceberg’ in relation
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to the actual number of incidents that take place. The incident reports in themselves, are however
useful markers of trends.
In the UK, the National Patient Safety Agency supports an e-learning tool related to root cause
analysis of adverse events. This is designed essentially for in depth review of specific adverse
clinical events rather than for studies to review sequences of adverse events. The review by
Stockwell and Slonim (2006) also indicates that it tends to be the more serious events which occur
which will be reviewed on the basis of root cause analysis and it may be more appropriate to monitor
parameters which are indicative of procedures beginning to fail rather than wait for a serious failure of
a process to occur. This is in many ways analogous with Quality Systems such as ISO9001:2008
(British Standards Institution, 2008) where routine monitoring of key performance indicators provides
controlling feedback about identified performance levels.
Within the system described by Reason (1995), types of human error are identified as skill based, rule
based and knowledge based. In addition specific ‘violations’ of procedure are identified as routine,
reasoned and reckless. Specific contributory factors are identified as Patient, Individual, Task,
Communication, Team and Social, Education and Training, Equipment and Resources, Work
Conditions and Organisation and Strategy. So called barriers to occurrence of adverse events
include Physical, Natural (e.g. time, distance ), Human action and Administration. Where the Root
Cause Analysis leads to review of processes and procedures, an analysis of such barriers can often
lead to error reduction. Within the information gathering exercise, differentiation is made between an
‘influencing contributory factor’ and a ‘causal contributory factor’ where the former may influence the
likelihood of an adverse event but the causal factor was the one which led to the event taking place.
The subsequent in depth review of issues relating to adverse incidents has itself a structured
framework to arrive at the relevant root causes of the adverse event. Usually such analysis will
involve a focused team approach.
The wider relevance of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis within healthcare is further discussed by
Stockwell and Slonim (2006) where the focused use of the tool in specific instances is identified as
being able to reduce risk of specific interventions such as endotracheal tube placement. While,
however, the tool is considered of somewhat limited value, its use within a range of error reduction
techniques is still relevant. Stockwell and Slonin (2006) references also Probabilistic Risk Analysis
with use of fault tree analysis (NASA 2002, Krouwer 2004) to indicate causation of a specific risk
outcome. Fault tree analysis is of course widely employed as component of Probabilistic Risk
Analysis to reduce the intrinsic failure rate of complex engineering systems such as nuclear power
stations and space launch systems.
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The report by Baldwin et al. (1998) describes the necessary organisational framework for
implementation of local forums for exchange of information and general development of team
communication. This is within the context of Intensive Care units in Australia. A key requirement
identified relates to appropriate planning/structuring of such events and with also the collation and
wider dissemination.
5.8 Summary
Interventions are described as a sequence of sub tasks which have pairings of ‘sub competency and
adverse effect’ and which can be linked to a series of ‘preventive measures’. The distribution of
‘adverse effects’ is used to structure a standard set of types of ‘adverse effects’ against which
comparisons are made with clinical adverse events associated with patient care in the literature
(chapter 7). Details are also described of sub structures of staff competency and type of adverse
effects. A review of clinical studies describing incidence of adverse events within the Critical Care
environment is used to identify causal factors for the development of risk simulation mechanisms.
These concepts are subsequently used in chapter 6 to develop a ‘risk engine’ mechanism based on
implementation of Fuzzy Logic techniques.
A key component of this review identified a specific series of classifications of types of adverse events,
their relative distribution and causation (Giraud et al. (1993); Bracco et al. (2003); Rothchild et al.
(2005); Valentin et al. (2006); Graf et al. (2005); Schuerer et al. (2006); Needham et al. (2004)). This
identified both a diverse series of such classifications and a general lack of a standardised approach.
Consideration of the literature also revealed variation in setting of ‘thresholds’ for identification of such
‘adverse effects’. Aspects of standardisation of systems for classification of clinical adverse events
are further discussed in chapter 8.
The set of referenced clinical studies in chapter 5 has provided an insight into aspects of
development of the ‘risk engine’ in section 6.2, in particular with identification of role of available
competency, level of supervision, level of distraction, and level of individual effectiveness. The
literature has also identified a range of more subtle factors such as team planning, awareness of
procedures and team communication. The role of these parameters in ‘risk engine’ functionality is
also reviewed in section 6.2. In general the set of referenced clinical studies in chapter 5 do not
propose models of risk causation based on identified parameters. This reflects generally the lack of
development of such risk causation models in healthcare.
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Chapter 6: Deriving Models of Clinical Risk
6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes how the structure of the ‘risk engine’ is implemented using a specific
implementation of Fuzzy Logic, where linguistic interpretation of input parameters drives the output
values of the functions. Fuzzy Logic has been applied in a wide range of applications where other
methods of control/analysis result in complex systems of control/simulation with discontinuities of
function.
The core of the chapter describes the specific implementation of a five state Mamdani fuzzy function
for both input and output states. The specific ‘Fuzzy Functions’ are effectively lookup functions of
form Z = f(X,Y) where in the specific implementation values of X, Y and Z are in range 0 to 10. A key
element of the ‘risk engine’ is a component to translate a linear value of ‘likelihood’ to a probability
function in range 0 to 1. In addition, additional structure is defined for functions such as supervision,
distraction and team competency to develop the ‘risk engine’ to the stage where it can process
sequences of previously simulated clinical activity. The utilisation of the Fuzzy Logic approach
requires that every parameter related to the risk simulation process is expressed as a numeric
quantity.
6.2 Describing a ‘Risk Engine’
The formal literature within the Critical Care community provides much valuable material for
developing models of risk. A key component of the research is the derivation of output values of risk
associated with patient interventions and where the system of simulated patient activity modifies a
subset of active input parameters which are assumed in turn to modify the output values of risk as
shown in figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1. Schematic of generic ‘risk engine’.
Within the context of risk in the clinical environment, various core parameters are self evident for this
role of ‘input parameters’. These are referenced in table 6.1 which also includes relevant references
which confirm the role of such parameters as factors relating to clinical risk.
Parameters influencing risk Confirming References
Competency available Giraud et al. 1993; Needham et al. (2004).
Level of supervision Aiken (2002) ; Binnekade et al. (2001) ; Tibby et al. (2004)
Level of distraction Gurses and Carayon (2007); Donchin and Seagull (2002)
Level of individual effectiveness
based on elements of fatigue,
stress, shift patterns etc.
van Dongen et al., (2003) ; Dorrian et al. (2006)
Christensen, Levinson and Dunn, (1992)
Koszalka and Skworcow (2003) ;Jones et al. (1988);
Barger et al. (2006) ;Elfering, Semmer and Grebner (2006)
Fischer et al. (2006) ; Sallinen et al. (2004)
Budnick et al. (1994) ; Iacovides et al. (2003)
Table 6.1. Set of core factors influencing levels of incidence of adverse clinical events within the
Critical Care environment and with confirming literature references.
Various studies, however, also demonstrate the relevance of associated factors which can act to alter
the relative incidence of adverse effects within the Critical Care environment. A clear component is
that of communication of awareness of clinical policies and procedures. While many studies describe
‘failure to follow procedures’ as a key factor in manifestation of adverse clinical incidents, this is
generally interpreted as a lack of awareness of procedures rather than deliberate intent not to follow
them. There is also identified a factor relating to the optimisation of policies and procedures, where a
specific policy, even if followed through to the letter, may not lead to an optimum outcome for the
patient. The challenge within the Critical Care environment and within healthcare in general is to
establish and maintain a set of appropriately written protocols to ensure implementation of best
practice. There is also a possible link with the use of medical equipment related to interventions
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which are linked to patient management and where there is an intrinsic component of risk associated
with the reliability/maintainability of the equipment item and indeed the ability of the clinical user to
operate it appropriately. It is also identified that team communication and patient planning are
important for providing clarity in both determining and communicating elements of patient care.
These strands with relevant supporting clinical references are described in table 6.2.
Related parameters influencing risk Confirming References
Awareness of policies and procedures Rothschild et al. (2005) ; Kern and Kox (1999)
Needham et al. (2004); Jain et al. (2006)
Auriant et al. (2002); McMullin et al. (2006)
Graf et al. (2005)
Optimisation of policies Kern and Kox (1999)
McMullin et al. (2006)
Use of medical equipment Corstjens et al. (2006)
Valentin et al. (2006)
Team communication Graf et al. (2005)
Needham et al. (2004)
Jain et al. (2006)
McFetridge et al. (2007); Currie (2002).
Rothschild et al. (2005).
Patient planning Sinopoli et al. (2007) ; Needham et al. (2004)
Table 6.2. Related parameters influencing levels of incidence of adverse clinical events and with
confirming literature references.
The method selected to define the relationships within the ‘risk engine’ is that of Fuzzy Logic, where
the approach allows function mapping based on linguistic interpretation of identified variables. In line
with the approach of linguistic interpretation, input parameters are ‘paired’ by means of implementation
of two-input single-output Mamdani fuzzy function functions (Mamdani and Assilian,1975). Figure 6.2
indicates a ‘risk engine’ which implements both the core and related parameters referenced in tables
6.1 and 6.2.
112
Figure 6.2. Complex model of system interactions using Mamdani Fuzzy functions. Highlighted
elements relate to ‘core’ elements of model – non highlighted elements relate to ‘related’ elements of
model.
Figure 6.2 is identified as the ‘complex’ ‘risk engine’ model and utilises nine fuzzy logic functions as
indicated by rounded boxes. The mode of operation of the ‘risk engine’ has the flexibility to skip
function elements that are not relevant for the specific evaluation of risk of an identified adverse effect.
Thus a routine nursing task may not be linked to ‘team communication’ or ‘patient planning’ and may
not involve use of medical equipment and may not be an identified procedure what is related to a
specific specialized clinical protocol.
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Within this framework, the component pairings of ‘Effectiveness/Distraction’, ‘Competency
Mismatch(individual)/Competency Mismatch (Team)’ and ‘Supervision/Likelihood of adverse effect’
relate to the implementation of ‘core’ elements of the model. The pairing of ‘effectiveness/distraction’
provides a balancing effect of these two factors that can be linguistically interpreted within a standard
Mamdani Fuzzy logic function. Similarly the components of competency mismatch provide another
set of balanced effects which can be linguistically interpreted within a standard Mamdani Fuzzy logic
function. The component of ‘Supervision’ is also identified as a moderating factor on a derived value
of likelihood of adverse effect and for which linguistic interpretation is readily identified.
For specific components associated with the ‘related’ factors, the derived property of ‘patient focus’
from interaction of team communication and patient planning is justified by specific references which
identify the importance of these factors. The output of patient focus is then combined with that of
modified individual effectiveness to create the parameter of ‘Task Focus’. Modification of output
likelihood is then related to the potential influence of the role of measurement uncertainty which is
modified by effects of the level of verification of measurement equipment (maintenance) and the
degree of stability of measurements. Finally the output is modified by the degree of optimisation of
the associated technique being processed.
It was considered, however, relevant to implement a ‘risk engine’ primarily consistent with the
operation of the core elements of risk evaluation as referenced in Table 6.1. In terms of medical
equipment, while this is a parameter which is associated with risk, the relative occurrence of adverse
events related to equipment failure/inaccuracy is relative low. In addition, specific adverse effects and
competency issues can be separately identified within the simulation model. The linked items of
‘team communication’, ‘patient planning’ with output of ‘patient focus’ are identified as having a
relevant role, though have not been implemented within the ‘core set’ due to the identified requirement
to validate a simplified set implementation of the ‘risk engine’. For a similar reason, the ‘optimisation’
mode parameter is not implemented.
Figure 6.3 indicates the ‘core’ configuration of the ‘risk engine’ that has been adopted within the
current research. From the viewpoint of computational speed and programming implementation,
however, additional complexity of ‘risk engine’ design does not significantly complicate the
programming implementation of the risk simulation system or degrade the speed of processing within
the module.
114
Figure 6.3. Structure of ‘core’ of ‘risk engine’ .
Figure 6.3 indicates how ‘Effectiveness’ is combined with ‘Distraction’ to create ‘Modified
Effectiveness’ and ‘Competency Mismatch (individual)’ combined with ‘Team Component
Competency’ to create ‘Modified Competency Mismatch’ as inputs to determine likelihood of specific
adverse outcome which is in turn modified by ‘supervision’ factor to create ‘modified likelihood’ output.
Also, specific flags can be set e.g. to enable/disable implementation of the supervision factor. Also,
specific functions can relate to various grades of task complexity.
In using the technique of fuzzy logic, it is appreciated that almost an infinitely large set of membership
functions could have been utilized for both input and output parameters. The functions Fz1, Fz2 etc.
are therefore a specific member of a much larger set of possible functions. The attractiveness of the
fuzzy approach is that with input of the basic understanding of how input and output states interact as
described in the rule system, no further analytical review of the model is required to derive output
functions.
With the development of the research and the active demonstration of the operation of the ‘risk engine’
on simulated sets of patient interventions, the role of Preventive Measures within the context of the
risk evaluation has become identified and is further described in section 8.0. This relates to
identification of factors which are identified as having a potential impact on likelihood and severity of
output adverse effects. Where probability weightings are linked with identified adverse effects,
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preventive measure provides an indication of factors/dependencies which are influencing the
likelihood of such adverse effects. This provides a mechanism to highlight factors such as ‘team
communication’ and ‘patient planning’ which have been excluded from the current implementation of
the ‘risk engine’.
The process of developing the underlying concepts as depicted in figure 6.3 has occupied a significant
element of time of the research. The implementation of a specific ‘risk engine’, is however, relatively
straightforward once the basic tools for deriving the fuzzy functions are available. Also, as a specific
function in Matlab ®, the programming component of the ‘risk engine’ is minimal. With each of these
applications involving the ‘fuzzy engine’, however, an essential component is to identify the intrinsic
links between the direct inputs and the intermediate derived parameter values.
The function of the ‘risk engine’ indicated in figure 6.3 will vary according to values of ‘ability to ask
flag’ and ‘supervision flag’ and also the level of complexity of the task (three levels). It was previously
identified that when specific sub tasks were being undertaken, very basic tasks would be undertaken
without any component of team competency being available (table 5.3). Also, it was identified that
the fuzzy logic rule systems linking ‘effectiveness and distraction’, ‘modified individual effectiveness’
and ‘modified competency mismatch’ would be influenced by the complexity of sub tasks being
undertaken. Separate rule systems are defined for low, intermediate and high complexity tasks.
The functions Fzn indicated in figure 6.3 are functions which have initially been derived using Fuzzy
Logic techniques, which translate, for example, input values X and Y in range 0 to 10, to a single
output value function in range 0 to 10. In the model simulation, where all relevant entries have a valid
numerical representation, this allows rapid determination of probability of a given adverse outcome.
While Fuzzy Logic techniques have been utilised to provide this functional mapping within a ‘risk
engine’, it is identified that functions driven by other mathematical techniques may be at least of
equivalent value. These have not been investigated at this stage.
6.3 Components of Fuzzy Logic Modelling
The initial theory of fuzzy sets as initially outlined by Zadeh (1965) has been subsequently developed
as a sub set of mathematics and has been applied in a wide range of problem areas. In particular for
the current application, use has been made of the widely employed two-input single-output (Mamdani
and Assilian 1975) fuzzy inference system though other systems such as described by Sugeno and
Kang (1988) and Tsukamoto (1979) have also been considered. Relevant material has also been
reviewed within Jang, Sun and Mizutani (1997). Four separate Mamdani two-input single-output
functions are employed to implement the ‘risk engine’ identified in figure 6.3.
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A wide range of membership functions have been identified within the context of problem
implementation within fuzzy sets. Specific types include triangular, trapezoidal, Gaussian and
generalised Bell. In the context of the current application use was made of a five level trapezoidal
function for both input and output functions as indicated in figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4. Illustration of a Mamdani system where independent input values X for input #1 and Y for
input #2 intersect the five level trapezoidal membership functions.
Table 6.3 summarises the functioning of the Fuzzy function indicted in figure 6.4. The value Z1(3)
indicates the value of intercept of input value X (input #1) with membership state 3 and
correspondingly the value Z2(4) indicates the intercept of value Y (input #2) with membership state 4.
With the application of identified fuzzy rules based on ‘linguistic’ relationships between the variables,
values of the corresponding output functions can be identified as indicated in table 6.1 where, for
example, rule 1 indicates ‘if input #1 is state 2 and input #2 is state 3 then output is state 2’.
117
Rule number 1 2 3 4
State input #1 2 3 2 3
State input #2 3 3 4 4
Output rule 2 3 2 3
Rule Function Min (Z1(2),Z2(3)) Min (Z1(3),Z2(3)) Min(Z1(2),Z2(4)) Min(Z1(3),Z2(4))
Table 6.3. Details of notional output rules based on input states with inclusion of rule function of the
minimum value of intercepts.
In this example, the maximum number of rules that would fire for a single (X,Y) determination is 4.
The specific functionality of figure 6.3 can be implemented by means of series of Mamdani fuzzy
functions where specific rules structures are defined for the inputs functions and the specified output
function. In terms of implementing the fuzzy logic model within Matlab®, the generic function
identified in equation 6.3 is represented in figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5. Details of main fuzzy function used for both input and output characterisation
( a=4, b=0.8, c=5, d=0.2 as in example above).
The first stage of the process is implemented by means of a locally developed Matlab®
function ‘Fuzzy_5_level’ with argument structure:
[a, b, c, d ]=Fuzzy_5_level(e) (6.1)
where (a, b) is one set of intersection values of input rule and corresponding value and (c, d) is the
second set of intersection value of input rule and corresponding intersection value and e is input
parameter. Values of a and c correspond to the value of identified component membership function.
Values of b and d are the specific function values which are intersected. Thus one pair (a, b) is
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always defined as at least one membership function is ‘hit’. The pair (c, d) may not always be
defined, for example when e<1.667 or e>8.333 in the example shown.
The membership function of a specific output rule is generated by the function ‘build_mf’ as outlined in
equation 6.2 where s is the output rule which ‘fires’ and y is the value of intersection function.
[mf] = build_mf(s,y) (6.2)
Figure 6.6 indicates specific membership functions generated relating to parameters identified in table
6.3.
Figure 6.6. Indication of separate output membership functions corresponding to discrete values within
equation 6.2 for intersection values of 0.31, 0.67, 0.26, 0.15 and 0.83.
Figure 6.7 indicates the resultant ‘combined’ membership function produced by taking the maximum
value of all component entries across the separate five output membership functions.
Figure: 6.7. Resultant output membership function produced from deriving maximum
value of each component membership function referenced in figure 6.6.
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Normally a maximum of four such membership functions would be generated. A set of five are
included to indicate the process of structuring membership functions prior to defuzzification.
Defuzzification is undertaken using the standard centroid method using function indicated in equation
6.3.
Outputcent = defuzz(tx,maxv,'centroid') (6.3)
Where tx is the output x range and maxv is the output y function expressed as the maximum value of
any components within a given output state as indicated in figure 6.5. The process of defuziffication
is designed to derive a ‘weight’ or ‘effective measure’ of the values of the values of the membership
functions. The ‘centroid’ method derives effectively the x axis value about which the area under the
graph would balance. Functions 6.1 and 6.2 are written using locally developed Matlab® code while
6.3 utilises the Matlab® fuzzy toolkit. A specific derived Matlab module was developed to produce
effectively a tool to derive an output Z parameter value for a set of input #1 and input #2 values in
range 0 to 10 with variable steps of 0.1. A total of 25 rules as outlined in table 6.4 were used to
structure the array of look up values. The module writes the 100x100 array to disc for later use by the
programme which determines the output probability of specific adverse effects.
Input #1 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Input #2 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1
Output
rule
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
24 2518 19 20 21 22 2312 13 14 15 16 176 7 8 9 10 11Rule
Number
1 2 3 4 5
Table 6.4. Indication of the 25 rules associated with the basic Mamdani function where each input can
exist in any of five states and the output state indicated as ‘?’ can be one of five output states.
A basic outline of characteristics of Mamdani fuzzy functions is outlined in Appendix 6.
6.4 Quantifying Competency Mismatch
A key element of risk simulation relates to derivation of a ‘competency mismatch’ function for use
within the ‘risk engine’ for calculation of adverse effects. Equation 6.4 identifies the value of CM,
competency mismatch, as a function of available competency (avail_compet) and required
competency (req_compet) and where M1 is a constant.
CM = 5 – M1.(avail_compet - req_compet) (6.4)
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Figure 6.8. Value of competency mismatch as a function of available competency and value of M1 for
value of required competency of 0.8.
Figure 6.8 indicates the significance of value of M1 for driving values of output competency mismatch.
Where the value of M1 is too low, then competency mismatch values will vary within too restrictive a
value limit. Conversely, when the value of M1 is too high the range of competency mismatch value
will be excessive and not conform to structures identified within the fuzzy model relationships.
Subsequently a value of M1 of 15 is adopted.
6.5 Examples of Implementation
Table 6.5 outlines typical rule based system for inputs and output relating competency mismatch of
the individual (#1) with element of additional competency (#2). This is derived based on ‘linguistic








1 1 1 1 12 2 2 2 2 23 2 3 3 3 3
2 1
5 5 4 3 3 4 4 4
3 2 1 5 4 34 3 2 1 5 45 4 3 2 1 5
1 1 1 1 1
5 4 3 2 1
3 2 2 2 2 24 4 3 3 3 3
24 25
5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4
18 19 20 21 22 2312 13 14 15 16 176 7 8 9 10 11Rule Number 1 2 3 4 5
Table 6.5. Detail of rule system for modification of competency mismatch of staff member #1 with
competency mismatch of assisting member of staff member #2. (5 = very high negative; 4 = high
negative; 3 = intermediate; 2 = high positive, 1 = very high positive).
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The derived three dimensional surface plot based on this rule set is indicated in figure 6.9.
Figure 6.9. Interaction of input components of competency mismatch to provide combined
output: CM#1 = competency mismatch staff member #1: CM#2 = competency mismatch of staff
member #2.
This indicates the way in which fuzzy logic rule based systems effectively define a mapping
function within the various stages of derivation of the ‘risk engine’. In a similar way, it is
appropriate to identify the rule functions for effectiveness and distraction using the three levels of
task complexity where is it assumed that distraction will be a more significant factor in more
complex tasks. It is appropriate, however, to define the states of distraction as it applies to
degradation of ability to complete tasks effectively.
Rule State Description
Very high (5) Likely to cause loss of effectiveness during complex or
moderately complex or simple tasks
High (4) Likely to cause loss of effectiveness during complex or
moderately complex tasks
Intermediate (3) Likely to cause loss of effectiveness during complex tasks
Low (2) Possible effect on some work
Very low (1) No effect on level of effectiveness
Table 6.6. Description of level of distraction and ability to influence individual effectiveness.
In this rule set, distraction is combined with effectiveness. Effectiveness is more significantly
degraded with degree of distraction.
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Effectiveness 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1











1 12 2 2 1 1 13 3 3 3 1 23 4 4 4 4 2
1 1 1 1 1
4 5 5 5 5
3 1 2 2 2 24 4 2 2 3 3
24 25
4 4 5 5 5 3 3 3
18 19 20 21 22 2312 13 14 15 16 176 7 8 9 10 11Rule Number 1 2 3 4 5
Table 6.7. Rule description for derivation of modified effectiveness based on levels of
distraction and for level of task complexity (low, intermediate and complex).
Figure 6.10. Combination of Effectiveness and Distraction for complex tasks (Fz1comp).
Thus the ‘risk engine’ identified in figure 6.3 can be designed and implemented using the ‘two input
one output’ Mamdani fuzzy model and where the numerical functions are essentially defined by the
identified set of rules for such functions. A summary of the various fuzzy logic functions are




5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Rule 2
input
5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1
Fz1comp
input
3 4 4 5 5 2 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1
Fz1int
input
4 4 5 5 5 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Fz1low
input
4 5 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Fz2
output
5 5 4 3 3 4 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Fz3comp
output
5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 4 5 2 2 2 3 4 1 1 1 1 3
Fz3int
output
5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 2
Fz3low
output
4 5 5 5 5 3 3 4 5 2 3 3 3 3 4 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1
Fz4
output
3 4 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 2 3 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Table 6.8. Summary of input and output rule structures utilised in the structure of figure 6.1.
6.6 Mapping from Output Linear Value to Event Probability
The values of likelihood of adverse events within a linear scale between 0 and 10 require to be
equated to an actual likelihood of occurrence in the range of 0 to 1 value through a separate mapping
function. Table 6.9 indicates a typical process of mapping of probability and time frame that is
routinely applied within risk assessments in the NHS (SAI Global 2004). Where, for example, a risk
event is likely to occur on a daily basis, with nominal probability of unity, then the relative probability of








Very likely Every day 1 8.3333
Likely Once a week 0.1429 6.667
Occasional Once every 3
months
0.01111 5
Rarely Once a year 1/365 3.333
Very rarely Once in five years 1/(365*5) 1.667
Table 6.9. Description of frequency and probability factors for event occurrence, where ‘scale value
likelihood’ is linear output value of the ‘risk engine’.
Figure 6.11 indicates the general variation of output probability with value of output likelihood using the
step interval of 1.66667 between values of output likelihood. This indicates the characteristic maximum
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value at output likelihood value of 8.3333 followed by step wise reduction to the minimum value at
1.6667.
Figure 6.11. Variation of relative probability with output likelihood and based on values in table 6.9.
Assuming a linear log function of relative probability as a function of linear output likelihood, this has a




where Ao is the maximum function value at OutAE=8.333, OutAE is the (linear) value of output
likelihood from the ‘risk engine’, Step is the interval value of output likelihood (set at 1.66667) and
Grad is a scaling factor.
Figure 6.12. Variation of relative probability as function of output likelihood for specific values of Ao
and Grad.
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Where specific values of output risk are derived as a result of simulation using random number
generation, a normalized event space of output likelihood values can be generated which requires to
be translated to corresponding values of probability. Figure 6.13 indicates how specific values of
constants used in equation 6.4 produce differences in values of cumulative normalized probability.
Figure 6.13. Variation of three separate cumulative probability functions with normalized event
frequency for higher risk states. Corresponding values of average probability are 0.0122, 0.0068 and
0.0046.
More extensive analysis of the probability mapping function with test sets of simulated risk values is
outlined in section 7.7.
6.7Driving the Model: Working with Interventions
While the specific components of the inputs to the ‘risk engine’ have been defined, additional structure
and definition is required to implement a working model. As previously described, interventions are
identified as a key element of the risk model. Figure 6.14 indicates how interventions with linked
competencies/adverse effects provide the basic structure for evaluation of risk effects. In the
example the competencies are looked up in the nursing competency table at the appropriate grade of
staff and the adverse effects in the corresponding (global) adverse effects table. Interventions for
other staff groups reference the relevant competency table. Figure 6.15 describes the complex
process of structuring input values to the ‘risk engine’ as part of the process of evaluation of
probabilities of adverse effects.
126
Figure 6.14. Structure of look up function of an intervention with three components of
competency/adverse effect.
Figure 6.15. Summary of inputs to the ‘risk engine’ (figure 6.3) to determine probability of adverse
effects associated with a specific component of competency within an identified intervention.
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The code flags set within the competency element (supervision flag and ask help flag) determine
specific modes of operation of the risk engine. The elements of physical, intellectual,
emotional/stress descriptors influence the effectiveness of an individual as interventions are
undertaken. The element of supervision is more highly defined for sets of nursing based
interventions.
6.8 Staff Roster Processes
A key component of operating a Critical Care Unit is the allocation of nursing staff to individual
patients. Previously, table 5.12 identified a sub banding structure within the ranges of bands 5 to 7.
Nursing staff are identified to form a ‘rostered’ pool of staff consisting of staff of various grades and
sub grades. The specific Critical Care Unit at University Hospital, Coventry, operates three ‘teams’ of
staff based on bed groupings of 8, 8 and 10 beds. These teams essentially work ‘autonomously’
based on the physical layout of work environment and where the beds in each cluster form a cohesive
team unit for communication of priorities, sharing of skills and local management of patient care. For
this set of ten beds, staffing of these beds is undertaken on a staff roster basis. Table 6.10 identifies
a typical analysis of relative staff grades within an identified sub unit of ten beds with utilisation of the




















Table 6.10. Example of allocation of nursing staff per notional 10 bed unit.
Each nurse ‘team’ will include at least one band 7 nurse allocated to the role of lead nurse.
128
For nursing staff of a specific band, such as band 5, specific details of individual staff are maintained
in the format indicated in table 6.11.
Competency Ability to Ask Supervision Handover Emotional &
stress
description level Coefficient Grade Grade
1 5b 0.8 0.67 3 3 3 3
2 5b 0.8 0.67 3 3 3 3
3 5b 0.8 0.67 3 3 3 3
4 5b 0.8 0.67 3 3 3 3
5 5b 0.8 0.67 3 3 3 3
6 5b 0.8 0.67 3 3 3 3
7 5b 0.8 0.67 3 3 3 3





Table 6.11. Variables associated with individual nursing staff with identification of competency
description (as applied to all competencies), ‘Ability to Ask’ factor for team competency sharing,
handover/admission function and physical, emotional/stress and intellectual reserve grades.
It is also possible to structure a specific ‘Supervision coefficient’, in range 0 to 1, to reflect the degree
of supervisory ability of the individual. Thus each individual nurse with a unique staff reference will
have a characteristic profile based on the sub code describing competency within the identified band
(eg 5a, 5b etc.) and the other identified factors. The ‘ability to ask’ parameter is a measure of the
relative probability that the staff member will ask for help in undertaking tasks. This acknowledges
that the potential availability of additional competency within the group of nursing co-workers does not
necessarily imply that it is taken up.
Details of nurse allocation within a specific time period is contained in a matrix of structure
(beds,shift_number) where ‘beds’ is the number of active beds and ‘shift_number’ is the shift number
that has been allocated and where the specific values of the matrix are the unique identifier of an
identified staff member. Staff are allocated to patients on the basis of clinical need, where the more ill
patients would be treated by the more experienced nursing staff. In the module which calculates
likelihood of probability of adverse effects, the staff available for duty at the start of each shift are
automatically matched to the patients by level of severity of patient condition. Table 6.12 indicates
the basic roster structure used for risk simulations and was derived by a specially developed roster
generation module which accessed a core set of 100 nurses with characteristic distribution of
competency grades.
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Table 6.12. Summary of simplified roster used in risk simulations where numeric entries reference
specific nursing co-workers.
For the group of 10 active beds, in the region of a minimum of 50 nursing staff are required to provide
sufficient roster structure and including elements of annual leave and sickness. This is assuming 4
consecutive shifts ‘ON’ and three equivalent shifts ‘OFF’. The training profile of staff, however, will
change dynamically as new staff are recruited and where staff in post develop their specific levels of
competence. The model has the potential to simulate contributions from dynamic changes to the
competency level of individual staff.
The nursing roster system within the Critical Care Unit at University Hospital, Coventry is generally
similar, except that additional scope is required to roster staff due to sick leave, study leave and
annual leave. Band 7 nursing staff tend not to work a full set of ‘duty’ shifts per week. A limited
number of staff will work 8 hour shifts but are not included in the roster model.
130
6.9 Team Competency Cover
One of the key perceptions of work within the Critical Care environment is that of competency sharing
within a team environment especially for nursing staff. Specific factors which relate to this mode are
outlined in table 6.13.
Factor Issues
Staff availability Who is physically present in the area at a given
point in time?
Staff proximity Who is sufficiently close to a specific staff
member to provide effective support?
Ability to provide additional
competence
Can staff bridge identified competency gap?
Table 6.13. Issues relating to providing nursing competency cover.
A notional physical layout of the active 10 bed sub-unit within the Critical Care unit is indicated in
figure 6.16. This shows specific bed numbers, an indicated bed (bed number #3) and pointers to
beds where staff of higher competency are physically present at the time when a staff member at bed
number #3 is undertaking an intervention. Parameters D1, D2 etc. are distance vectors to identified
beds.
Figure 6.16. Representation of active ten bed sub unit where nursing staff in beds 2, 6, 7 and 10 are
actually present and can contribute a higher competency for the individual at bed 3.
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In the process of identification of maximum potentially available competency to a staff nursing
member, probability functions are identified with each ‘bed-to-bed’ link which relate to the availability of
staff member (present/not present and identified as Attend(i)) and the effect of separation between
individuals which is identified as Sep_comp(i,j) in equation 6.6. Where this probability is zero, the
component of potential additional competency is ignored. These factors indicate that levels of ‘team’
competency will be degraded by senior staff who have to spend significant periods of time outside the
immediate clinical area or where the physical layout of the unit prevents effective team communication
and contact.
In addition, the model identifies an ‘Ability to Ask’ function Fask(j), which influences the process of
seeking additional competency. Set typically as a probability value of 0.8, this factor can affect the
level of additional competency which is potentially available but perhaps not taken up by the individual
in question. The maximum available team competency for staff member j relative to a specific sub
competency is identified as:
Team_Max_Comp(j)= Fask(j). Max[Comp(i). Attend(i).Sep_comp(i,j)] i=i,10 i#j (6.6)
Where Comp(i) is the competency level of nurse at bed i.
The Sep_comp(i,j) function introduces a factor to reduce the team interaction at increased distance
between nursing co-workers. Table 6.14. describes the interactions between an active bed (rows)
and linked beds (columns).
Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 Link 5 Link 6 Link 7 Link 8 Link 9
Bed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Bed 2 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Bed 3 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Bed 4 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10
Bed 5 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10
Bed 6 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10
Bed 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10
Bed 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10
Bed 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10
Bed 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Table 6.14. Matrix of links of active bed and linked beds: For example active bed #1 links with beds
2,3 4,5 6,7,8,9 and 10 and active bed #8 links with beds 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9 and 10.
Table 6.15 describes the values of probability of interaction using the rule outlined in figure 6.15.
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Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 Link 5 Link 6 Link 7 Link 8 Link 9
Bed 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8333 0.8333 0.6777 0.6777
Bed 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.8333 0.8333 0.6777 0.6777
Bed 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8333 0.8333
Bed 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8333 0.8333
Bed 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bed 6 0.8333 0.8333 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bed 7 0.8333 0.8333 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bed 8 0.8333 0.8333 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bed 9 0.6777 0.6777 0.8333 0.8333 1 1 1 1 1
Bed 10 0.6777 0.6777 0.8333 0.8333 1 1 1 1 1
Table 6.15. Values of probability of ‘action at a distance’ based on interaction rule as referenced
Sep_comp(i,j) in equation 6.6.
Figure 6.17. Rule function describing probability of competency sharing as a function of row difference
between beds. More remote beds are likely to have less interaction.
Thus in the example of link from bed 3 to bed 10 in figure 6.17, this is a difference of 3 rows, which is
associated with a probability value of 0.8333. This value is associated with element (Bed 3, Link9) of
table 6.14.
This model of competency sharing identifies the relative probabilities of supporting individual
competency from the team. For a number of reasons, such as fetching of consumable items/drugs,
answering the telephone, etc. allocated nursing staff are not always present at the position of the
allocated nursing station. At specific instants in time, the available ‘team competency’ will be most
affected by the availability of the ‘team leader’ who is assumed to have most competency across the
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range of patient interventions. The value of probability of attendance can be considered to be
influenced by physical design/layout factors such as proximity of stock rooms/drug stores to the clinical
area and general logistical planning. This approach indicates how logistical layout can influence risk
factors associated with patient care.
It is also relevant to point out that the physical distribution of patients by severity grade can also
influence the level of team competency sharing.
Figure 6.18. Indication of how distribution of patients by severity within the active sub unit (where
numbers in brackets indicate level of severity of patient condition) will influence the sharing of
competency as more highly trained staff are associated with patients of greater severity grade. In
configuration A, most of the severely ill patients are in beds 1 to 4 which could restrict competency
sharing while in configuration B, they are more widely distributed within the unit which would tend to
enhance competency sharing.
6.10 Structuring Supervision
Supervision of nursing staff can be considered to have one component related to operational
supervision by nursing co-workers in a specific sub unit (notionally ten bed model) and another
component by other clinical co-workers such non-operational nursing staff (of senior grade) and other
staff including doctors, pharmacists and dieticians.
Where a supervision parameter used with the fuzzy risk model has a range of value of 0 to 10, for
nursing co-worker j, this can be considered to be of format:
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Sv(j) = cncw.Sncw(j) + coc.So (6.7)
Where Sv(j) is the combined supervision value for nursing staff member j, Sncw(j) is the component
from other nursing co-workers and So is the combination for other clinical staff. Parameters cncw and
coc are coefficients <1 to identify the mix of supervision between nursing co-workers and other clinical
staff. Initial values of cncw and coc are identified as 0.9 and 0.1 and So as value 8.0 for dayshift and
4.0 for nightshift. This indicates the dominance of supervision due to nursing co-workers.
The value of Sncw(j) for nursing co-worker j can be identified as:
Sncw(j)=Σ (Sf(i) .   t(i).   Sep_sup(i,j)) i=1,10 i#j                                                                              (6.8)
Where Sf(i) is a supervision factor associated with a specific staff grade as indicated in figure 7.10, t(i)
is 0 or 1 depending on whether bed is active/non active or if the staff member is present/not present
and Sep_sup(i,j) is a probability of interaction function between beds related to supervisory role and
with similar function to Sep_comp(i,j) utilised in equation 6.6. It is identified that the parameters of
Sep_comp(i,j) and Sep_sup(i,j) are essentially equivalent, where the influence of physical layout will
tend to influence both competency sharing and level of supervision. Section 6.14 outlines a
systematic approach for generating values of Sep_comp(i,j) and Sep_sup(i,j). A key element
identified in the evaluation of the supervision coefficient Sep_sup(i,j) is the awareness of patient
condition between bed areas. In subsequent simulations using subsets of test data in chapter 7,
Sep_comp(i,j) and Sep_sup(i,j) can be set to separate values if required.
Equation 6.9 describes the relationship between the supervision factor associated with a specific staff
grade and the corresponding nursing co-worker, as indicated in figure 6.19.
Sf(i) = 0.053571.Subg(j) + 0.7321 (6.9)
Within this model, the factor of ‘action at a distance’ is assumed to be similar for competency sharing
and also for additive supervision.
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Figure 6.19. Variation of supervision component Sf(i) as a function of sub grade of nurse (1 to 5: band
5: 6 to 10 band 6 and 10 to 15 band 7).
6.11 Structuring Distraction
Distraction factors were previously referenced in section 6.2 where the level of bed occupancy was
related to a notional distraction factor in the range 0 to 10 which could be used as an input to the fuzzy
model. Subsequently, with the identification of a ‘severity’ parameter in range 1 to 5, the ‘distraction’
function is seen to be influenced by both the bed occupancy status and the corresponding level of
severity of patient condition. Specific distraction weightings are empirically applied as indicated in












1 2 3 4 5
Distraction Coefficient
Dc(j)
0.65 0.75 1 1.25 1.5
Table 6.16. Distraction coefficients used to determine distraction function within the 10 bed model
critical care unit.
The value of distraction parameter, Dist(j) for nursing co-worker j is given by:
Dist_ncw(j)=Σ(Dc(i).bedoc(i) Sep_dist(i,j)) i=1,10 i#j (6.10)
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Where Dc(i) is the distraction coefficient as indicated in table 6.16, bedoc(i) is value 0 or 1 depending
on the bed occupation status and Sep_dist(i,j) is a parameter weighting the distractive effect of
function of bed separation. The function of Sep_dist(i,j) is similar to that of Sep_comp(i,j) and
Sep_sup(i,j). Table 6.17 indicates a derived set of distraction coefficients derived in section 6.14.
This numeric structure takes account of ‘line of sight’ in functions describing visual contact, verbal
contact and awareness of patient condition.
Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 Link 5 Link 6 Link 7 Link 8 Link 9
Bed 1 1 1 1 0.719 0.898 0.573 0.573 0.468 0.468
Bed 2 1 1 1 0.898 0.719 0.573 0.573 0.468 0.468
Bed 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.719 0.898 0.573 0.573
Bed 4 1 1 1 1 1 0.898 0.719 0.573 0.573
Bed 5 0.719 0.898 1 1 1 1 1 0.719 0.898
Bed 6 0.898 0.719 1 1 1 1 1 0.898 0.719
Bed 7 0.573 0.573 0.719 0.898 1 1 1 1 1
Bed 8 0.573 0.573 0.898 0.719 1 1 1 1 1
Bed 9 0.468 0.468 0.573 0.573 0.719 0.898 1 1 1
Bed 10 0.468 0.468 0.573 0.573 0.898 0.719 1 1 1
Table 6.17. Derived set of distraction coefficients.
6.12 Outcome of Model Development: Physical Factors
A significant feature of the model development has been identification of sub structures and
dependencies within derived values of key parameters such as competency, supervision and
distraction as expressed within equations 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 and relating to specific parameter values
of Sep_comp(i,j), Sep_sup(i,j) and Sep_dist(i,j). These parameters can be described as strongly
coupled where there is a significant reduction in coefficient values as a function of bed separation and
conversely weakly coupled where the reduction in values with bed separation is less significant.
It remains a valid observation, however, that physical factors that encourage good competency
sharing and good levels of supervision will also tend to increase factors of distraction within a team of
nursing co-workers. The scope for further review and analysis of interaction of factors relating
to competency sharing, levels of supervision and distraction is outlined in chapter 8.
6.13 Operation of the Risk Estimation Engine
At this stage, all of the essential definitions of the structure of the origin of data sets and how they
interact within the information flows of the ‘risk engine’ have been defined. Subsequently the
operation of specific elements of this calculation process are identified. In particular, the detail of the
specific ‘risk engine’.
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In many ways the core function of the analysis process is the ‘risk engine’ itself, which within MatLab
®, is implemented as a function with numerous inputs and a single output value of relative risk of an
adverse effect. Table 6.18 summarises the set of ‘fuzzy’ look up functions used in implementation of
the ‘risk engine’.
Function Reference Function combined Complexity level
F1zlow Effectiveness & Distraction low
F1zint Effectiveness & Distraction intermediate
F1zcomp Effectiveness & Distraction high
Fz2 Individual competence & team
competence mismatch
-
Fz3low Modified effectiveness & modified
competency mismatch
low
Fz3int Modified effectiveness & modified
competency mismatch
intermediate
Fz3comp Modified effectiveness & modified
competency mismatch
high
Fz4 Likelihood of specific adverse
effect & supervision
-
Table 6.18. Identification of fuzzy functions used to evaluate adverse risk effect values.
Figure 6.20 summarises the derivation of input arguments to the main function of the ‘risk engine’.
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Figure 6.20. Derivation of input arguments to the main ‘risk engine’ function.
The specific syntax of the associated function is identified as:
[OutAE,Stat] =
NCW_Risk_Engine_09a [Eff, Sup, Dist, CMI, CMT, Intr, CmCd, F1zlow, F1zint, F1zcomp, Fz2
,Fz3low, Fz3int, Fz3comp, Fz4] (6.11)
Where OutAE is the output likelihood (linear value), Stat is an internally derived status value, Eff is
individual effectiveness, Sup is supervision, Dist is distraction factor, CMI is individual competency
mismatch, CMT is team competency mismatch, Intr is value of code describing adverse effect and
CmCd describes codes such as supervision flag, ability to ask flag and complexity level. The function
NCW_Risk_Engine utilises the fuzzy functions previously referenced and which are shown in table
6.6.
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Figure 6.21 indicates the structure of data required to be assimilated into the main risk engine module.
Figure 6.21. Structure of main data entries required for evaluation of risk values in main ‘risk engine’
module.
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Figure 6.22. Overview of processing of intervention data within module evaluating competency/risk
processing of simulated intervention data.
I identify next time slot in time line of interventions I 
is y derive shift number and day/night status 
start day or derive patient episode values 
night derive episode day value 
shift derive bed status 
derive bed critical levels (1 to 5) 
N 
derive nurse staff reference and competency details 
allocate nursing staff to patients 
initialise value of handover functions 
initislise PH EM ME stamina values for active nurses 
read grade of depletion values (PH, EM, ME) 
set sleep deprivation for shift 
read in interventions at time slot across set of beds 
and check for admission/discharge events 
admit or discharge 
bed 
y update patient episode 
status .. update episode day value 
change 
update bed status 
update bed critical level (1 to 5) 
establish admit function if admit 
Nf 
for each intervention 
derive break down to sub competenc ies/adverse effects 
for each component derive physical, emotional, mental element 
derive competency mismatch for individual 
derive team component competency mismatch 
derive supervision factor for team 
derive 'risk engine' pathway 
derive 'handover' function value 
derive admit function value 
derive distraction function value 
derive sleep deprivation function value 
derive 'night dip' function value for night shift 
+ 
1 operate 'risk engine' I • write log file entry to disk and increment log counter I 
I 
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Figure 6.23 summarises the processing structure for calculation of probability of adverse effects of
simulated interventions. Typically the active module will take 34 hours to process interventions
associated with 9 months of activity. Processes of testing/validating the risk engine typically use
smaller simulation data sets.
6.14 : Determination of Effect of Physical Aspects of Work Environment on Risk
Factors
Development of the risk simulation system in sections 6.9 to 6.11 has identified characteristics of the
physical work environment within Critical Care which impact on levels of risk associated with clinical
activity. These relationships are summarised in table 6.19.
Parameter Function Equation
Sep_comp(i,j) Value of probability of interaction between staff member j (seeking
assistance) and staff member i (providing additional competency)
6.6
Sep_sup(i,j) Value of probability of interaction between staff member j (obtaining
supervision) and staff member i (providing supervision)
6.8
Sep_dist(i,j) Value of probability of interaction between bed j (perceived component
of distraction) and bed i (contributing component of distraction)
6.10
Table 6.19. Summary of identified parameters linking characteristics of the physical work
environment within Critical Care and levels of risk associated with clinical activity.
These factors have been incorporated into the risk simulation system and with confirmation of the
expected variation in simulated output risk with specific variation in parameter values. It is identified
that further consideration is required for evaluation of the specific values of parameters outlined in
table 6.19 to identify appropriate values for identified configurations of the physical work environment.
142
Within the context of identification of parameters outlined in table 6.19, table 6.20 outlines details of
parameters identified as associated with each parameter.
Parameters Associated factors
Sep_comp(i,j) Visual contact (staff j to staff i)
Competency sharing Verbal contact (staff j to staff i)
Proximity (staff j to staff i)
Mobility (staff j)
Visual contact (staff i to staff j)
Srep_sup(i,j) Verbal contact (staff i to staff j)
Supervision Proximity (staff i to staff j)
Mobility (staff j)
Awareness patient condition (bed i to bed j)
Sep_dist(i,j) Visual contact (staff j to staff i)
Distraction Verbal contact (staff j to staff i)
Proximity (staff j to staff i)
Awareness patient condition (bed j to bed i)
Table 6.20. Associated factors linked to parameters of competency sharing, supervision and
distraction and where j references the bed for which these coefficients relate.
It is identified that one option for deriving values of the parameter coefficients is to create a Fuzzy logic
implementation for each parameter using appropriate linguistic structures as outlined in figures 6.23,
6.24 and 6.25.
Figure 6.23. Use of Fuzzy Logic for derivation of coefficients for determination of Sep_comp(i,j).
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Figure 6.24. Use of Fuzzy Logic for derivation of coefficients for determination of Sep_sup(i,j).
Figure 6.25 Use of Fuzzy Logic for derivation of coefficients for determination of Sep_dist(i,j).
Figure 6.26 describes the linguistic description of input parameter functions referenced in figures 6.23
to 6.25. Output function values have a comparable state description.
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Figure 6.26 .Linguistic description of input parameters for determination of spatial coefficients of
interaction.
Visual contact 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Verbal contact 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1
2 4 3 2 2 13 3 5 4 3 24 3 3 5 4 3
24 25
Modified contact 5 5 4 4 3 5 4
18 19 20 21 22 2312 13 14 15 16 176 7 8 9 10 11Rule Number 1 2 3 4 5
Table 6.21. Function assignment ‘Fsep1’: Input parameters: visual contact, and verbal contact :
Output parameter : Modified Contact.
Figure 6.27. Surface plot of Fuzzy function Fsep1 as outlined in table 6.21.
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Proximity 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Mobility 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1
2 3 3 2 1 13 3 4 4 3 24 4 4 4 4 3
24 25
Modified Proximity 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
18 19 20 21 22 2312 13 14 15 16 176 7 8 9 10 11Rule Number 1 2 3 4 5
Table 6.22. Function assignment ‘Fsep2’: Input parameters: Proximity and Mobility : Output
parameter : Modified Proximity.
Figure 6.28. Surface plot of Fuzzy function Fsep2 as outlined in table 6.22.
Modified contact 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Modified Proximity 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1
Likelihood of
interaction
5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 3 5 4 3 3 3 5 4 3 2 2 4 4 3 2 1
24 2518 19 20 21 22 2312 13 14 15 16 176 7 8 9 10 11Rule Number 1 2 3 4 5
Table 6.23. Function assignment: Input parameters ‘Fsep3’: Modified contact and Modified proximity
: Output parameter : Likelihood of interaction – Sep_comp(i,j)
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Figure 6.29. Surface plot of Fuzzy function Fsep3 as outlined in table 6.23.
Likelihood of
interaction
5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Awareness of
patient condition
5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1
Output coefficient 5 5 4 3 3 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 1 1
24 2518 19 20 21 22 2312 13 14 15 16 176 7 8 9 10 11Rule Number 1 2 3 4 5
Table 6.24. Function assignment: Input parameters ‘Fsep4’: Likelihood of Interaction and Modified
proximity : Output parameter : Likelihood of interaction.
Figure 6.30. Surface plot of Fuzzy function Fsep4 as outlined in table 6.24.
Look up fuzzy functions have been configured using previously developed tools to derive look up table
values.
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This illustrates the further use of Fuzzy logic to derive values of coefficients as outlined in table 6.19.
This therefore defines a process for determination of these coefficients for specific spatial
configurations of Critical Care areas and for determination of specific values appropriate to the local
configuration modelled on a bed value of ten.
A series of values for Sep_comp were derived for a standard ten bed configuration as referenced
previously in figure 6.14. Values of visual contact, verbal contact, proximity and mobility were
identified with bed to bed interactions as indicated in table 6.25 (bed 1) and table 6.26 (bed 5).
Bed link Visual contact Verbal contact Proximity Mobility
1-2 9 9 9 6.5
1-3 9 9 9 6.5
1-4 8.5 8.5 8.5 6.5
1-5 6 6 6.5 6.5
1-6 7.2 6.5 6 6.5
1-7 4.5 4 5 6.5
1-8 5 4.5 5 6.5
1-9 3 4 3.5 6.5
1-10 3.5 4 3.5 6.5
Table 6.25. Details of values of input parameters associated with bed 1 within the ten bed unit.
Bed link Visual contact Verbal contact Proximity Mobility
5-1 6 6 6.5 6.5
5-2 7.2 6.5 6 6.5
5-3 9 9 9 6.5
5-4 8.5 8.5 8.5 6.5
5-6 9 9 9 6.5
5-7 9 9 9 6.5
5-8 8.5 8.5 8.5 6.5
5-9 6 6 6.5 6.5
5-10 7.2 6.5 6 6.5
Table 6.26. Details of values of input parameters associated with bed 5 within the ten bed unit.
Values of calculated coefficients of Sup_comp are indicated in table 6.27.
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Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 Link 5 Link 6 Link 7 Link 8 Link 9
bed 1 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 6.288 7.6124 6.2979 6.3325 6.288 6.288
bed 2 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 7.6124 6.288 6.3325 6.2979 6.288 6.288
bed 3 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 6.288 7.6124 6.2979 6.3325
bed 4 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 7.6124 6.288 6.3325 6.2979
bed 5 6.288 7.6124 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 6.288 7.6124
bed 6 7.6124 6.288 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 7.6124 6.288
bed 7 6.2979 6.3325 6.288 7.6124 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
bed 8 6.3325 6.2979 7.6124 6.288 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
bed 9 6.288 6.288 6.2979 6.3325 6.288 7.6124 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
bed 10 6.288 6.288 6.3325 6.2979 7.6124 6.288 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
Table 6.27. Values of calculated coefficients of Sup_comp (x10).
These are also represented in figure 6.29. This closely resembles the structure previously identified
in table 6.15 and figure 6.15 where the key component was row difference between beds. In the
more detailed Fuzzy Logic implementation, the component of line of sight can be incorporated in
estimations, where, for example, bed 1 to bed 6 has higher visual contact than bed 1 to bed 5, even
though they have the same row difference.
Figure 6.31. Surface plot of competency sharing coefficients for specific implementation of fuzzy logic
implementation of figure 6.23.
The process of analysis is also relevant for determination of coefficients Sep_sup (tables 6.28 and
figure 6.32) and Sep_dist (table 6.29 and figure 6.33).
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Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 Link 5 Link 6 Link 7 Link 8 Link 9
bed 1 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 6.1861 7.8427 5.2288 6.2316 5 5
bed 2 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 7.8427 6.1861 6.2316 5.2288 5 5
bed 3 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 6.1861 7.8427 5.2288 6.2316
bed 4 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 7.8427 6.1861 6.2316 5.2288
bed 5 6.1861 7.8427 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 6.1861 7.8427
bed 6 7.8427 6.1861 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 7.8427 6.1861
bed 7 5.2288 6.2316 6.1861 7.8427 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
bed 8 6.2316 5.2288 7.8427 6.1861 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
bed 9 5 5 5.2288 6.2316 6.1861 7.8427 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
bed 10 5 5 6.2316 5.2288 7.8427 6.1861 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
Table 6.28. Values of calculated coefficients of Sep_sup (x10).
Figure 6.32. Surface plot of supervision coefficients for specific implementation of fuzzy logic
implementation of figure 6.24.
This indicates a more marked effect of bed distance/separation on the corresponding coefficients of
supervision. Modifications to bed arrangements such as the inclusion of pillars within the ten bed
area would modify the values of the supervision coefficients.
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Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 Link 5 Link 6 Link 7 Link 8 Link 9
bed 1 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 6.288 7.8427 5 5 4.0872 4.0329
bed 2 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 7.8427 6.288 5 5 4.0329 4.0872
bed 3 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 6.288 7.8427 5 5
bed 4 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 7.8427 6.288 5 5
bed 5 6.288 7.8427 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 6.288 7.8427
bed 6 7.8427 6.288 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 7.8427 6.288
bed 7 5 5 6.288 7.8427 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
bed 8 5 5 7.8427 6.288 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
bed 9 4.0872 4.0329 5 5 6.288 7.8427 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
bed 10 4.0329 4.0872 5 5 7.8427 6.288 8.7293 8.7293 8.7293
Table 6.29. Values of calculated coefficients of Sep_dist (x10).
Figure 6.33. Surface plot of distraction coefficients for specific implementation of fuzzy logic
implementation of figure 6.25.
This section has developed the concept of factors relating to competency sharing, supervision and
distraction within a specific ten bed unit of standard bed layout. A model using Fuzzy logic has been
developed and used to determine coefficient values relating to competency sharing, supervision and
distraction as previously outlined in sections 6.9 to 6.12. This has identified refinements to the
structure initially assigned to these coefficients and provided justification for use of specific values of
these coefficient values.
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6.15 Derivation of Single Effectiveness Factor from Multiple Effectiveness Functions
The formalisation of models of Fuzzy logic within the current chapter has been applied also to aspects
of effectiveness functions previously introduced in chapter 3 in the context of determination of a single
parameter value of individual effectiveness. A specific set of effectiveness parameters have been
identified in relation to factors that have the potential to influence patterns of individual performance in
the context of undertaking clinical activity. The set of parameters are replicated as table 6.30.
Term Description
Ens Circadian rhythm day shift and night shift working
Eph Fatigue, based on physical exertion and based on task activities over a shift cycle
Eem Fatigue, based on emotional/stress ‘exertion’ and based on task activities over a shift cycle
Eme Fatigue, based on intellectual ‘exertion’ and based on task activities over a shift cycle
Eh Effects related to handover at the start of a 12 hour shift
Eadm Effects related to admission of a new patient
Esd Effect due to sleep deficit
Elt Long term effectiveness
Table 6.30. Summary of individual effectiveness factors.
It is appropriate to structure the specific effectiveness factors according to effect on functions
which could relate to undertaking clinical interventions, as indicated in table 6.31.
Term Concentration Decision making Attention to detail Energy Follow protocols Communication
Ens x x x
Eph x x




Esd x x x
Elt x x x x x x
Table 6.31. Summary of functions potentially influenced by effectiveness factors.
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Table 6.28 outlines details of key functions affected by specific effectiveness factors. This identifies
similarities between Elt and Eem, Eadm and Eh and Ens and Esd and provides the key linguistic
interpretation structures for implementation within a Fuzzy Logic structure as indicated in figure 6.34.
Figure 6.34. Relationship structure for fuzzy logic rule implementation of effectiveness factors.
This specific function requires a total of seven fuzzy functions for its implementation, indicating an
increased level of activity compared with the core function of the ‘risk engine’ which required four
distinct fuzzy functions. Input parameters to fuzzy functions are identified as ‘1’ and ‘2’ for
subsequent use in table 6.29.
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Rule number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Rule #1 input 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Rule #2 input 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1
Feff1 5 4 3 2 1 4 4 3 2 1 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Feff2 5 4 3 2 1 4 4 3 2 1 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Feff3 5 4 3 2 1 4 4 3 2 1 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Feff4 5 4 3 2 1 4 4 3 2 1 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Feff5 5 4 3 2 1 4 4 3 2 1 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Feff6 5 5 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Feff7 5 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 3 3 2 1 1
Table 6.32. Fuzzy logic rules set relating to figure 6.32.
Functions Feff1, Feff2, Feff3, Feff4 and Feff5 are identical as derived from including the minimum
value of effectiveness contribution from specific input contributions. Identification of ‘1’ and ‘2’ for ‘rule
#1 input’ and ‘rule #2 input’ is structured in figure 6.34.
Figure 6.35. Fuzzy function Feff1 based on minimum value of effectiveness contribution from input
values. Functions Feff1 through to Feff5 have identical characteristics.
The development of this function of combined effectiveness makes available to the main ‘risk engine’
the option to include the minimum value function or the combined function. Based on the
complexities of the seven component fuzzy function, however, detailed analysis of the performance of
the combined function would be a complex undertaking. An initial comparison of the characteristics of
the two functions was undertaken by random simulation of values of input functions as indicated in
table 6.33 where rand(1) indicates a random number value in range 0 to 1.
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Parameter Function value
Elt 5.6 + 2.3.rand(1)
Eem 5.5 + 3.4.rand(1)
Ens 5.4 + 3.3.rand(1)
Esd 5.9 + 2.0.rand(1)
Eh 6.7 + 1.2.rand(1)
Ead 4.2 + 2.6.rand(1)
Eph 5.1 + 1.2.rand(1)
Eme 5.9 + 2.0.rand(1)
Table 6.33. Test sequence of random values for comparison of ‘minimum function’ and ‘combined
effectiveness’ functions. See table 6.30 for parameter descriptions.
An extract from the sequence of values is indicated in figure 6.36, indicating general correspondence
between the two functions.
Figure 6.36. Extract of simulated sequence indicating values of ‘combined function’ and ‘minimum
value function’.
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Fractional distribution of values of percentage difference between combined function and minimum
function expressed relative to minimum function are outlined in figure 6.37. This indicates the trend
for values of combined function to be greater in value than the minimum function.
Figure 6.37. Fractional distribution of values of percentage difference between combined function
and minimum function expressed relative to minimum function value and based on 1000 random
values derived from mechanism referenced in table 6.30.
6.16 General Observations
The approach of the research has been to identify the requirements for simulation of clinical risk using
the identified model and then implement the various components of the model as appropriate. One of
the consequences of seeking to simulate clinical activity and its ‘associated risk’ is the number of
components of such a model which have to be ‘invented’ since references in conventional medical
literature to such models are almost entirely lacking.
The ‘risk engine’ system has been implemented as a specific fuzzy logic implementation in the form of a
five level input/output trapezoidal function. At this stage in the description of the research, the use of
this specific implementation is essentially identifying a mechanism to implement the concepts identified
in the research and is not identifying an optimised ‘risk engine’.
Within this context, the simulation of clinical activity as a series of discrete interventions has been the
most demanding of resources. This is due to the inherent complexities relating to patient care within the
Critical Care environment. The structuring of interventions has also involved extensive periods of
observation/staff interview and also significant analysis of data within patient data sets within the QS
data base system.
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It is anticipated that subsequent phases of the research where the specific modules interact to generate
output levels of adverse effects will provide additional relevant fine tuning and monitoring/verification of
their function.
The development of the risk model, however, has identified elements of local infrastructure which are
shown to influence levels of adverse effects. These include components of physical bed layout,
location of storage facilities such as drugs and consumables and distribution of patients by severity of
condition. This in turn identifies the scope for optimisation techniques for design of Critical Care units
where the performance factors of different states can be identified with evaluations of risk with clinical
activity.
6.17 Summary
The chapter has described how the dynamics of the ‘risk engine’ can be implemented by means of a
series of linked functions incorporating Mamdani Fuzzy Logic. This together with structuring of input
functions such as supervision, distraction, individual and team competency and the core function of
the ‘risk engine’ develops the project to the stage of being able to evaluate risk associated with
sequences of clinical interventions created by the previously referenced processes of simulation of
clinical activity. The operation of the ‘risk engine’ to ‘tune’ its function and process sequences of
simulated clinical interventions is outlined in chapter 7.
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Chapter 7: Operation of Risk Simulation System
7.1 Overview
In this chapter the ‘risk engine’ is initially exercised on subsets of values of test input parameters in
order to validate its performance. An example of this is the variation of output probability of adverse
effects with variation in input values of individual effectiveness and distraction while other input
parameters are held constant. Subsequently the characteristics of the risk simulation system are
described where sets of simulated patient activity are processed by the risk simulation system. This
is initially to check the qualitative performance of the risk simulation system with variation of specific
parameters referenced in the risk simulation system and expressed in sets of equations introduced in
chapter 6. Such parameters include level of nurse attendance (relating to supervision), level of
requesting competency support, probability transfer function, level of sleep deprivation, level of
nursing staff competency within rostered teams, nurse handover responses, level of interaction
between beds based on physical separation and level of individual effectiveness based on Circadian
(night shift) functions. Options for review of data relating to root cause analysis are identified. In
addition, simulated risk values relating to a 9 month period of simulated clinical activity are expressed
using ‘type’ of adverse effect codes and compared with local adverse clinical incident reporting
information. Analysis is also undertaken of activity within a ‘normalised’ single day time frame and
compared with results of the SEE study (Valentin et al. 2006). In addition, the relative distribution of
risk according to sub grade of nursing staff is simulated for a range of skill mix levels within rostered
nursing groups. Modes of reporting frequency of adverse clinical events are reviewed from the
literature in order to establish appropriate comparison modes with the risk simulation system.
7.2 Validation Processes
The process of validation and ‘tuning’ of the module to determine values of probability of adverse
effects identifies the following components:
a) Verification of implementation of defined model and component interactions
b) Verification of use of appropriate components of model data
c) Verification of output values of risk engine as a function of input values (supervision,
distraction, effectiveness, competency mismatch of individual and competency mismatch of
team)
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Validation processes are facilitated by the generation of an array of (N,98) elements where N is the
number of adverse effects calculated and the 98 elements allow verification of a wide range of derived
parameter with also the data elements being written to disc as a ‘reference’ file. Stage b) relates to
structuring parameters which equate as far as possible to anticipated parameter values within the
structures being simulated. Stage c) relates to identification of how values of key functions such as
supervision, distraction and effectiveness interact in the active model. A significant element of this
validation stage is associated with determining the dynamic range of these functions as inputs to the
‘risk engine’.
A sub set of core set of elements within this log file (total 98 elements) are identified in table 7.1.
Log file of adverse effect details Additional Details
Episode number as in main simulation sequence
Bed number In range 1 to 10
Intervention slot Sequence value of 5 minute ‘slot’
Staff Group 01, 02 etc
Type adverse effect As per defined categories
Distraction value Component individual effectiveness
Physical component effectiveness Component individual effectiveness
Emotional/stress component effectiveness Component individual effectiveness
Intellectual component effectiveness Component individual effectiveness
Sleep Deprivation component effectiveness Component individual effectiveness
Night dip component effectiveness Component individual effectiveness
Derived Individual Effectiveness value As input to ‘risk engine’ estimation
Supervision value As input to ‘risk engine’ estimation
Adverse effect reference – global In range 1 to 524
Competency reference within staff group eg. band 5d, 6c for nursing
Linear value adverse effect In range 0 to 10
Probability value adverse effect In range 0 to 1
Probability look up table element Defined value of Ao, Grad and Step
Table 7.1. Core set of values retained in log file.
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Initial evaluation of the module which determines probabilities of adverse effects was undertaken with
an initial subset of a 9 month simulated set of clinical interventions (simulation set #1). This initial
evaluation process was essentially used to validate the functionality of the module in deriving values of
probability of adverse effects.
One of the significant elements of the data model is the option to exclude the contribution of
supervision in determination of output probability value based on the nature of the specific
competency being modelled. This is intended to take account of sub competencies/tasks which are
essentially undertaken without supervision. The ‘risk engine’ will calculate different risk levels for sub
tasks which have or do not have associated components of supervision. The distraction component
is identified as increasing with both bed occupancy and the level of severity of patients. The level of
supervision is identified to also potentially increase with increased numbers of staff on duty who may
be available to prevent adverse effects taking place. One of the effects identified in the model
structure is the effect on supervision factors of physical location of beds and the distribution of patients
by level of complexity within the available bed space. In addition, the model takes account of the
‘availability’ factor of other nursing staff in the active clinical area, where staff may not be in a position
to provide supervision if they are undertaking duties elsewhere.
Detailed information generated by the main routine which determines the probability level of adverse
effects is stored at the end of each analysis run. A range of ‘review’ modules are available to interpret
details of each set of data as indicated in figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1. Twin stage process of analysis of data where ‘Configuration of Input Data Model’ can
relate to both the set of data files read into the system or a specific configuration of the module to
determine probability of adverse effects.
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The module in figure 7.1 can review data from a single log file or determine an analysis based on a
series of such files. This is used, for example, to identify correlations between input model
parameters and output values. Within the log file, each entry is approximately 330 bytes, with an
analysis of 347393 risk estimations occupying a file of size of approximately 115 Mbytes and
corresponding to around 9 months of simulated clinical activity.
A more detailed analysis of elements relating to competency sharing, supervision and distraction has
been previously outlined in section 6.14, where these factors are modified by elements of the physical
work environment. This approach identifies a separate fuzzy ‘engine’ for determination of coefficients
relating to competency sharing, supervision and distraction and where any specific ‘bed to bed’
interaction is referenced by values of visual contact, verbal contact, proximity and mobility. The
method employed is essentially that used to derive the functioning of the ‘risk engine’ as described in
section 6.3.
7.3 Validation of Risk Engine
A key component of the validation process of the module which determines the probability of specific
adverse effects is the validation of the risk engine component referenced in equation 6.10. Table 7.2
indicates specific modes of checking of the ‘risk engine’ where a pair of identified variables (‘Variable
pair’) range from 0 to 10 and remaining parameters (‘Value other variables’) are set at indicated
default values.
Variable pair Levels complexity Supervision flag Ability to ask flag Value other variables
Eff, Dist Low, medium, high 0 and 1 0 and 1 5
Eff, CMI Low, medium, high 0 and 1 0 and 1 5
Eff,CMT Low, medium, high 0 and 1 0 and 1 5
Eff,Sup Low, medium, high 0 and 1 0 and 1 5
Dist, CMI Low, medium, high 0 and 1 0 and 1 5
Dist,CMT Low, medium, high 0 and 1 0 and 1 5
Dist,Sup Low, medium, high 0 and 1 0 and 1 5
CMI,CMT Low, medium, high 0 and 1 0 and 1 5
CMI,Sup Low, medium, high 0 and 1 0 and 1 5
Table 7.2. Indication of sets of functions of ‘risk engine’ visually verified. Eff = Individual
effectiveness; Dist = Distraction; CMI = Competency Mismatch Individual ; CMT = Competency
Mismatch Team; Sup = Supervision. In example of ‘Variable pair’ of Eff and Dist, ‘other’ variables
would be CMI, CMT and Sup.
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Representation of the states of the simulated values can be undertaken using either values of linear
output or be converted to a probability value through the use of the function described in equation
6.24. The probability function gives both indication of the general relationship between the two input
parameters and an assessment of the associated level of probability values.
.
Figure 7.2. Output mapping of rule system using probability mapping display for Individual
Effectiveness (Eff) and Competency Mismatch Team (CMT) and other inputs = 5.0: Supervision flag =
0: Ability to ask flag=1: Level complexity =3; Probability lookup table value = 4.
Figure 7.3. Output mapping of rule system of figure 7.2 with corresponding linear output shown for
comparison. The probability mapping provides more direct indication of performance of the ‘risk
engine’.
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Figure 7.4: Output mapping of rule system using probability mapping display for Individual
Effectiveness (Eff) and Distraction (Dist) and other inputs = 5.0 :Supervision flag = 1: Ability to ask
flag=1: Level complexity =3: Probability lookup table value = 4.
Figure 7.5. Output mapping of rule system using probability mapping display for Supervision (Sup) and
Distraction (Dist) for other inputs = 5.0 :Supervision flag = 1: Ability to ask flag=1: Level complexity
=3: Probability lookup table value = 4.
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Figure 7.6. Output mapping of rule system using probability mapping display for Individual
Effectiveness (Eff) and Distraction (Dist) for other inputs = 5.0:Supervision flag = 1: Ability to ask
flag=1: Level complexity =2.
Figure 7.7. Output mapping of rule system using probability mapping display for Individual
Effectiveness (Eff) and Distraction (Dist) for other inputs = 5.0: Supervision flag = 1: Ability to ask
flag=0: Level complexity =2.
Figures 7.4 to 7.7 are included to indicate the general modes of interaction of specific input
parameters for specific values of other input parameters and for specific values of codes for
supervision flag, ability to ask flag and a level of complexity of task (1 = low: 2 = intermediate and 3 =
complex). Where a specific input parameter is excluded from the calculation in the risk engine, such
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as when supervision flag or ability to ask flag is zero, then the ‘risk engine’ appropriately modifies the
output response, as indicated in figure 7.7 where the exclusion of Competency Mismatch (Team) does
not control the contribution of increasing Competency Mismatch (Individual). Also, where both
functions are excluded in the mapping of Supervision and Competency Mismatch (Team), then a flat
surface is appropriately displayed.
The specific details of function surfaces are identified with the specific characteristics of the fuzzy
function previously selected. The surfaces indicated relate to default values of 5 of the non varying
input parameter values. There are therefore innumerable surface functions where the non varying
input parameter values can be allocated a range of fixed values.
The simulation of the risk engine at specific levels of task complexity indicates the significant
contribution that task complexity plays in determining levels of output probability. Figures 7.8, 7.9 and
7.10 indicate the simulation outputs for corresponding complexity levels of 1 (low), 2 (intermediate)
and 3 (complex). There is significant difference between figure 7.8 and 7.9 (complex and
intermediate) though the difference between 7.9 and 7.10 (intermediate and low) typically affects only
low levels of output probability relating to high levels of individual effectiveness. This is further
indication of the high importance of the process of classification of activity within these three grades of
difficulty. It raises the question, also, about the sufficiency of using a three level classification system
for task complexity.
Figure 7.8. Output mapping of rule system using probability mapping display for Individual
Effectiveness (Eff) and Supervision (Sup) and other inputs = 5.0 :Supervision flag = 1: Ability to ask
flag=1: Level complexity =3: Probability lookup table value = 4.
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Figure 7.9. Output mapping of rule system using probability mapping display for Individual
Effectiveness (Eff) and Supervision (Sup) and other inputs = 5.0 :Supervision flag = 1: Ability to ask
flag=1: Level complexity =2: Probability lookup table value = 4.
Figure 7.10. Output mapping of rule system using probability mapping display for Individual
Effectiveness (Eff) and Supervision (Sup) and other inputs = 5.0 :Supervision flag = 1: Ability to ask
flag=1: Level complexity =1: Probability lookup table value = 4.
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7.4 Review of Distribution of Input Parameters and Associated Output Probability
Figure 7.11 indicates a series of sequential inputs (CMI, CMT, Dist, Sup and Eff) and output
(Probability) of the risk engine for a sub set of values of a risk simulation process of adverse effects.
This is a review mode using a specific ‘review module’ where parameters are read from a log file as
indicated in figure 7.1. This facility is used initially to inspect the range of values presented to the risk
engine and also the derived output probability values. The sets of input parameters can be grouped
into:
 Competency mismatch values (Individual (CMI) and team (CMT) )
 Distraction (Dist), supervision (Sup) (referenced to bed occupancy)
 Individual effectiveness (Eff)
This provides a means of fine tuning the model to ensure a necessary and sufficient range in input
values to ensure that the ‘risk engine’ is appropriately driven. In figure 7.1, elements from the log file
can be selected using a range of parameters values including bed number, staff member, grade of
staff, competency reference of sub task, and adverse effect reference associated with sub task. In
figure 7.11, the specific selected item is competency reference 13 (identify peripheral intra
Venous site).
Figure 7.11. Input parameter values and output probability value (times 1000) for competency element
13 (identify peripheral intra venous site). Active codes for ‘risk engine’ are Supervision flag =1, Ability
to ask flag = 0: Complexity code = 2: Probability lookup table value = 4.(Prob = Probability value of
specific adverse effect).
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Figure 7.12 indicates an expanded element of this output sequence between 60 and 87 elapsed days.
Figure 7.12. Input parameter values and output probability value (times 1000) for competency element
13 (identify peripheral intra venous site) for sequence between 60 and 85 days. Active codes for risk
engine are Supervision flag =1: Ability to ask flag = 0: Complexity code = 2. Probability lookup table
value = 4.
In terms of scaling distraction and supervision within the range of input values, the trend indicated in
the above figure is for these two parameters to generally track each other. The local maximum of
output probability at around 61 days is triggered by the reduction in level of supervision. The local
maximum of output probability at around 82 days is triggered by the reduction in supervision level and
where this is not apparently offset by the corresponding reduction in level of distraction.
7.5 ‘Two Dimensional’ View of Simulation Process of Risk Engine
The characteristics of the risk engine can, however, be difficult to interpret in structure of figures 7.2
and 7.10. In addition to the three dimensional representation of variables, it is also possible to inspect
a two dimensional simulation of variation of two parameters such as supervision and distraction as
indicated in figure 7.13. This can be interpreted with reference to figure 7.5 to confirm the
correspondence between the output values of probability indicated in figure 7.5 and those indicated in
figure 7.13.
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Figure 7.13. Simulated characteristics of output probability (x 100) (Prob) for simulated variations of
Supervision (Sup) and Distraction (Dist) for Supervision flag =1: Ability to ask flag = 0: Complexity
code = 3 and other input parameters =5.0.
Figure 7.14. Simulated characteristics of output probability (x 100) (Prob) for simulated variations of
Supervision (Sup) and Distraction (Dist) for Supervision flag =1: Ability to ask flag = 0: Complexity
code = 2 and other input parameters = 5.0.
This two dimensional method of displaying input and output parameter values of figure 7.14 indicates
in the example of input parameters Supervision and Distraction, the importance of level of complexity
of task in deriving levels of output probability. The interaction between Distraction and Supervision is
structured by the derivation of the distraction function and the supervision function based on bed
occupancy level, patient severity and staff availability. Initial indications of behaviour of these two
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functions indicates that they are typically balanced in their variations but that distraction can dominate
when there may be a reduction in supervision due to non availability of staff in the clinical area.
Figure 7.15 indicates occurrences where supervision is likely to dominate distraction and establish low
values of output probability – negative ordinate values. In addition, occurrences are identified where
Distraction dominates and are likely to drive higher values of output probability, resulting in positive
ordinate values. This indicates that the two functions are probably appropriately ‘balanced’ so that
there is no trend for a specific parameter – Supervision or Distraction to dominate. This indicates the
importance of scaling the input variables to the ‘risk engine’ appropriately.
Figure 7.15. Detail of distribution of values of (Distraction-Supervision) as a function of value of
supervision for the data set shown in figure 7.11 and where mean value of (Distraction –Supervision)
is -0.0574; SD = 0.8149.
In optimising the module for derivation of probability of adverse effects, it is necessary to match the
characteristic of the fuzzy function with the distribution of competency values associated with
individuals and the equation that derives competency mismatch at the individual and team level.
Figures 7.16 and 7.17 indicate the effect of constraining function of CMT (competency mismatch –
team) in deriving output probability values.
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Figure 7.16. Example of sensitivity of output probability x 10 (Prob) to value of CMT (competency
mismatch team) for variable value of CMI (competency mismatch individual) and fixed values of CMT,
Distraction, Effectiveness and Supervision of 5.0. The value of CMT of 4.5 is not sufficient to offset
the effect of increasing individual competency mismatch (CMI).
Figure 7.17. Example of sensitivity of output probability x 10 (Prob) to value of CMT (competency
mismatch team) for variable value of CMI (competency mismatch individual) and fixed values of CMT,
Distraction, Effectiveness and Supervision of 5.0. The value of CMT of 4.0 is able to offset the effect
of increasing individual competency mismatch (CMI).
In terms of a scaling maximum and minimum competency values these are identified as 0.6 and 0.9
and where a value of 0.8 is identified as a level for required competency for the specific task. Values
in excess of 0.8 are identified as indicating capacity for training other staff to undertake the specific
task.
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Based in the indicated range of values of competence and the identified level of required competency,
the potential maximum and minimum value of CMI and CMT are indicated in table 7.3. This
corresponds to a value of M1=15 in equation 6.4.
CMI CMT
Maximum 8 Note 1
Minimum 3.5 3.5
Table 7.3. Identified range of values of maximum and minimum values for CMI and CMT based on
range of individual competency of 0.6 to 0.9 and for required competency level of 0.8. (Note 1: The
maximum value of CMT derived from maximum available competency within a set of nursing co-
workers.)
In allocating the values of competency with the set of nursing competencies, numerous competencies
are standard generic competencies which are assigned the value of 0.8 as the required level for the
lowest sub band of staff. Other competencies are allocated a starting competency of less than 0.8 to
indicate practice which should be undertaken with some element of supervision by more senior staff.
One variable element in moderation of individual competency mismatch by availability of supportive
team competency is the term relating to ‘ability to ask’. Where the value of this term is unity, the
individual will always seek assistance from the team and can be set at variable levels to identify the
influence of this factor on output probability of adverse effects.
7.6 Exercising the Model
In using the model to generate output values of risk associated with interventions and tasks, variations
in the output values for the established model can be considered to relate to:
 Variations in the model in internal representation/calculation of variables
 Variations in parameters that are related to organisational structure, clinical activity and
physical layout
Elements in the first category include:
 Probability mapping function
 Function to simulate handover response




 Function for competency mismatch (individual and team)
 Definition of level of intervention task complexity
 Components physical, emotional, intellectual depletion per intervention
 Recovery models physical, emotional, intellectual depletion per intervention
 Derivation of effectiveness function value based on all input parameters (physical, emotional,
intellectual, handover, admission, night shift component, sleep deprivation)
Elements in the second category would include:
 Allocation of grades/sub grades of nursing staff within a specific rota
 Competencies allocated to specific grades of staff by grade/sub grade
 Level of sleep deprivation
 Levels of staff availability in clinical area
 Levels of ‘ability to ask’ in competency sharing
 Factors influencing bed to bed interaction (physical environment)
Subsequent exercising of the risk model can be identified with both categories. Activity with the first
category assists in understanding the role and importance of various elements of design of the risk
model, while in the second aspect, details are provided of changes in risk profile based on actual
operational factors.
7.7 Probability Mapping Function
It is relevant to review the output probability mapping function which translates the linear output of the
risk engine in range 0 to 10 to a specific probability value in the range between 0 and 1 as described
in equation 6.5. Figure 7.18 indicates a specific series of simulated elements with a range of output
probability values across the set of available tables outlined in table 7.4.
173
Figure 7.18. Variation in output probability values of adverse effects as a function of probability look up
table values in range 1 to 6 associated with 310 elements associated with specific competency
element 247 (review admission notes) using simulation set #1 and for table values indicated in table
7.4.
Table value Ao Grad Step Mean Max SD
1 0.9 5 1.6667 0.0616 0.1782 0.031
2 0.9 6 1.6667 0.0462 0.1483 0.0255
3 0.9 7 1.6667 0.0363 0.127 0.0215
4 0.9 8 1.6667 0.0295 0.111 0.0185
5 0.9 9 1.6667 0.0246 0.0986 0.0161
6 0.9 10 1.6667 0.0209 0.0887 0.0143
Table 7.4. Values of mean, maximum and standard deviation (SD) of a sequence of 310 values of
probability of adverse effects as displayed in figure 7.18.
In subsequent estimations of simulated probability values, use is made of table 3 settings (Ao = 0.9;
Grad = 7; Step = 1.6667). This is on account of the correspondence of this configuration with the
basic risk analysis time frame/probability values identified in figure 6.8.
As part of a larger test series of 247222 discrete ‘competency/adverse effect’ pairs, figure 7.19
indicates the sum of all probabilities and percentage of total probability value greater than 0.1 as a
function of table look up value in range 1 to 6. This shows the key role of the table value to derive
output probability from the linear output of the risk engine. Reducing the sensitivity of this function
reduces the value of sum of all probabilities and increases the percentage of contributions in range
greater than 0.1. The ratio of sum of probabilities of table element #1 and table element #6 is 4.7.
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Figure 7.19. Variation of sum of all probabilities of adverse effects and percentage of individual values
of probability of adverse effects in excess of 0.1 (scaled x 100) as a function of table took up value of
probability transfer function referenced in figure 7.4.
7.8 Nurse Staff Attendance in Clinical Area
One basic component reviewed is the fraction of time staff spend within the unit, as a modifying factor
for supervision. Changes in the mean output probability for a specific simulation profile are indicated
in figure 7.20.
Figure 7.20. Variation of mean output probability derived from 27423 separate probability estimations
for various values of fractional attendance of staff within a Critical Care Unit.
Assuming a linear regression applies to the data, the relevant equation is given by:
Prob _atn = - 0.0062. Fract + 0.0146
(7.1)
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Where Fract is the fraction of time available to assist with supervision and Prob_atn is the mean
probability value of all interventions as a function of value of Fract. For a reduction of staff attendance
from value of 1.0 to 0.9, there is an associated increase in mean probability value of all adverse
effects of approximately 7.3%.
Where a specific competency (element 247 - review admission notes) is selected from the set of all
active competencies, an equivalent relationship is identified:
Prob_atn = - 0.0486.Fract + 0.0921 (7.2)
For a reduction of staff attendance from value of 1.0 to 0.9, there is an associated increase in mean
probability value of approximately 11.2%. This illustrates a general point that specific sub tasks will
have levels of probability of adverse effect which are influenced by the level of assigned sub task
complexity and whether such tasks are supervised or are part of team working.
7.9 Probability of Interaction Coefficients
The series of curves illustrated in figure 7.21 indicates a series of functions which describe levels
of team interaction based on physical separation of nursing co-workers by bed row difference
and with reference to bed layout structure indicated previously in figure 6.13.
Figure 7.21. Identification of specific series of ‘probability of interaction coefficients’ used to determine
changes in mean levels of output probability of test simulation.
The three curves series #2, series #3 and series #4 indicated in figure 7.21 are derived by
decrementing values of series #1 by 0.1 for bed row differences of two and greater. Figure 7.22
describes the values of simulation probabilities for the series of values of probability for the set of
parameters outlined in figure 7.21.
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Figure 7.22. Value of mean output probability (all simulated interventions) for the set of interaction
series identified in figure 7.21.
This confirms the trend to increase output likelihood of risk when there is reduced interaction between
nursing co-workers on account of the effect of distance separation between beds in the work area.
The difference in mean probability (all interventions) between series #4 and series #1 is equivalent to
a percentage change of 9.16%. For this evaluation, a set of unity distraction coefficients was utilised
and similar values were used for values of Sep_comp(i,j) and Sep_sup(i,j). This indicates the
importance of ergonomic bed layout in the planning phase of Critical Care Units. As referenced
previously, a systematic approach for determination of such interaction coefficients is outlined in
section 6.14. This forms the basis of further work in finding optimised solutions of operational risk
reduction within a specific clinical area based on bed layout.
7.10 Ability to Ask Parameter Value
Figure 7.23 indicates the variation of mean probability of simulated set #1 as a function of value of
‘ability to ask parameter’ as the probability that a nurse will ask for assistance where there is a
competency shortfall and it is appropriate to ask for such assistance.
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Figure 7.23. Value of mean output probability (all simulated interventions simulation set #1) for values
of ability to ask parameter’.
This confirms the trend to increase output likelihood of risk when there is reduced likelihood that staff
ask for help from the team of nursing co-workers. The relative change in mean probability (all
interventions), from a parameter value of 1.0 to 0.6 is 2.1%.
7.11 Determination of Characteristics of Output Probability Distributions
For any process of operation of the ‘risk engine’ system, it is important to determine the distribution of
probabilities within a given simulation set and also potential differences in distributions for specific
configurations of simulated systems. Figure 7.24 indicates a specific method of inspection of
distributions of probability values, where the normalised cumulative probability value Cum(pn) is given
by:
Cum(p(n)) = Σ p(i) /Cumsum i = 1,n                                                                                             (7.3)
Where Cum(p(n) is the cumulative sum of all components of probability from p(1) to p(n) and Cumsum
is the sum of all contributions in the series. In this analysis, the probability space between 0 and 1 is
sub divided into 1000 elements. The relative frequency of the distribution is indicated with the modal
value normalised to unity.
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Figure 7.24. Details of normalised cumulative probability and normalised frequency of probability
values for a specific simulation.
This indicates that approximately 95% of normalised cumulative probability values are achieved for
probability values of less than 0.1. The modal probability is 0.008.
In addition, the method of analysis of normalised cumulative probability values can provide insight into
comparisons of probability distributions resulting from specific configurations of the risk engine system.
Figure 7.25 indicates the normalised cumulative difference between two specific risk estimations as a
function of value of determined probability. This indicates that around 95% of differences in
normalised cumulative probability appear to be accounted by probability values less than 0.1. This is
an intrinsic characteristic of the functionality of the collective ‘risk engine’ modelled system. The
distribution of probability values will also be influenced by the mapping function referenced in
figure 6.10 which translates from linear output of the ‘risk engine’.
Figure 7.25. Normalised cumulative difference in probability values as a function of probability value
where upper curve indicates percentage of total normalised cumulative difference value and lower
curve indicates actual cumulative probability difference. (reference 15 and reference 24).
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Figure 7.25 indicates that the change in parameters within the risk engine between higher risk and
lower risk configurations are not producing a changed distribution of probability event space. Figure
7.26 indicates a comparison which results in a smaller difference in cumulative probability values –
and where changes in levels of probability greater than 0.3 trigger more significant differences in the
cumulative probability values.
Figure 7.26. Cumulative difference in probability values as a function of probability value where upper
curve indicates percentage of total cumulative difference value and lower curve indicates actual
cumulative probability difference. (reference 15 and reference 22).
In considering the probability distributions of the output risk simulations, it is possible to identify the
residual set of probabilities, say less than 0.1 which can be classified as ‘safe practice’, where the
work activity is inherently safe. Probability values in excess of 0.1 can be described as ‘inherently
unsafe’ and provide a more sensitive index of change of risk status of simulated clinical activity.
7.12 Configuration of Derivation of Competency Mismatch Components
The setting of ‘sensitivity’ to components of competency mismatch for both individual and team
elements as outlined in equation 6.4 through the value of M1 is a key element of the risk simulation
system. Risk simulations in sequence 1 to 5 were undertaken where a range of sensitivities to
competency mismatch terms were included, and where values of M1 of 10, 12.5, 15, 17.5 and 20 were
used. Analysis included review of simulated probabilities in excess of 0.1 as indicated in figure 7.27.
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Figure 7.27: Colourmap indicates key to probability ‘bins’ where 1= 0.1 to 0.2, 2= 0.2 to 0.3 etc. In the
first sequence, there are no probability values greater than 0.1. As the value of M1 is increased from
10 (simulation sequence #1) through to 20 (simulation sequence #5) to increase sensitivity to
competency mismatch, there is a trend for increase in the number of ‘probability events’ within each
sequence with values greater than 0.1.
Figure 7.28. Colourmap indicates key to probability ‘bins’ where 1= 0.1 to 0.2, 2= 0.2 to 0.3 etc. In the
first sequence, there are no probability values greater than 0.1. Corresponding values of sum of
probabilities within each ‘probability bin’ references are indicated.
This indicates that as expected the value of M1 as referenced in equation 6.4 is an important indicator
of sensitivity of simulation system to gaps in competency.
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7.13 Sleep Deprivation Functions
Figure 7.29 indicates the variation of the sum of contributions of probabilities of adverse effects as a
function of effectiveness factor introduced via sleep deprivation for day shift activity, night shift activity
and combined shift activity. The series of day shift activity corresponds to variation of sleep
deprivation in day shift with fixed night shift sleep deprivation of 5 hours and the night shift series
corresponds to values of fixed day shift sleep deprivation of 5 hours and varying night shift sleep
deprivation values. The trend for sum of all probabilities of adverse effect is similar for the sets of
data. For the series with varying sleep deprivation in the night shift this corresponds to a 32 %
increase in sum of all contributions in transition from a sleep deprivation value of 2 hours to 30 hours
and a value of 65 % for the combined day and night shift. This indicates the sensitivity of output
probability values to the value of individual effectiveness expressed through sleep deprivation factor.
In the application of this factor, all staff within the indicated shift have the same level of sleep
deprivation applied.
Figure 7.29. Variation of the sum of contributions to probability of adverse effects as a function of
factor introduced via sleep deprivation effectiveness factor for day shift activity, night shift activity and
combined shift activity and where values of sleep deprivation are set to 5 hours in the non varying
shifts.
At high values of sleep deprivation the associated effectiveness factor introduced is dominating the
individual effectiveness value. Sleep deprivation values will tend to be greater during night shift
periods than day shift working on account of the anticipated dislocation of sleep patterns. This
demonstrates the anticipated effect within the risk model of increasing value of sleep deprivation
factors.
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7.14 Simulations with Varying Levels of Team Competency
Table 7.5 outlines parameters used to simulate output levels of adverse effects as a function of
competency within nursing group members of the established staff roster.
Table 7.5. Identification of sequence of levels of competency associated with sequences 1 to 7 of
increasing individual competency. Sequence #5 is the default level of team competency.
nurse re f seq 1 seq 2 seq 3 seq 4 seq S seq 6 seq 7 
12 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 
27 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 
29 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 
42 3 3 4 5 5 5 6 
44 3 3 4 5 5 6 8 
48 3 4 4 5 5 8 10 
64 4 4 5 7 8 9 10 
73 5 6 6 8 8 9 10 
77 6 7 8 9 10 10 12 
89 9 10 10 10 13 14 15 
Tota l 40 45 so 60 65 73 85 
nurse re f seq 1 seq 2 seq 3 seq 4 seq S seq 6 seq 7 
13 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 
16 2 2 3 3 3 4 5 
30 2 2 4 4 4 4 5 
33 4 4 4 4 5 6 7 
45 4 4 5 5 5 6 7 
49 5 5 5 5 6 8 9 
65 6 6 6 7 7 9 9 
69 6 6 6 7 7 10 10 
75 7 7 8 8 8 10 11 
85 10 10 10 10 9 11 14 
Tota l 48 48 53 56 57 71 81 
nurse re f seq 1 seq 2 seq 3 seq 4 seq S seq 6 seq 7 
14 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 
28 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 
31 2 3 3 4 4 5 6 
43 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 
46 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 
so 5 5 5 5 6 7 8 
66 6 7 7 7 8 9 9 
74 6 7 7 8 9 10 10 
78 8 8 8 9 9 10 12 
90 9 10 10 10 13 14 15 
47 53 55 60 67 76 81 
nurse re f seq 1 seq 2 seq 3 seq 4 seq S seq 6 seq 7 
15 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 
17 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 
32 2 3 3 4 4 s s 
34 3 4 4 4 5 6 6 
47 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 
51 4 4 5 5 7 8 8 
67 6 6 7 7 8 9 10 
70 6 7 8 8 8 10 11 
76 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 
86 9 9 10 10 11 12 14 
46 49 56 58 66 75 81 
Globa l tota l 181 195 214 234 255 295 328 
183
Sequences #1 to #7 relate to increasing levels of competency within each nursing shift. This
particular analysis has been identified to establish the basic sensitivity of the risk model to varying
individual competency mismatch. Figure 7.30 indicates how the values of sum of individual
probabilities and those >0.1 in value vary as a function the sum of all sub grades of each roster group.
In the structuring of this analysis, the staff references remain the same but a specific ‘Nursing_unique’
reference file is accessed with modified levels of nurse competency. This provides a flexible method
of factoring in changes in competency within the simulation processes.
Figure 7.30. Outcome of simulated probability values of adverse effects (sum all probabilities and sum
probabilities >0.1 (x10)) for the roster structures indicated in table 7.4 and which relate to sum of sub
grade values of all staff within the roster group.
This shows an almost linear relationship between the sum of all probabilities and the corresponding
sum of all sub grades in the roster group. There is however, increased sensitivity to probabilities
greater than 0.1 with a reduction in value of the sum of the sub grade values for the rostered groups of
nurses.
Figure 7.31 indicates details of events with derived probabilities greater than 0.1, indicating a higher
percentage of such events for reduced levels of group competency.
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Figure 7.31. Variation in characteristics of probability distribution for varying values of sub grades
within rostered groups for probability values less than 0.1. With decreasing values of competency in
the sub groups, there is an increase in contributions of probability values greater than 0.1.
7.15 Simulation of Handover Response
The component of handover response is associated in the model with a reduction of individual
effectiveness as referenced in equation 3.3. The default set of relationships of handover functions
was previously outlined in table 3.5. A range of similar tables was created which introduced handover
functions which coupled with increasing and decreasing effect on the handover response component
of individual effectiveness. Table 7.6 indicates one set of parameters which described the most
significant coupling to individual effectiveness and table 7.7 that table with the least significant
coupling.
A0 A0 A0 hr hr hr
band 5 band 6 band 7 band 5 band 6 band 7
grade 1 0.45 0.4 0.35 5.5 4.5 4
grade 2 0.425 0.375 0.325 4 3.5 3.5
grade 3 0.4 0.35 0.3 3.5 3.25 3
grade 4 0.375 0.325 0.275 3 2.75 2.5
grade 5 0.35 0.3 0.25 2.5 2.25 2
Table 7.6. Details of assigned values of A0 and time to 50% recovery (hr - hours) for specific severity
grade of patient and assigned nursing band: most significant coupling to individual effectiveness.
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A0 A0 A0 hr hr hr
band 5 band 6 band 7 band 5 band 6 band 7
grade 1 0.25 0.2 0.15 3 2.5 2
grade 2 0.225 0.175 0.125 2 1.5 1.5
grade 3 0.2 0.15 0.1 1.5 1.25 1
grade 4 0.175 0.125 0.075 1 0.75 0.5
grade 5 0.15 0.1 0.05 0.5 0.25 0.5
Table 7.7. Details of assigned values of A0 and time to 50% recovery (hr - hours) for specific severity
grade of patient and assigned nursing band: least significant coupling to individual effectiveness.
Figure 7.32. Variation of sum of output probabilities for test set as a function of value of A0 (grade 3:
band 5) and where increasing values of A0 relate to increased effect on individual effectiveness at
handover. Coupled with value of A0 is also the associated factor of recovery time associated with
individual effectiveness.
With increasing value of A0, figure 7.32 indicates the sum of all probabilities increases as the
handover effect has increasing influence on individual effectiveness.
7.16 Nurse Supervision Function
A linear relationship has been previously derived in section 6.10 between the sub grade level of a
nurse and the corresponding component of supervision which is available to the set of nursing co-
workers. This associated ‘weight’ of contribution as a function of sub grade is expressed as:
Nsup = 0.05357 . Subg + 0.7321 (6.9)
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Where Nsup is the contribution of a nursing co-worker to the group and Subg is the value of sub grade
allocated to the specific nursing co worker. Values of Subg range from 1 to 15.
Figure 7.33 outlines the variation of sum of all probabilities and the sum of probabilities greater than
0.1 as a function of percentage change from default value of constant 0.7321 in equation 6.9.
Figure 7.33. Variation of sum of all probabilities and the sum of probabilities greater than 0.1 as a
function of percentage change from default value of constant 0.7321 in equation 7.7. Linear
coefficients identified as ( -0.9759,185.5756). Test set #1.
This confirms the anticipated response of the model to the change in indicated parameter, where an
increased contribution to supervision is associated with a reduction in sum of probability values.
7.17 ‘Night Dip’ Function
Based on consistent reporting of loss of individual effectiveness during night shift working, and with a
local minimum of individual effectiveness, a specific function outlined in equation 3.5 was previously
identified as an empirical match to the required effectiveness function. Figure 7.34 indicates how
variations of this function influence the resulting probabilities of adverse effects. There is a general
trend for increase in sum of all probabilities for reduction in value of minimum value at 03:30 am. The
effect on probability values in excess of 0.1 is not apparent.
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Figure 7.34. Variation of sum of probabilities and sum of probabilities >0.1 as a function of minimum
value of night dip function.
7.18 Risk Structure within Competency Events
Each specific competency can be considered to have an associated risk factor, which would be
modified by parameters of:
 Supervision flag
 Ability to ask (team)
 Level of task complexity
It is appropriate to review the specific contributions made to output risk based on the specific values of
these parameters since they specifically influence the calculated values of risk of each adverse effect.
Table 7.8 summarises values of simulation of a total of 347393 risk estimations where a total of











Table 7.8. Values of simulation of a total of 347393 risk estimations where a total of 323941 relate
to active supervision with team competency sharing.
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Figure 7.35 indicates the relative factors of contribution of level of task complexity towards sum of all
risk contributions. Essentially complex tasks contribute approximately 5.05 times as much as tasks of
low complexity while intermediate tasks contribute 1.56 times as much as tasks of low complexity.
This confirms that the definition of task complexity is a key element in configuration of the risk
simulation systems. Table 7.8 indicates that 52% of the sum of contributions greater that 0.1 is
contributed from complex tasks which constitute only 7.9% of all the identified risk estimations. The
mechanism for these changes is within the varying values of the fuzzy look up functions as referenced
in table 6.6. Like for like comparisons are not referenced for codes relating to supervision and
competency sharing.
Figure 7.35. Relative factors of contribution of level of task complexity towards sum of all risk
contributions.
7.19 Root Cause Analysis of Adverse Effects Occurring with Elevated Levels of
Probability
The classical approach of Reason (1990) in explaining the causation of risk based events is the ‘Swiss
cheese’ model where in given circumstances the combined effects of controls, surveillance and
checks are not sufficient to balance the process of event causation. The risk simulation model
provides a demonstrable framework where these effects can be replicated within a formal
computational framework. The risk simulation model being described has therefore the potential to
provide insight into why a specific adverse effect is triggered at a high probability value, based on
analysis of specific events associated with key values of input parameters in the risk engine. This
process is facilitated by review of the log file which is created with each cycle of risk simulation. Table
7.9 outlines the key fields reviewed by the root cause analysis review module used to analyse specific
adverse effects which occur with high probability, as suggestive of unsafe practice. Probability values

















Individual Effectiveness (minimum value of (a) to (g))
Probability Value
Table 7.9. Core elements in review table for determination of root cause of occurrences of unsafe
practice based on review of individual parameter values.
Recalled data can be analysed using graphical techniques of Matlab ® or Excel ® as indicated in
figures 7.36 and figure 7.37 where data are displayed as a sequence of in descending order of value
of output probability.
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Figure 7.36. Graphical display of sequence of events with probability events greater than 0.05
indicating values of Competency Mismatch Individual (CMI); Competency Mismatch Team (CMT);
Distraction (DIST); Supervision (SUP) and output probability (PROB). The sequence is sorted in
descending order of probability value and with values of output probability scaled by a factor of 10.
The display mode in figure 7.36 can provide insight into the interactions between input factors. Figure
7.37 indicates details of data set with Excel ® analysis.
Figure 7.37 Graphical display using Excel® of sequence of events with probability events greater than
0.05 indicating values of Competency Mismatch Individual (CMI); Competency Mismatch Team
(CMT); Distraction (DIST); Supervision (SUP) and output probability (PROB). Elements in each data
set, e.g. nth element interact with corresponding elements in other data sets to produce the nth
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element of output probability. The sequence is sorted in descending order of probability value and
with values of output probability scales by a factor of 10.
The display mode in figure 7.37 provides a useful appreciation of how interactions between the
various parameters produce the resulting range of output probability values. In this particular
analysis, the dominant component producing the highest values of output probability appears to be the
factor of competency mismatch of the individual. In addition, the relatively large values of
effectiveness are possibly ‘masking’ the variations in values of distraction. A key feature of the
risk simulation facility is identified as the relative ease with which ‘root cause analysis’ of
adverse effects can be undertaken.
Additional levels of review can be included by extraction of additional variables which may influence
the operation of specific risk evaluations. A key factor is also the level of complexity of the specific
sub task being undertaken.
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7.20 Type of Adverse Effects Distribution: Initial Test Data Set
Table 7.10 indicates the distribution of types of adverse effects for nursing interventions in relation to a
simulated series of 9 months of test simulation data for normalised frequency of activation, weighted
distribution and weighted probability per patient day stay. This confirms the initial assessment of
figure 4.20 relating to gaps in series of interventions included in the initial test set.
Table 7.10. Summary of distribution of types of adverse effects for nursing interventions for 9 months
set of simulated data using initial test simulation sequence for normalised frequency of activation
(347393 events), weighted distribution (sum of 2158.4) and weighted probability per patient day stay
(total 1397.17 days).
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Figure 7.38. Graphical representation of data of table 7.10.
The analysis is grouping specific adverse effects together under a single ‘type’ of adverse effect
reference. The more commonly referenced normalisation factor is that of ‘events per patient day’.
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Figure 7.39. Representation of distributions of adverse effects for normalised frequency (top),
normalised frequency probability weighted (middle) and normalised probability per patient day
(bottom) and for data set described in table 7.10. The effect of the probability weighting is evident
between distributions in top section compared with middle and bottom sections. The cluster of
adverse effects around 380 relates primarily to patient ventilation.
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7.21 Analysis of Risk of Adverse Effects as a Function of Time of Day
One means of investigating influence of time of day in the level of incidence of adverse effects is to
display an indication of the relative risk within 5 minute ‘slots’ associated with ‘sub
competency/adverse effects’. Initially the normalised distribution of all ‘sub competency/adverse
effects’ within the 288 time slots of a notional day is derived for a specific set of simulated clinical
activity. In the second stage the normalised sum of probability values within the corresponding 288
time slots is derived for the same set of ‘sub competency/adverse effects’. The ratio value is then
derived of the normalised sum of probabilities divided by the corresponding normalised number of ‘sub
competency/adverse effects’ for each time slot within the notional day. Lastly these values are
normalised so that the sum of all 288 contributions within the notional day is unity.
Figure 7.40 indicates the results of this distribution for 9 months of simulated data. This indicates a
local minimum of values around 11.00 am and a local maximum around 03.30 am.
Figure 7.40. Details of measure of normalised risk as a function of time of day for all estimations of
adverse effects structured within a single time of day episode and for a 9 month simulated period of
interventions. (time interval value 144 = 12.00 noon).
Figure 7.41. Distribution or normalised ratio values of probability of adverse effect around 03:30 am
(time interval value 43).
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The local maximum of values in figure 7.41 at around 03.30 am would appear to correspond with the
minimum value of the ‘night dip’ function associated with night shift working previously referenced in
section 3.10.
Figure 7.42. Distribution or normalised ratio values of probability of adverse effect around 07.30 am
shift change (time interval value 91).
The local maximum value in figure 7.42 at around 07.30 am (time interval value 91) appears to be
linked with the morning shift changeover though the effect would appear to be short lived.
Figure 7.43. Distribution or normalised ratio values of probability of adverse effect around 07.30 pm
shift change (time interval value 235).
In this data set the time of shift changeover at 07.30 pm (time element value 235) does not appear
to contribute significantly to the normalised risk ratio value.
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Figure 7.44. Variation of normalised frequency of ‘sub competency/adverse effects’ within 5 minute
time intervals within generic single day time interval.
Figure 7.44 indicates a relatively similar pattern of activity of ‘sub competency/adverse effects’ within a
generic single day time distribution. Additional activity associated with increased
admission/discharges between 10.00 am and 04.00 pm (time interval values 120 and 192) as
referenced in figure 4.4 would not appear to be present.
This mode of analysis of reviewing parameters within the time frame of a generic single day provides a
relevant means of review of output distributions of adverse effects which are associated with
parameters linked to structured time based activity such as shift handover episodes and interventions
affected by ‘night dip’ effects of reduced individual effectiveness.
It is relevant to compare this derived distribution with the ‘chronological distribution of sentinel events’
derived as part of the SEE study (Valentin et al. 2006). Within this study, the time distribution of 584
events is referenced within the frame of time of day of occurrence. Peaks of sentinel events are
reported at times which are linked with ward rounds and shift changeover, though the data is not
sufficiently detailed to confirm with high levels of confidence. Interpretation of this international study
requires some caution since it is the summed data from a series of 220 Critical Care Units.
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Figure 7.45. Chronological distribution of ‘Sentinel events’ within the SEE study after Valentin et al.
(2006) in hour intervals.
The minimum level of SEE events appears to be coincident with the circadian ‘night dip’ at around
03.30 pm. It is likely, however, that this minimum of ‘sentinel events’ is also co-incident with minimum
levels of activity and possibly minimum levels of staff supervision to report such ‘sentinel events’.
Figure 7.45 also requires to be interpreted in the context of general effectiveness of reporting
mechanisms of ‘sentinel events’.
7.22 Analysis of Relative Risk with Nurse Sub Grade Allocation
In the output log file created by the risk simulation process, the value of probability of adverse effect is
associated with specific nursing co-worker sub grade value and where nursing sub-grade values as
described previously in section 5.2 range from 1 to 15. A relevant output from this set of data is a
normalised distribution of sub tasks as a function of sub grade of nursing co-worker as outlined in
figure 7.46. This distribution is naturally highly dependent on the levels of staff selected within the
roster structure of nursing co-workers and the allocation process of nursing co-workers to patients.
There is no ‘grade 13’ within the sub grades of nursing staff within the specific staff roster used for the
analysis.
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Figure 7.46. Normalised distribution of activity levels (numbers of sub tasks) as a function of sub grade
of nursing co-workers for a specific roster configuration and set of simulated clinical activity (total
adverse effects 63,769).
For a given simulated data set and for a specific structure of nursing competencies within a roster
structure as previously referenced in table 7.5, details of normalised distribution of risk can be
determined as a function of nursing sub grade. This is undertaken by determining separately for each
nursing sub grade value the sum of total probabilities of adverse effects and the total number of
adverse effects and deriving a relative value of probability per nursing sub group value. These values
are then normalised so that the sum of all contributions over the total set of 15 possible contributions
is unity.
Figure 7.47 indicates the associated distribution of normalised ratio values for the distribution
referenced in figure 7.46. This indicates a reduction in ratio value for sub grades 3 to 8 consistent
with competencies increasing through these sub grades. The distribution of figure 7.47 will also be
influenced by the nature of tasks linked to specific sub levels, where the lowest sub bands will be
allocated to least ill patients and with staff of increasing seniority more likely to be associated with
interventions which are more complex and associated with higher competency requirements and
higher levels of risk. This is suggested in the increase in ratio values for sub grades 9, 10 and 11.
With further increase in competency, there is a trend in sub bands 12 and 14 to reduce normalised
ratio values. The structure of figure 7.46 is closely dependent on the set of competencies for specific
sub tasks allocated to specific nursing sub grades.
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Figure 7.47. Values of normalised ratio value of probability of adverse effect as a function of nursing
sub grade for specific nursing roster distribution (band 7 components included) and set of simulated
clinical activity (total adverse effects 63,769).
This facility provides a means of review of relative risk of undertaking interventions as a function of
nursing sub grade. The effect of competency sharing between nursing co-workers can be readily
demonstrated using this mode of analysis to review distributions as a function of mix and distribution
of nursing co-workers. Where there is a reduction in numbers of more senior staff, such as indicated
in figure 7.48 then a ‘flat’ pattern of normalised ratio value is observed, indicating possibly a loss of
supervisory function. There are no available clinical studies/sets of data which can be used to check
against the findings of the model.
Figure 7.48. Values of normalised ratio value of probability of adverse effect as a function of nursing
sub grade for specific nursing roster distribution (no band 7 components) and set of simulated clinical
activity (total adverse effects 63,769).
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7.23 Components of Competency Sharing, Supervision and Distraction
A framework for derivation of ‘bed to bed’ interactions associated with competency sharing,
supervision and distraction as a function of physical bed layout has been described in section
6.14. This approach utilised fuzzy logic descriptions of key parameters of interaction and
general techniques as incorporated in the construction of the ‘risk engine’ described in section 6.2.
The risk simulation system is sensitive to variations in the values of these matrix elements which
allows for minimisation of risk factors as a function of bed layout. This aspect of further work is
referenced within chapter 8.
7.24 Review of Clinical Adverse Event Reporting: Critical Care Unit 2007-2009
UHCW NHS Trust monitors Clinical Adverse Events (CAEs) throughout its organisation as a means of
reducing the incidence of such adverse events and generally improving patient care. A series of
reports in Excel ® in time period January 2007 to July 2009 and related to patient care within the
Critical Care Unit at University Hospital, Coventry was made available by the Clinical Governance
Department. The specific CAE forms were not individually reviewed. The structure of these reports
is listed in table 7.11.
Information Item Role/Description
ID Unique numeric CAE identifier
Incident date Date of incident
Detail (coded) Coded description of detail such as ‘laboratory investigations’, ‘transfer’
or ‘Infection Control’
Adverse event (coded) Coded description of type of adverse event, such as ‘delay in
administering medication’, ‘inappropriate transfer’ or ‘communication
failure within the team’
Description Free text description of details relating to CAE
Action taken Free text description of action taken in relation to the CAE, including
feedback from staff directly involved, issue resolution if action within
CCU or action relating to other clinical groups such as Theatres and
A&E.
Table 7.11. Structure of format of Clinical Adverse Event report.
Table 7.12 describes relative frequency of these events using the mapping to the set of types of
adverse effects as listed previously in table 5.10 and where the relative frequency (Rel. Frq.) values
indicate the number of events per 1000 patient days. Details of patient ‘days’ were derived from






1 Medication 3.1 23 Central lines 0.31
2 Nutrition 0.21 24 Arterial lines 0.10
3 Monitoring 0.15 25 Epidurals 0.10
4 Airway 0.41 26 Analgesia 0.36
5 Communication to team 0.67 27 Patient involvement 1.03
6 Communication patient/rel 0.05 28 Intra cranial pressure 0
7 Acquired infection 0.67 29 Chest drains 0.05
8 Handover processes 0.87 30 EVDs 0.21
9 IV infusions 0.67 31 Lower digestive tract 0.0
10 Patient records & ident. 0.51 32 Patient/bed restraints 0.0
11 QS system 0.10 33 Renal function 0.0
12 Logistics of supply 0.36 34 Lumbar puncture 0.05
13 Pathology/patient samples 0.31 35 Dermatological support 0.0
14 Blood products 0.41 36 Cardioversion 0.0
15 Radiology 0.36 37 Defibrillation 0.05
16 Tissue viability 3.7 38 Traction 0.0
17 Fluid balance 0.10 39 TPN 0.05
18 Use of consumables 0.93 40 Basic patient care 2.36
19 Patient observations 0.0 41 Staff injury 0.05
20 Catheters 0.05 42 Unit disruption 0.05
21 Wound management 0 43 Patient pathway 3.39
22 Enteral feeding 0
Table 7.12. Summary details of documented Clinical Adverse Events normalised to events per 1000
patient days of clinical activity in time period January 2007 to July 2009 and assuming an annual
patient episode of 7531 days.
This indicates the dominance of effects of ‘Patient pathway’, ‘Basic patient care’, ‘Medication’ and
‘Tissue viability’. This mode of reporting of Clinical Adverse Events assigns the ‘originator’
department as the clinical department where the incident is reported. This results in a key percentage
of reports arising from inappropriate actions outside the Critical Care Unit. Specific examples of this
relating to ‘Patient pathway’ would include:
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 Patient received directly from theatres and not from Recovery, with no CVP line or arterial line
in place on admission to the Critical Care Unit.
 Lack of documentation from Neuro surgeons for patient with multiple neurosurgical injuries
delays patient management in the Critical Care Unit.
 Unacceptable transfer of ill patient from Clinical Decisions Unit with no monitoring or
nursing/medical escort.
Medication errors arising from outside the Critical Care Unit can also be identified based on
inappropriate drugs administration, for example, in Theatres or in Recovery. Although the incidents
relating to ‘Airway’ are few in number, these tend to equate to high levels of risk, such as the blocking
of an ET tube by bronchial secretions or disconnection of a ventilator. The discipline applied to
medication practice is strictly formal, where relatively minor deviations from accepted practice initiate
the reporting of a CAE. Such minor deviations would include, for example, the identification of a
missing single vial of Potassium Chloride in the Controlled Drug cabinet. Medication errors also
include instances where prescribed medication is omitted.
The relatively large numbers of Clinical Adverse Events relating to tissue viability can also reflect
instances where tissue viability issues are identified on admission from other hospitals or clinical areas
within UHCW NHS Trust. The relatively large number of incidents reflects also the process of
periodic patient review to identify instances of compromised patient tissue viability. It is also likely that
there is a component of under reporting of Clinical Adverse Events within the Critical Care Unit.
7.25 Comparison of Data Relating to ‘Adverse Effects’ and ‘Adverse Events’
There is a subtle difference between the two sets of data, where the distribution of adverse effects
represents a distribution of probabilities where every specific adverse effect has a finite probability
value between 0 and 1. By comparison, however, adverse events are either present (value 1) or
absent (value 0).
The distribution of adverse effects is highly dependent on the initial mapping of interventions as part of
the patient treatment process. It is also dependent on the sub structure of ‘competency/adverse
effect’ incorporated within specific interventions. In addition, the current set of interventions are
essentially those associated with nursing co-workers, so specific sets of interventions, for example
associated with Radiology, would not be identified.
The comparison of the two sets of data, as outlined in figure 7.48 indicates a significant difference
between the parameters values – see table 7.10 for specific adverse effect values per patient day.
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Figure 7.49. Details of values of clinical adverse events (x 100: blue) and adverse effects normalised
(magenta) to activity per 1000 patient days and using classification of type of adverse effect.
The role of adverse effects is identified with quantification of risk factors within a risk modelling
framework. The role of Clinical Adverse Event reporting relates to reporting based on agreed ‘event
characteristic’ parameters and where subsequently relevant corrective and preventive measures are
established to reduce likelihood of re-occurrence. It is also relevant to compare levels of Clinical
Adverse Events with comparable levels reported by the SEE study (Valentin et al. 2006) as indicated
in table 7.13.














Medication 105 3.1 18.2
Equipment 92 0.93 115.1
Airway 33 0.41 667.9
Alarms 13 0.15 -
Table 7.13. Approximate comparison of levels of Clinical Adverse Events with levels reported by the
SEE study (Valentin et al. 2006) and referenced to level based on derived risk simulation of adverse
effects (current research). No specific code match is indicated for ‘Alarms’.
This confirms the low levels of CAE reporting relative to comparable clinical studies and the lack of
value in using this information source to compare against the simulated risk sequences. Issues are
also identified in reconciling the separate coding systems of the SEE study with the types of adverse
effect created in the simulated risk analysis. Options also exist for selection of ‘high’ risk codes
relating to adverse effects to indicate an event that could trigger a clinical adverse event using the
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code definitions previously outlined in table 5.9. In addition comparison of measured and simulated
risk patterns would benefit from mapping simulated adverse effects directly to the simplified code
systems of studies such as the SEE study (Valentin 2006). This also highlights the need for
standardisation in description of event criteria as referenced in the categories such as ‘airway’ and
‘alarms’ referenced in table 7.13.
A clearer verification of the risk simulation system is clearly focused on more effective means of
simulating the clinical activity of patients passing through the Critical Care facility and would indicate
refinement of the existing extensive software module which undertakes this function. This again
emphasises the basic requirement of any risk simulation system to effectively reflect the patterns of
associated clinical activity.
7.26 Observations
The process of operating the risk simulation system has allowed aspects of its characteristics to be
determined, with variations in internal representation of functions within the model and also direct input
of parameters such as staff competency producing specific effects on the levels of output probability of
adverse effects. The general observed effects have essentially been consistent with qualitative
expectations where single parameters have been altered.
The nature of the risk being determined by the risk simulation system is referenced at the level of
‘adverse effects’ which can relate to specific adverse clinical incidents or also be identified as the
creation of a ‘less satisfactory’ level of patient condition which may have the potential when combined
with other factors to lead to a Clinical Adverse Event. Adverse effects can also be considered as
triggers which have the potential to result in Clinical Adverse Events.
Where active comparisons are made between the simulated adverse effects and frequency of
occurrence of clinical incidents in the reported studies, it may be relevant to map codes directly
between the adverse effects and the code structure of a specific study. In the example of the SEE
study, for example, this would require a mapping to the limited set of categories referenced in table
7.13.
The more useful measure of level of incidence of incidents as referenced in table 7.13 is where activity
is normalised to specific periods of clinical activity such as per 100 patient days (Valentin et al. (2006))
or per 1000 patient days (Jain et al. (2006)). A comparison of reporting frameworks has
previously been described in table 5.35. The equivalent measure identified in this research is that of
‘effects per patient day’ as referenced in figure 7.38 and figure 7.39 where this can be in respect of a
‘type of adverse effect’ or a ‘specific adverse effect’. In table 7.12, Clinical Adverse Events are
referenced within a period of 1000 patient days. These factors can be identified using the total
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number of patient days associated with a set period of simulated clinical activity. In addition, this
factor will automatically take account of periods where specific beds are not occupied.
The intrinsic difference between ‘adverse effects’ and Clinical Adverse Events has been previously
referenced. It is anticipated that the normalised frequency of ‘adverse effects’ will normally be greater
than that of Clinical Adverse Events where the common reference framework of ‘types of adverse
effect’ is utilised. This is based on the structuring of ‘adverse effects’ as being essentially contributory
factors to ‘adverse clinical incidents’ as indicated in figure 7.50.
Figure 7.50. Implied relationship between adverse effects and adverse clinical incidents.
7.27 Summary
The exercising of the ‘risk engine’ based on subsets of values of test input parameters confirmed
qualitatively the correct functioning of the risk simulation system. The specific three dimensional
representations of probability functions essentially derived via the fuzzy logic functions were identified
as a specific subset of a much larger set of possible functions. In addition, risk simulation results
based on simulated patient activity qualitatively confirmed the expected behaviour of the model for
specific parameters such as the level of nurse attendance (relating to supervision), level of requesting
competency support, level of sleep deprivation, level of nursing staff competency within rostered
teams, nurse handover responses, level of interaction between beds based on physical separation
and level of individual effectiveness based on Circadian (night shift) functions.
The comparison between simulated risk values of a 9 month period of simulated clinical activity using
‘type’ of adverse effect codes and local adverse clinical incident reporting information over a two year
period showed poor ‘overlap’ and also missing elements within the simulated set of clinical
interventions. It was identified, however, that the local adverse clinical incident reporting system
appears to be significantly underestimating the level of such adverse events when comparisons are
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made with relevant clinical studies such as the SEE study. This confirms the essential difference
between ‘formal’ clinical adverse events which may require extensive administrative management
and resolution by senior nursing/medical staff and voluntary self reporting (no blame) schemes for
reporting of more minor yet also relevant observations and for which there is little or no
administrative overhead.
The analysis of activity derived from the 9 month period of simulated clinical activity and within a
‘normalised’ single day time frame confirmed the role of the ‘night shift’ effect and morning handover
effect though the anticipated increase of activity between 10:00 am and 04:00 pm was not clearly
evident. The analysis of activity derived from the 9 month period of simulated clinical activity and
within a ‘normalised’ single day time frame as referenced with the results of the SEE study (Valentin et
al. 2006) showed poor overlap which is identified as originating in part from the process of simulation
of clinical interventions and possibly also reporting mechanisms within the SEE study.
This confirms the importance of mechanisms and processes to replicate as accurately as possible
the level of patient activity within periods of simulated clinical activity. Possible methods to more
accurately develop such techniques are referenced in chapter 8 within the context of further
work.
There was some encouraging overlap between the simulated adverse effect levels and the summary
categories of the SEE study through further work is required to improved clinical activity simulation,
express the SEE output category codes directly from individual adverse effects and possibly utilise the
level of risk structure to identify the more serious elements of adverse effects which would contribute
towards clinical adverse events.
The relative distribution of risk according to rostered sub grade of nursing staff within the 9 month
period of simulated clinical activity confirmed the anticipated role of more senior staff in reducing the
relative risk of less experienced nursing team members though this was not validated against any
established clinical study or equivalent local data set. It was identified that reporting the frequency of
adverse clinical events as probability per day or per 1000 patient days provided a relevant means of
comparison between the risk simulation system and the corresponding clinical literature. In the
following and final chapter a further review of the research is undertaken and areas for further work
are summarised.
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Chapter 8: General Conclusions and Further Work
8.1 Summary and Justification of Major Contributions
The following key contributions (elements) described in this Thesis are identified as:
Element 1 The identification and implementation of the concept of expressing levels of clinical
risk within a specific clinical environment with expression as finite probabilities of occurrence.
Justification: The reality of healthcare is that adverse clinical events all too readily can be expressed
as probabilities of occurrence with reference to a base line level of activity - such as events per
equivalent 1000 patient days. It was identified at an early stage within the research that systems for
modelling clinical risk should also describe outcomes within a formal framework of determined
probabilities. The remaining set of identified elements in this section describe essentially processes
and mechanisms for implementation of this concept.
Element 2 Structure of patient care as a series of interventions and where interventions are
described at the level of sub tasks which are associated with linked levels of competency, adverse
effects and also preventive measures.
Justification: The description of interventions within the context of the role of sub tasks, linked levels of
competency and preventive measures provides a structured generic framework for analysis of clinical
activity. This approach is also the basis on which the method of risk simulation operates. It is
identified that the method operates at a specific ‘quantum’ level of risk identification where the
identified ‘adverse effects’ are at a level which cannot usefully be sub divided to other levels. This
‘quantisation’ of risk is identified as an approach which can also be applied within other areas of risk
analysis and risk simulation. The approach of risk ‘quantisation’ has also made possible identification
of characteristics associated with both ‘sub tasks’ and ‘adverse effects’. In the context of ‘sub tasks’,
for example, these can potentially be modified by competency sharing and also supervision and also
described at specific levels of complexity. It is identified that the task of developing the structure of
interventions is quite distinct from the practical processes of identifying specific interventions within a
specific clinical setting. The identification of ‘sub tasks’ and ‘adverse effects’ confirms the reality that
a single clinical intervention can be associated with more than one adverse clinical outcome.
209
Element 3 System for simulation of clinical activity based on admission/discharge data and
analysis of clinical intervention data. This consists of two main components of admission/discharge
details : date time admission and date time discharge, specialty etc. and interventions associated
with specific patient admission/discharge episodes.
Justification: The process of simulation of clinical risk associated with clinical activity requires methods
to create clinical interventions which closely reflect actual interventions experienced by patients. The
component of simulation related to admission/discharge episodes has been adequately determined by
detailed analysis of patient admission/discharge details. The component of simulation based on
‘populating’ patient admission/discharge episodes with appropriate interventions has been found more
challenging and developed method within MathLab® programming language leads to over complex
programming techniques which are highly specific to a given clinical specialty.
Element 4 Derivation of competency mismatch function to describe gap between available
competence and required level of competence and implementation of concept of team competency
levels.
Justification: The representation of competency levels associated with sub tasks using a linear scale
and the identification of competency mismatch relative to a defined numeric level has provided a
means of deriving an input parameter for operation of the ‘risk engine’ – as referenced in element 5.
Linked with the concept of individual competency is that of ‘group competency’ where the maximum
available competency potentially available to a team member is that of the most competent individual
within the team. This allowed competency mismatch levels to be determined for each sub task within
an intervention and also value of corresponding team competency mismatch as inputs to the ‘risk
engine’
Element 5 Development of empirical effectiveness functions to structure the ‘individual
effectiveness’ value of clinical staff with component functions relating to circadian rhythm, physical
exertion, intellectual exertion, stress, shift handover, influence of admission of patient and sleep
deficit.
Justification: An extensive review of the literature relating to adverse clinical incidents in the Critical
Care environment identified a range of factors influencing individual effectiveness but without any
derivation of empirical functions that could be used to describe values associated with individual
effectiveness. A series of empirical functions relating to circadian rhythm, physical exertion,
intellectual exertion, stress, shift handover, influence of admission of patient and sleep deficit were
created based on direct observations within the Critical Care environment and also with reference to
the relevant literature.
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Element 6 Development of ‘risk engine’ consisting of four Fuzzy transitions to calculate output
probability of occurrence of specific adverse effect based on five input functions with individual
effectiveness linked with distraction, individual competency mismatch linked with team competency
mismatch and moderating effect of supervision
Justification: The development of the ‘risk engine’ is identified as the single most important
contribution to the Thesis where in a novel implementation a finite value of probability is associated
with each sub task within an intervention. The ‘risk engine’ represents an intuitive representation of
interaction of parameters which reflects behavioural patterns referenced in the literature and also
observed within the setting of clinical activity within the Critical Care Unit. In addition, the
implementation of the ‘risk engine’ where fuzzy functions are essentially look up functions provides
efficiency in processing time. The operation of the ‘risk engine’ is identified to be associated with
processes of optimisation where ranges of parameters are required to be configured to lie within
typical parameter ranges
Element 7 The introduction of ‘coefficients of interaction’ based on physical layout of Critical Care
sub unit which identifies role of physical environment on influence of supervision, competency sharing
and distraction
Justification: The identification of ‘coefficients of interaction’ based on physical layout of Critical Care
sub unit which has led to the evaluation of role of physical environment on influence of supervision,
competency sharing and distraction has been an unexpected but a significant outcome of the
research. This confirms that the physical layout of the Critical Care Unit (and that of similar units) is
contributing factors to level of clinical adverse incidents. In addition, the research has identified a
method of determining such coefficients of interaction for these healthcare facilities.
Element 8 Integration of all elements into the risk simulation system listing all elements of the
identified components and deriving levels of probability of adverse effects based on periods of
simulated clinical activity.
Justification: While the identification of the component elements of the risk simulation system provides
complexity within each element, the integration of all elements into the risk simulation system into a
cohesive functioning model implemented in Matlab ® represents a significant contribution in the
research and introduces associated challenges of verification of function of associated software.
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8.2 General Conclusions
The research work described in this Thesis comprises the following phases:
 Development of risk model
 Determination of modes of clinical interventions/activity
 Implementation of risk model functionality
 Optimisation/tuning of characteristics of risk model functionality
 Simulation studies with the risk simulation system using simulated clinical activity
 Comparison of simulated risk with observed risk patterns
 Identification of ‘preventive measures’ analysis as a tool for risk reduction
A novel approach for simulation of risk in the clinical environment has been described in the Thesis
with a specific focus related to risk within a Critical Care Unit, which provides a framework for clinical
risk simulation based on detailed description of task activity. Such a risk simulation system is also
identified as a mechanism for potentially reducing the risk of clinical systems as they are initially
designed and configured, rather than operationally managed. The risk simulation model is also
identified as having general applicability to other task/risk related environments.
In undertaking the various stages of the risk model development, both the challenge/benefits and
difficulties/pitfalls associated with such a process have been encountered. On the plus side, for
example, the simulation system can identify increased structure for elements which had previously
been identified within conventional risk analysis within the clinical environment but without
demonstrated linkage to clinical risk. An example of this would include the identification of team
interaction, supervisory function and distraction level based on parameters linked to the design of the
physical environment. Another positive outcome of such a process has been the structuring of role of
preventive measures which are intrinsically linked to the structure of ‘sub task/adverse effect’ which is
used as the foundation of the risk model. This component was intuitively identified during the process
of risk model development and provides a generic supportive approach towards risk reduction
strategies. It also provides the direct link between preventive measures and task activity which is not
an identified method of risk reduction strategies in healthcare.
A process of risk analysis using the outlined approach in this research, coupled with appropriate
determination of linked preventive measures has the potential to provide a consistent approach to risk
reduction in the clinical environment. The structure of the identified risk model is also likely to be
appropriate for risk reduction within other complex task/skill related work environments.
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The relevant clinical literature identifies that clinical staff are only too aware of the restrictions which
impact specific tasks, especially those restrictions which are apparently outside of their immediate
control. Such limitations include the availability of services from other health professionals, availability
of drugs/consumables, access to computerised reporting systems and effectiveness of pathology
services. The inherent awareness of such factors allows them to be readily incorporated within the
risk model, primarily in the context of adverse effects and preventive measures. While the risk
simulation system has evolved from its core definitions, subsequent operation of the model confirms
the overriding importance of the approach of structuring interventions at the level of ‘sub-task/adverse
effects’ where the lowest level of risk components (sub competencies/adverse effects) and associated
preventive measures can be identified.
The structure of the intrinsic ‘risk engine’ utilises fuzzy components with two parameter inputs. Where
subjective parameters such as effectiveness, distraction and competency mismatch are being used as
linguistic interpretations of level and degree, the linguistic sense of inputs with the fuzzy logic remains
clear with two parameter inputs but would become confused with three or more inputs to derive logical
relationships.
The research has indicated the requirement for effective processes to validate the functioning of
programming elements within the ‘risk engine’ facility. This has largely been undertaken by operation
of the ‘risk engine’ with selected input parameter values and internally held constants and with
observations of sets of output values from the ‘risk engine’. This has largely been derived empirically
based on observations of how the model performs over a range of configurations. This is identified
as an important component of any risk simulation system which uses the functionality of ‘risk
engine’ to evaluate levels of risk of adverse effects.
The research has also identified the relevance of probability values of a specific adverse effect
normalised to a specific period of patient stay such as per patient day or 1000 days. While this is a
practical expression of relative probability, such a value will also tend to be relevant for the specific
case mix (specialty and severity) used initially for simulation. Variants of such probability values can
also be referenced for individual specialties.
While techniques for risk reduction in acute healthcare have consumed significant resources, errors
continue to take place. The risk simulation approach outlined in this research is an example of
another technique to improve the safety of the clinical environment. A specific focus of the technique
is the engagement in detail with the clinical activity within the work environment which self identifies
components of risk and preventive measures identified as contributing factors to reduce clinical risk.
The research has undertaken the approach of a ‘catch all’ scenario where as much clinical activity as
possible has been identified for inclusion within the model sequence. Less ambitious approaches of
quantification of specific components of clinical activity such as medication, infusions and ventilator
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support would also have been viable approaches and where published research describes the
frequency of adverse outcomes within such specific areas of clinical activity. It is considered,
however, that it is the development of systems of risk simulation for ‘catch all’ activity which presents
most potential for risk reduction scenarios. The derivation of such systems, however, is complex
though at a level of complexity that can be managed by currently available computer resources.
The process of risk estimation outlined within the research is potentially capable of transfer to other
fields of activity. In the context of describing tasks at the levels of competency, adverse effect and
preventive measure, the structure is clearly generally applicable. A relevant example is identified as
rail track maintenance where interventions are described as sets of sub tasks with listed details of
associated competency, adverse effect and preventive measures. Within identified work teams, a
range of competencies would be identified and with the highest level associated with senior
supervisory staff. Modification of individual competency mismatch would be structured by available
supervisory structures. The analysis would be driven by task related activity which would be
analogous to interventions structured at the clinical level. Comparable expressions for distraction and
effectiveness would be derived from the nature of task activities. As with the requirement for
observation within the clinical environment, appropriate simulation models would require to be
developed based on analysis and observation of patterns of actual job activity. As with the structure
of simulation of clinical activity, the time consuming component of the simulation process would be
characterisation of the nature of activity and the time sequence of specific tasks within work teams.
Within this context, the function of the ‘risk engine’ as structured in figure 6.1 and with the range of
input/output parameter values would again seem appropriate. Effectiveness functions in the clinical
applications relating to ‘admission’ and ‘handover’ would not be directly relevant though scope would
exist to incorporate functions considered relevant and based on analysis of activity.
8.3 Further Work
Within the scope of derivation of the fuzzy logic look up functions that have been derived to provide
the functionality of the risk simulation system, there exists the scope for significant levels of
experimentation in evaluation of both variants of fuzzy logic functions and equivalent functions derived
from a range of methods. It is identified that this is an area which would benefit from additional
investigation and with initially variants of fuzzy logic functions providing equivalent and applicable
solutions
The risk model has identified how activity within the Critical Care environment can be structured in a
detailed way at the ‘task’ level of activity. Refinements of the identification and scheduling of clinical
activity levels could, for example, be undertaken by a more focused time and motion study, either by
self reporting of staff or by means of more detailed independent observer activity. There seems,
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however, to be in inherent professional resistance to collect information at this level of detail. In
addition, it is technically possible to identify ‘person positioning information’ based on RFID technology
where the physical location of staff can be continuously monitored to identify percentage of time at the
patient bedside. Again, there may be difficulties in obtaining ethical approval for research involving
this level of personal information but it is identified that such information has the potential to
significantly improve processes of simulation of staff utilisation.
A key achievement of the research has been to demonstrate the implementation of the model within a
stable programming environment where complex information flows can be reliably processed.
There is perhaps a differentiation between the level of complexity which a programming environment
can reliably handle and a level of complexity at the human level which can be reliably designed,
implemented and verified. With the implementation of a specific level of model complexity, this
process has identified areas for further refinement of the model to increase its general level of
flexibility. In terms of sleep deprivation, for example, it would be possible to include a level of sleep
deprivation applied to specific individuals and which varied with the day sequence number of period of
duty within a sequence of days of duty on dayshift or night shift. This would more effectively replicate
the pattern of progressive sleep deprivation during active shift working.
The element of long term factors of individual effectiveness has been referenced but not specifically
implemented in the risk model. Such functions would have correspondence with processes of
individual burnout referenced by Iacovides et al. (2003). Based on the existing levels of complexity
identified within the programming structures, it would be possible to implement this function where
selected staff members are associated with a time varying function of individual effectiveness linked to
long term stress factors within the period of simulation of clinical activity.
The research associates considerable importance with elements of physical environment related to
factors of sharing of competency within a team, supervision levels and distraction. As increased
physical separation decreases the interaction between beds, this will tend to reduce competency
sharing and supervision as negative effects and also decrease distraction element which is a positive
effect. For designers of Critical Care environments, the challenge is to structure these functions to
minimise the identified associated risk components and maximise benefits of increased team sharing
and supervision. In this context, a process is identified in section 6.14 to allow evaluation of
associated matrix parameters as referenced in tables 6.13 and table 6.15. The structuring of these
algorithms identifies specific areas of research for comparative evaluation of these parameters within
the Critical Care community and also within the field of architectural design of hospitals. This matches
with the growing awareness in health system of ‘lean’ systems where the physical environment
is designed around work processes to optimise levels of work effectiveness and in consequence
reduce levels of risk.
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The risk simulation model has identified the role of physical environment in influencing relative
factors of competency sharing, levels of supervision and distraction. In general factors which
improve competency sharing and supervision will provide for increased distraction. This
identifies that further work is appropriate to indentify factors which can be undertaken in physical
layout designs to optimise the positive effects of competency sharing and supervision without
proportional increase of distraction levels.
The research has identified individual effectiveness as a being influenced by a range of effectiveness
functions, and where the default value presented to the ‘risk engine’ is that of the minimum value of
the function values. Section 6.15 develops a structure using fuzzy logic to implement a linguistically
consistent model for combination of the component functions to derive a single output risk factor. It is
identified that further work at the level of operational research is required to review/validate the
derivation of a single ‘representative’ value of effectiveness function and in general
review/investigate the role of individual effectiveness functions.
Considerable effort has been directed to structuring patterns of interventions which correspond as
closely as possible with actual work processes within the Critical Care unit. The results of current risk
simulation studies confirms the internal resilience of the ‘risk engine’ design and structure but identifies
further refinement is necessary in structuring of the referenced interventions with specific patient
episodes. This is identified from observations of ‘missing’ interventions within the set of known clinical
activity. This confirms the importance of deriving a sequence of simulated interventions which
corresponds as closely as possible with the activity of the identified clinical area. The effective
description of interventions relating to patient treatment also remains at the core of more
general programmes of risk reduction within patient pathways.
The implantation of the risk model has involved the creation of a diverse set of data arrays, the
majority of which have been implemented through the use of Excel ® spreadsheets. It is identified
that a useful development in respect of further work would be to structure an information tool that
would allow the creation a diverse set of data files to fully support the requirements of the risk engine
system.
It is identified that the risk model described in the Thesis is one where ‘primary’ ‘adverse effects’ are
described and which arise out of direct identification of possible outcomes. Further work is required
to identify mechanisms where one or more ‘primary’ types of adverse effects combine to give rise to
‘secondary’ types of risk.
In addition, standardisation of system of classification of clinical adverse events would benefit
further research in this area.
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Appendix 1: Summary of Data Structures
Detail of sequences of data sets derived from the QS data base system. Data sets #1 and #2 contain
summary details of individual patient discharge episodes – with inclusion of summary details of level of
clinical care and associated interventions. Data set #3 contains a full set of TISS activity per patient
episode.
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1 TISS-Hourly Vital Signs 21 WTISS-excessive diarrhoea
2 TISS-Hourly Neuro Vital Signs 22 WTISS-stoma care
3 WTISS-less than hrly neuro obs 23 WTISS-routine dressings (wound)
4 TISS-ECG Monitoring 24
WTISS-multiple dressing
changes
5 WTISS-oximetry 25 WTISS-wound irrigation/debride.
6 TISS-Measure Cardiac Output 26 WTISS-Tracheostomy care
7 WTISS-intake/output 27 WTISS-bed
8 TISS-Peripheral IVs 28 WTISS-patient restraints in situ
9
WTISS-triple/quad luman CVP
line 29 WTISS-isolation of patient
10 TISS-Arterial Line 30 WTISS-pressure sore
11 TISS-Pulmonary Artery Catheter 31 WTISS-chest Xray
12 WTISS-epidural 32 WTISS-Routine blood specimens
13 WTISS-P.C.A. 33 WTISS-Multiple ABGS
14 TISS-Intracranial pres monitor 34 WTISS-Special Lab Tests
15 TISS-Urinary Catheter 35 WTISS-microbiology
16 TISS-Chest Tubes 36 WTISS-Ultrasound/echo/EEG
17 WTISS-drainage tubes -wound 37 WTISS-Diag. Proc. outside ITU
18 WTISS-change EVD 38 WTISS-urine analysis
19 WTISS-NG tube enteral feeds 39 WTISS-stable/unstable dialysis
20 WTISS-enema 40 WTISS-CVVH






41 TISS-Peritoneal Dialysis 66 TISS-Anticoagulation
42 WTISS-op whilst on ITU 67 WTISS-Thrombolytic therapy
43 WTISS-Endoscop/Bronchoscopy 68 TISS-Acute Digitalization<48hrs
44 WTISS-New trach mini trach 69 WTISS-Antiarrhythmia infusion
45 WTISS-Pleural Tap 70 TISS-Concentrated K+ Infusion
46 WTISS-Paracentesis 71 WTISS-Metabolic imb. treatment
47 WTISS-Pericardial Tap 72
WTISS-Electrolyte imb.
treatment
48 WTISS-Lumbar puncture 73 WTISS-Arterial Infusion
49 w CCMDS Liver support 74 WTISS-Fluid replacement
50 w CCMDS Dermatological support 75 TISS-Pres-activated Bld Infusion
51 WTISS-Active AV Pacing 76 TISS-Platelet Transfusions
52 WTISS-Standby Pacemaker 77 WTISS->5units blood products
53 TISS-Cardioversion-Arrhythmia 78 WTISS-Central TPN/vitrimix
54 WTISS-Arrest/defib 79 WTISS-peripheral TPN/Intralipid
55 w arrest record complete 80 TISS-Rx Seizures/Meta Enceph
56 TISS-Lavage of Acute GI Bleed 81 TISS-Nasal/Oral Intubation
57 WTISS-induced hypothermia 82
WTISS-Nasopharyngeal
suctioning
58 TISS-Orthopedic Traction 83 WTISS-CMV/SIMV/IMV
59 WTISS-Continuous Drug Infusion 84 WTISS-spont/CPAP
60 TISS-Antibiotics IV 85 WTISS-Oxygen
61 WTISS-Intermittent IV drugs 86 WTISS-Physiotherapy
62 WTISS-Stat IV drugs 87 WTISS-Nebulised drugs
63 TISS-Active Diuresis
64 WTISS-Renal dose dopamine
65 TISS-Vasoactive Drug Infusion
Table A2.2 TISS elements in series 41 to 87
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1 TISS-Hourly Vital Signs only 11 Implement hourly
2 TISS-Hourly + Neuro Vital Signs 21 Implement as required
4 TISS-ECG Monitoring 41 Implement all patients
5 WTISS-oximetry 51 Implement all patients
6 TISS-Measure Cardiac Output 61 identify requirement (medic)
62 implement procedure (ventilator type)
63 Implement procedure (arterial waveforms)
64 Observe and interpret waveforms




72 Interpret fluid balance (medic)
73 Interpret fluid balance (nurse)
74 Alteration patient fluid balance (nurse)
74 End activity
8 TISS-Peripheral IVs 81 identify requirement
82 peripheral line establish/replace (nurse)
83 peripheral line establish /replace (medic)
87 Remove IV site (nurse)
88 End of activity
9
WTISS-triple/quad luman CVP
line 91 Establish/replace CVP line (medic)
93 Positional check x-ray CVP line
96 Remove CVP line/End of activity
10 TISS-Arterial Line 101 establish arterial line arm (medic)
102 Establish arterial line leg (medic)
105 Remove arterial line / end activity
12 WTISS-epidural 121 maintenance mode
122 Replace drug reservoir
123 Removal catheter/end activity
13 WTISS-P.C.A. 131 identify requirement
132 Establish PCA
133 Replace PCA
134 Remove PCA/end activity






14 TISS-Intracranial pres monitor 141
Insert bolt (neurosurgeon/ccu
medic)
142 Observe IC pressure (nurse)
143 Monitor condition sensor system
144 Replace sensing element
145 Remove bolt/end activity (medic)
15 TISS-Urinary Catheter 151 female insertion - (nursing)





male remove (medical) / end
activity
16 TISS-Chest Tubes 161 identify requirement
162 Insert chest drain (medic)
164 Change bottle – chest drain (nurse)
165 Observe drain chest tube
166 Remove chest tubes/end of activity
17 WTISS-drainage tubes -wound 171
identify requirement wound
drainage
172 Insert wound drainage
173
Observe condition wound drainage
(hourly to 4 hourly)
174 Replace wound drain bag
175 Remove wound drain/end activity
18 WTISS-change EVD 181 identify requirement
182 Initiate procedure (medic)
183
Observe condition EVD hourly and
record volume (nurse)
184 Remove EVD/end activity
19 WTISS-NG tube enteral feeds 191 Initiate enteral feeding (nurse)
192 x-ray confirmation NG placement
193 Insert NG tube only (medic)
194 Check pH of stomach sample
196 Stop enteral feeding
197
Remove NG tube/end activity
(nurse)
20 WTISS-enema 201 identify requirement
202 Undertake enema
203 End activity






21 WTISS-excessive diarrhoea 211 Manage excessive diarrhoea
212 End activity
22 WTISS-stoma care 221
CCU nurse stoma management (once per
3 days)












irrigation/debride. 252 Wound irrigation
26 WTISS-Tracheostomy care 261 Tracheotomy care (daily)
262 Suction care (variable frequency)
267 End of activity
27 WTISS-bed 271 identify bed required
272 set up bed normal
273 set up bed specialist
274 Move patient (4 hourly)
275 remove bed specialist
28 WTISS-patient restraints in situ 281 identify need for patient restraint
282 establish patient restraint
284 End activity
29 WTISS-isolation of patient 291 identify need for isolation
292 follow isolation protocol
30 WTISS-pressure sore 301 assess risk of pressure sore
302 Observe at risk sites (daily)
303 Dressing change - bed sores
305 End activity
31 WTISS-chest Xray 312 radiographer component
313 Clinical review x-ray
314 Interpretation NG tube
315 Interpretation of central line – x-ray
316 Interpretation of trachy tube – x-ray
316 End activity








specimens 321 Bloods (am screen & admission)
322 Determine cross match
323 Determine clotting factor
324 Request liver function test
325 End activity
33 WTISS-Multiple ABGS 331 Blood gases & interpret
34 WTISS-Special Lab Tests 341 to be expanded
35 WTISS-microbiology 355 Screen on admission MRSA/cleb
356 Screen on discharge MRSA/cleb
357 Screen on 7 days MRSA/cleb
358 Prescribe antibiotic (medic)
359 End activity
36 WTISS-Ultrasound/echo/EEG 361 radiologist ultrasound
362 neurophysiologist EEG (neuro)
363 clinical assessment (neuro)
37
WTISS-Diag. Proc. outside
ITU 371 accompany patient CT/MRI
372 End activity
38 WTISS-urine analysis 381 Test on admission
382 End activity
40 WTISS-CVVH 402 Initiate CVVH procedure




Endoscopy/Bronchoscopy 431 identify need for endoscopy/bronch
432 undertake procedure (endoscopy)
433 undertake procedure (bronchoscopy)
44 WTISS-New trach mini trach 442 Insertion external trachy - (medic)
446 removal of trachy
447 Insertion mini trach
449 remove mini trach
45 WTISS-Pleural Tap 452 undertake procedure (Radiologist)
453 undertake procedure (CCU medic)
454 End activity
48 WTISS-Lumbar puncture 482
undertake lumbar puncture and interpret
findings
486 End activity








support 502 undertake procedure (Drmatologist)
503 Monitor dermatological condition (nurse)
504 End activity
51 Medication - focus 511
Review patient medication on admission
(medic)
512
Review patient medication on admission
(Pharmacist)
513
Review patient medication - routine
(Pharmacist)
514 Prescribe and administer drug
515 Prescribe drug only
516 Case review medication
517 Review patient antibiotics (Microbiologists)
518 End activity
52 Drug Round Activity 521 Identify Routine drug round activity
522
Administration of drug within drug round
(specific drug)
523 Administration of IV infusion (syringe driver)
524 Administration of IV infusion (volumetric)
525 Administration of drug (immediate)
526 Respond to infusion alarm (syringe driver)
527 Respond to infusion alarm (volumetric )
528 End activity
53 TISS-Cardioversion-Arrhythmia 532 undertake procedure cardiov.
533 End activity
54 WTISS-Arrest/defib 541 undertake defibrillation
542 End activity
57 WTISS-induced hypothermia 572 undertake procedure
573 Observe core body temperature
574 End activity
58 TISS-Orthopedic Traction 581 identify traction requirements (Orth)
582 implement requirements (Nursing)




Infusion 591 Initiate continuous drugs
595 End activity
60 TISS-Antibiotics IV 601 Initiate antibiotic treatment
606 End activity - antibiotics
61 WTISS-Intermittent IV drugs 611 Initiate int IV drugs
616 End activity






62 WTISS-Stat IV drugs 621 Initiate STAT IV drugs
624 End activity STAT IV drugs
63 TISS-Active Diuresis 632 implement procedure
633 End activity
65 TISS-Vasoactive Drug Infusion 652 Implement procedure vasoactive infusion
653 End activity
66 TISS-Anticoagulation 662 implement procedure - anticoagulation
663 Clotting screen (anticoagulation)
664 End activity
67 WTISS-Thrombolytic therapy 672 Implement Clotting screen (thrombolytic)
673 End activity thrombolytic therapy
69 WTISS-Antiarrhythmia infusion 691 implement Antiarrhythmia infusion
693 End activity
70 TISS-Concentrated K+ Infusion 702 implement procedure conc K+ infusion




treatment 712 implement procedure metab.imb.




treatment 721 identify requirement
722 implement procedure
723 Electrolyte monitor (elect imb)
724 End activity
74 WTISS-Fluid replacement 741 identify requirement
742 implement procedure
743 End activity
75 TISS-Pres-activated Bld Infusion 752 Obtain cross match
753
implement procedure bld transfusion –
pres activated
754 End activity
76 TISS-Platelet Transfusions 761
Evaluate requirement for platelet
transfusion
762
Implement procedure – platelet
transfusion
763 Obtain clotting screen
764 End procedure






77 WTISS->5units blood products 772 implement procedure
773 Obtain cross match
774 Monitor patient Hb
775 End activity
78 WTISS-Central TPN/vitrimix 784 Prescribe TPN (Diet)
785 Prescribe TPN (Medic)
786 Review TPN (Diet))
787 Implement TPN (nurse)
788 Monitor TPN (nurse)
789 End activity
81 TISS-Nasal/Oral Intubation 811 Intubate (oral)
812 Intubate (nasal)
815 End activity/remove (oral)
816 End activity/remove (nasal)
82
WTISS-Nasopharyngeal
suctioning 821 Initiate Nasoph. suctioning
822 Routine suction episode
823 End activity
83 WTISS-CMV/SIMV/IMV 832 implement procedure
833
Respond ventilation alarm &
observe
834 Patient ventilation care (suct etc.)
835 Cease ventilation episode
84 WTISS-spont/CPAP 841 identify requirement
842 implement procedure





Monitor /adjust O2 concentration
& humidification
855 End activity
86 WTISS-Physiotherapy 861 identify requirement
862 implement procedure
863 End activity
87 WTISS-Nebulised drugs 872 Implement nebulised drugs
873 Monitor nebulised delivery
874 End activity
Table A3.7. set of expanded TISS based interventions (group elements 77-87).
.
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Appendix 4: General Nursing Activity
Gen No. General Description No.
1 GEN_Nurse handover_ON_Shift 1011
2 GEN_Nurse handover_OFF_shift 1021
3 GEN_Pain_management_assess 1031









13 GEN_discharge patient_survival 1131
14 GEN_discharge_patient_non_survival 1141












27 GEN_Discharge_planning surv 1271





Appendix 5: Staff Tables
Staff Group Grade Structure Grade
Code
Nursing: Band 8b( Matron)
Band 7 (sister)
Band 6 (senior)
































Table A5.1 Summary of staff types that can have involvement within a typical critical care
environment.
239
Appendix 6: Internal Functioning of Mamdani Fuzzy Functions
1 Introduction
The process of risk estimation of adverse effects is identified as being derived using the Mamdani
Fuzzy function (Mamdani and Assilian, 1975) outlined in chapter 6. The characteristics of this
particular function were analysed in more detail in this appendix in order to identify specific factors that
could have relevance for the use of the function within the identified ‘risk engine’.
Values of Competency Mismatch and Effectiveness were assigned randomly as:
Cm(hh)=0.9+8.7.rand(1) (A6.1)
Eff(hh)= 2.6+6.9.rand(1) (A6.2)
Where Cm(hh) is Competency Mismatch of element hh, Eff(hh) is associated Individual
Effectiveness and hh is in range 1,1000. A specific rule system as outlined in table A6.1 was
used. No configuration of the MatLab® random number functions was undertaken.
Competency Mismatch 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Effectiveness 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1
Output 3 4 4 5 5 3 3 4 4 4 2 2 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
24 2518 19 20 21 22 2312 13 14 15 16 176 7 8 9 10 11Rule Number 1 2 3 4 5
Table A6.1. Rule table for output rule firing based on Competency Mismatch and
Individual Effectiveness.
Each pair of input values fires on average 3.2 states (3200 from 1000 input values).
Figure A6.1. Summary distribution of relative frequency of output state derivation and also output
defuzzified value for each state that fires.
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Figure A6.1 outlines characteristics of output states selected as a function of input parameter values.
Figure A6.2 indicates the corresponding distribution of defuzzified values for each set of input values
with interval value of 0.1.
Figure A6.2. Corresponding distribution of defuzzified value for each set of input values with interval
value of 0.1 for output ‘likelihood’.
The input space of variables is this example is set to activate all rules within the rule matrix. This
indicates maximum and minimum values of output ‘likelihood’ determined by the structural nature of
the Mamdani fuzzy function in its trapezoidal implementation.
Figure A6.3 Corresponding frequency of rule activation for the identified data set in equation A6.1.
Figure A6.3 indicates the corresponding frequency of rule activation. This pattern is established by
the overlap of random numbers generated the selectivity of states of the input fuzzy functions.
A modified set of input function data was also defined as:
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Cm(hh)=1.0 + 5.4.rand(1) (A6:3)
Eff(hh)= 1.6 + 4.4.rand(1) (A6:4)
This created a more restricted set of input parameters values as indicated in figure A6:4.
Figure A6.4. Summary distribution of relative frequency of output state derivation and also output
defuzzified value for each state that fires for reduced range of values of input values.
Figure A6.5 indicates the corresponding range of values of output ‘likelihood’ based on set of input
parameters of reduced value range. The maximum value of output likelihood is this thus reduced.
This also corresponds with non-firing of rules 1 to 6 in figure A6.6.
Figure A6.5. Corresponding distribution of defuzzified value for each input value of Cm(hh) and Eff(hh)
for A reduced field of values.
Figure A6.6 identified corresponding frequency of rule firing for the reduced set of input values.
242
Figure A6.6. Rule distribution for data set for reduced range of input parameters.
These observations generally confirm the characteristics of the functioning of the Mamdani fuzzy
function utilized for implementation of Fuzzy logic within the ‘risk engine’ structured in figure 6.3.
The complexity of the ‘risk engine’, however, is identified to relate to the utilisation of up to four of such
functions to determine the output likelihood of adverse effects.
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Appendix 7: Elements of Risk Simulation in Other Clinical Areas
1 Introduction
One of the areas identified for future work was that related to application of the risk model within other
clinical areas. Specific summary overviews of a range of clinical areas are identified.
1.1 Accident and Emergency Department
The environment of the Critical Care Unit characterises relatively low levels of patient throughput but
with a wide range of patient interventions in a multi-specialty environment. This is contrasted by
activity within the Accident and Emergency department where there is a much higher patient
throughput but typically a reduced level and number of patient interventions. In addition, the
interventions are typically less complex and with a priority for screening patient condition and/or
stabilising patient condition prior to referral elsewhere. The scope of risk simulation within this clinical
environment is identified to be essentially similar with the requirement to identify the specific
interventions with associated sub competencies and adverse effects as well as the basic sequence of
patient led activity. Patient throughput within the Accident and Emergency Department of large acute
hospitals is in the region of 75,000 per year - equivalent to in excess of 200 cases per day. Most
patient episodes will be of less than 6 hours duration. Extensive records of patient activities are now
typically available within patient record systems and the scope and extent of such records has evolved
considerably since initial developments in information systems within the A&E environment (Clarkson
et al. 1982).
In A&E, however, there is no permanent location for patients who progress through physical locations
according to the stage of treatment. A simulation system would be required which would allocate
patients to specific locations in accordance with the flow of patients within the unit. Superimposed on
this flow of patients would be the identified interventions experienced by the patient. Functions of
competency mismatch would require to be modulated by a function which took into account the likely
availability of other staff within the immediate vicinity of the patient.
Similarly, functions of supervision would be modulated by local availability of senior staff. In addition,
distraction would require a function modulated by levels of local clinical activity. It is likely that
effectiveness functions which reflect levels of physical, emotional and intellectual ‘exertion’ would play
a more prominent role with the determination of patterns of individual effectiveness.
The physical layout of the A&E unit would also play a key role in the risk simulation. While
information on generic aspects of patient care such as registration date and time and discharge date
and time, elements of patient work flows and time spent in specific activity zones would require to be
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determined by prolonged periods of observation. There is increased focus within this model on the
role of the doctor in managing the patient rather in the role of the nurse to provide care. Again, there
is an intrinsic component of ‘risk’ within the physical design of such departments.
1.2 Cardiac Intensive Care
Within University Hospital, Coventry, Cardiac Surgery utilises dedicated high dependency facilities
within a specific 16 bedded Cardiac Intensive Care. Typical case mix will include heart bypass and
valve surgery of various types. The operation of this unit will reflect high throughput value with
reduced length of stay where admissions are dominated by planned surgery streamed from a
dedicated set of cardiac theatres. The scope of interventions will reflect a reduction in requirement of
ventilated episodes and a narrower range of administered medications and nursing/clinical
interventions. Within this facility at University Hospital, Coventry, there is no implementation of the
QS system which is utilised within the main Critical Care unit, so characterisation of the model of
admission/discharge episodes and the nature of interventions would require the employment of
alternative methods.
1.3 Surgical Ward
While the same ‘risk engine’ system would be applicable, the internal representation of the model
would reflect key structural changes in both the nature of interventions and the allocation of clinical
staffing resources. Structuring risk clinical risk simulation in this environment would require extensive
periods of direct observation to accumulate a representative series of patient care episodes which
could in turn be used to simulate long time sequences of associated patient care. In general patients
would be less intensively treated but with increased variations in the level of resources (e.g. clinical
staffing) available. Elements of physical layout of clinical areas would also impact on risk factors
relating to sharing of competency, supervision and levels of distraction. One of the complexities of
the model simulation would be to actively locate clinical staff within the clinical area and identify
interactions which took place between staff members. Processes of specific importance would
include those of admission and discharge, where transfer and communication of key elements of
patient information would have a significant effect on patient management.
1.4 Simulations of Models of Continuity of Care
This identification of the levels of complexity associated with this research indicate that further
development of such research should be primarily focused within quantification of the clinical activity
experienced by patients in order to more appropriately match the patterns of Clinical Adverse Events
with the simulated patterns of adverse effects. This identifies an extension of the concept within the
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discipline of clinical risk management of virtual patient simulation where initially simulation of activity
relates to a specific ‘micro environment’ such as Critical Care or Accident and Emergency. In the
wider scenario, however, it becomes relevant to simulate patient ‘pathways’ as a sequence of
episodes across specific ‘micro environments’ as indicated in figure A7.1 and where specific
interactions are also associated with entry to the care process, transitions between micro
environments and the exist from the care process.
Figure A7.1. Structure of patient pathway which indicates linked sequences of care within ‘micro
environments’.
This current research describes risk simulation within a specific ‘micro environment’ of a Critical Care
Unit, though a more comprehensive model would include entire patient care pathways. In such an
expanded approach, each ‘micro environment’ would require structuring of its own specific risk
simulation model. Such an expanded approach would also require extensive implementation of
‘handover effects’ within the patient journey.
In the context of the quality of care delivered within a health system, the trend has been to focus on
the competence and training of the health professional ‘at the cutting edge’ of care. Examples would
include the anaesthetist maintaining patient equilibrium during surgery, the surgeon undertaking
surgery, the nurse in Critical Care administering intravenous infusions or the ophthalmologist treating
a patient with a laser. It is all too obvious, however, that many of the risks within a healthcare system
relate to processes which initiate, direct, manage and review the patient ‘pathway’ and which may not
directly involve clinicians.
Such processes would structure the initial patient referral, review by a medic, identification of
treatment, delivery of treatment and subsequent follow up. This process can be identified as a
sequence of interventions within separate ‘micro systems’ which manage the patient treatment
‘pathway’ as indicated in figure A7.1 Failure within these facilitating functions, however, can result in
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